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Abstract 
Cyberspace has become one of the new frontiers for countries to demonstrate 
their power to survive in the digitized world. The UAE has become a major target for 
cyber conflicts due to the rapid increase in economic activity and technology. 
Further, the widespread use of internet in the region to the tune of 88% by the end of 
2014 has exposed the critical infrastructure to all forms of cyber threats. 
In this dissertation, the researcher presents a detailed study of the existing 
cybersecurity defences globally and an investigation into the factors that influence 
effectiveness of cybersecurity defences in Abu Dhabi government entities. Further, 
the role of cybersecurity education, training and awareness in enhancing 
effectiveness of cybersecurity and the role of senior management in providing 
strategic direction to government entities on cybersecurity are evaluated in addition 
to determining the contribution of strategic planning and technology level in ensuring 
an effective cybersecurity system. 
The study has evaluated the level of Cybersecurity Effectiveness (CSE) in 
Abu Dhabi Government Entities and the results show that Science and Technology 
entity performed better than all other Entities with CSE Mean = 4.37 while Public 
Order showed the least performance with CSE Mean = 3.83 and the combined model 
of six factors with R-square value 0.317 after multiple regression implying that 32% 
change in CSE in the government entities is occurring due to the six (6) independent 
variables used in the study. Further, results show that management has the 
responsibility of putting in place strategies, frameworks and policies that respond 
appropriately to the prevention, detection and mitigation of cyberattacks. Results 
viii 
 
 
 
further indicate that culture sensitive training and awareness programmes add to the 
quality and effectiveness of cybersecurity systems in government entities. 
Further, study findings reveal that qualified and experienced personnel in 
government entities show greater understanding of cyber and information security 
issues.  Finally, the researcher proposes a cybersecurity framework and a checklist, 
with checkpoints, for evaluating the effectiveness of cybersecurity systems within 
government entities and future research interventions. 
Keywords: Cyberspace, cybersecurity system, cybersecurity checklist, cybersecurity 
effectiveness (CSE). 
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 )cibarA ni( tcartsbA dna eltiT
 إطار لتقييم مدى فعالية الأمن الإلكتروني في الجهات الحكومية بإمارة أبوظبي
 الملخص
أصبح الفضاء الإلكتروني واحدا ًمن المجالات الجديدة التي تستغلها الدول لإظهار قوتها 
 الإمارات العربية المتحدة هدفا ًرئيسياً دولة وقد أصبحت  ،تها على البقاء في العالم الرقميوقدر
إضافة  ،نشاط الاقتصادي والتكنولوجي فيهاللصراعات الإلكترونية بسبب الارتفاع السريع في ال
% بحسب 88إلى هذا، ساهم الاستخدام الواسع للإنترنت في المنطقة، والذي وصل إلى 
، في تعريض البنية التحتية الحيوية إلى كافة أشكال التهديدات 2014إحصائيات عام 
 الإلكترونية. 
 
هذه الأطروحة يقدم الباحث دراسة مفصلة حول دفاعات الأمن الإلكتروني الموجودة في 
حالياً حول العالم ويحقق في العوامل التي تؤثر على فاعلية دفاعات الأمن الإلكتروني لدى 
الجهات الحكومية في أبو ظبي. إضافة إلى هذا، يعمل الباحث في هذه الدراسة على تقييم دور 
والتدريب، والتوعية في مجال الأمن الإلكتروني في تعزيز فاعلية الأمن جهود التثقيف، 
الإلكتروني وكذلك دور الإدارة العليا في توفير توجيه استراتيجي للجهات الحكومية حول 
موضوع الأمن الإلكتروني، إلى جانب تحديد مساهمة التخطيط الاستراتيجي ومستوى 
 ام الأمن الإلكتروني.التكنولوجيا في ضمان كفاءة وفاعلية نظ
 
قامت الدراسة بتقييم مستوى فاعلية الأمن الإلكتروني لدى الجهات الحكومية في أبو 
قدمت أداًء أفضل من كافة الجهات  ةوالتكنولوجي ميةالعل الجهاتظبي وأظهرت النتائج أن 
أقل ، في حين حقق قطاع النظام العام 73.4الأخرى بمتوسط فاعلية أمن إلكتروني مقداره 
بالإضافة إلى النموذج المكون من ستة عوامل  38.3بمتوسط فاعلية أمن إلكتروني مقداره 
% من التغيير في فاعلية 42بعد انحدار متعدد أشار إلى أن ما نسبته  713.0بمعامل تحديد 
) المستخدمة في 6الأمن الإلكتروني لدى الجهات الحكومية ناتج عن المتغيرات المستقلة الستة (
راسة. إلى جانب ذلك، تظهر النتائج أن الإدارة تتحمل مسؤولية تنفيذ استراتيجيات، وأطر الد
عمل، وسياسات تستجيب بشكل مناسب لعمليات الوقاية من الهجمات الإلكترونية وكشفها 
 x
 
 
 
والتخفيف من آثارها. كما تُشير النتائج إلى أن برامج التدريب والتوعية القائمة على الثقافة 
 تعزيز جودة وفاعلية أنظمة الأمن الإلكتروني لدى الجهات الحكومية. تساهم في 
 
كما تُظهر نتائج الدراسة أن الموظفين المؤهلين ذوي الخبرة العاملين لدى الجهات 
الحكومية لديهم قدرة أكبر على فهم مشاكل وقضايا أمن الإنترنت والمعلومات مقارنة بغيرهم. 
إطار عمل وقائمة تحقق خاصة بموضوع الأمن الإلكتروني وفي نهاية الدراسة يقدم الباحث 
 بهدف تقييم فاعلية أنظمة الأمن الإلكتروني لدى الجهات الحكومية والجهود البحثية المستقبلية. 
 
وني، قائمة التحقق الخاصة الأمن الالكتروني، نظام الأمن الإلكتر مفاهيم البحث الرئيسية:
 .الإدارة الاستراتيجية، الإلكتروني تروني، فاعلية الأمنالإلك بالأمن
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Overview  
           This chapter provides an insight into the study concerning the identification of 
factors that influence or affect cybersecurity effectiveness in Abu Dhabi government 
entities. After an initial review of the literature, it is revealed that lack of 
cybersecurity effectiveness presents a management problem that needs critical 
attention (Kritzinger and Von Solms, 2010; Al Bawaba, 2012; and Rotvold, 2008). 
This critical literature review together with the researcher’s professional experience 
in the practice of cyber and information security in the region made it possible to 
identify several management problems and the research gaps that justify the research 
topic, which would allow further analysis and the identification of key strategies to 
close these gaps. In this chapter, the research problem is illustrated followed by lists 
of the study objectives and underlying research questions. The remaining part of the 
chapter contains a brief discussion of the research variables, presentation of the 
research hypotheses, an estimate of the study’s significance, overview of the research 
limitations and delimitations, presentation of terms of interest and finally a 
discussion of the outline of the dissertation. The outline of this chapter is indicated in 
the Figure 1 below. 
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1.2 Research Background 
The Middle East and the whole world have witnessed an increase in 
cyberattacks on critical infrastructure, especially on such financial and energy sectors 
as banks and major oil firms (Saeed et al., 2014). These attacks have targeted major 
national security symbols, for instance, military and law enforcement departments. 
Preventing such attacks is a management issue that requires critical government 
attention and senior management support requiring high levels of understanding and 
knowledge. Furthermore, cybercrime has been cited as an escalating threat to the 
economies of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries and their plans for 
digital transformation as well as the creation of smart cities. Therefore, failure to 
tackle the issue would impede the strategic development of the region if adequate 
policies are not formed and legal frameworks across member states are not more 
fully developed (Hakmer, 2017). 
The latest emerging trends reveal that by the year 2020 over 25 billion 
devices will be connected globally and this Internet of Things (IoT) block chain will 
bring out the security challenges and cyber risks inherent in these technologies 
(KPMG Report, 2017). In spite of this, the report reveals that globally the numbers of 
skilled cybersecurity professionals are meagre to overcome these threats. 
Additionally, the Emirate of Dubai is working steadily towards achieving smart city 
status by the year 2020, which requires engagement in smart policies and 
frameworks for cyber defence such as tabling cybersecurity as a key stakeholder 
smart defence policy for the UAE through the creation of enough knowledge to 
assess cyberattacks (Efthymiopoulos and Christopher, 2014). This seems an 
additional justification for the present study.  
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Moreover, many global industrial cyberattacks have successfully defeated 
technological security solutions through preying on human weaknesses in knowledge 
and skills, and the manipulation of insiders within organizations into unsuspectingly 
delivering entry and access to critical organizational assets (Uchenna et al., 2016). 
This ever-expanding knowledge gap on cyber and information security issues among 
organizational managers and employees in different organizations justifies a study 
that will explore strategies for cybersecurity training, awareness and education in 
Abu Dhabi government entities.  
Since cyber-criminal activities can be initiated anywhere in the world to 
target organizations within the UAE and neighbouring GCC states, it is difficult to 
control the number or sophistication of such attempts. However, senior management 
has the responsibility of putting in place strategies and structures in response to these 
attacks. In addition, the UAE is expected to double its cybersecurity budget to $10 
billion within the next decade to bolster cybersecurity defences. 
While this study is limited in scope to Abu Dhabi government entities, the 
results may easily be applicable to private sector organizations as well. As the 
cybersecurity effectiveness of government agencies is critical to the maintenance of 
services to the public, the researcher intends through this study to propose framework 
that can be used by management not only to evaluate how effective current measures 
are but also to prevent attacks that emanate from the internet. This framework was 
developed after a thorough review of the current literature that identified several 
variables. These include the competence of information security staff, effective user 
training programmes; effective user awareness programmes; presence of 
cybersecurity strategic plans and the type of technology deployed.  
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1.3 Research Problem 
Over recent years, cyberattacks and threats have become a major problem 
facing a number of countries. The UAE in particular has become a major target for 
cyberattacks, due to the rapid increase in its economic activity, technological 
advances and the rise of the oil, gas and energy sectors (Andrew and Gotz, 2013). 
Furthermore, the extensive use of the internet in the region to the tune of 88% of the 
population by the end of 2014 has exposed the critical national assets vulnerable and 
left the prevailing cybersecurity defences and critical government infrastructure at 
the mercy of sophisticated cyberattacks. To mention a few of them, the destinations 
of such attacks include Saudi Arabia and Qatar in 2012 and 2013 respectively and 
the Iranian Green revolution in 2009 (Saeed et al., 2014; Cressey and Hayfer, 2012).  
In order for residents and citizens to access e-government services, the UAE 
government has required each person to own an Emirates Identity card comprising an 
electronic chip embedded with key information about him/her (Al-Khouri et al., 
2011; Al-Khouri, 2012). This card is necessary to access important services across 
the country. While it has been designed to ensure the confidentiality, integrity and 
availability of information for the user, it cannot guarantee that the existing 
cybersecurity defences will not be compromised by any attacker’s tactics. A number 
of strategies have been devised to resolve cybersecurity issues globally. For instance, 
the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) presented a cybersecurity 
framework for critical infrastructure in February, 2014, after the declaration of 
President Barack Obama’s Executive Order 13636 of 2013, to formulate a 
framework that would harmonize consensus and standard industry best practices to 
provide a flexible and cost effective approach to enhancing cybersecurity 
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(Shackelford et al., 2014 and Shen, 2014).  
The NIST framework proposes technological functions to resolve cyber 
threats through identification, protection, detection, response and recovery from 
cyberattacks. Despite these technological precautions, intruders may break into 
existing security systems by concentrating on their weakest link, the uninformed 
users who lack the basic cybersecurity training and awareness programmes that 
would equip them for newer forms of attack. Meanwhile, NESA issued new cyber-
crime legislation for the UAE in 2012, with a major focus on defending against 
military attacks and critical infrastructure. However, it is uncertain how many 
government entities across the world have incorporated similar laws in their strategic 
planning processes, policies and operations. Therefore, a study to identify the factors 
that influence or affect the cybersecurity effectiveness of Abu Dhabi’s government 
entities can be justified. 
1.4 Objectives of the Study 
The overall objective of the study is to identify the factors that influence or 
affect the cybersecurity effectiveness of Abu Dhabi’s government entities and to 
propose a framework and a checklist that can be used to evaluate the effectiveness of 
their existing cybersecurity defences. 
1.4.1 Specific Objectives 
To achieve the overall goal of the study and to enable the researcher to address 
individual areas of concern, the research is specifically intended to investigate and 
determine:   
i. The factors that contribute to the cybersecurity effectiveness of Abu 
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Dhabi government entities. 
ii. The role of management in the prevention of cyberattacks in Abu Dhabi 
government entities. 
iii. The role of training and awareness in the prevention of cyberattacks in  
Abu Dhabi government entities;  
iv. The role of the technology level in the prevention of cyberattacks in Abu 
Dhabi government entities. 
1.5 Research Questions  
This section discusses the research questions and hypotheses that form the 
foundation for this study.  
1.5.1 Research Questions 
Since the Abu Dhabi government continues to invest and depend on e-
government services, several questions can be raised. In this research, the researcher 
raises and investigates the following questions, as the basis for this study: 
i. How effective are the existing cybersecurity defenses in stopping 
cyberattacks and response to breaches?  
ii. To what extent does senior management support the establishment and 
implementation of cybersecurity defense strategies?    
iii. Are the existing information security professionals in government entities 
well qualified and experienced to detect and stop cyberattacks?  
iv. How effective are the implemented staff training programs in various 
departments?   
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v. Does cybersecurity strategic planning contribute to organizational 
cybersecurity effectiveness? 
vi. How effective are the existing user awareness programmes in various 
departments? 
1.5.2 Research Variables 
 In order to conduct this study, several variables have been identified as 
necessary for developing a robust framework for cybersecurity effectiveness. 
Cybersecurity effectiveness in an organization is made up of all the technologies, 
processes, procedures, policies, strategies and personnel that work together with the 
sole purpose of preventing cyberattacks from doing damage and responding to any 
threats against its information systems. Cybersecurity effectiveness is considered the 
dependent variable in this study. In order for the cybersecurity of any organization to 
become effective, the study theorizes that the conditions forming the independent 
variable are met as discussed below. 
First, there has to be evidence of senior management support. Evidence of 
senior management support includes the presence of a senior officer at the rank of 
Chief Information Officer (CIO) or Chief Information Security Officer (CISO) with 
well-defined authority on information security matters in the organization and the 
presence of cybersecurity strategic plans for the entire organization or department. 
Further, this person must have demonstrated an understanding of cybersecurity 
matters in the organization through the deployment of well-qualified information 
security teams, supplemented by on-going continued-education programmes; 
implementation of effective policies and procedures; training and awareness 
programmes and deployment of appropriate technologies for all users; and adoption 
9 
 
 
 
by the organization of international best practices, (Kritzinger and Von Solms, 2010; 
Al Bawaba, 2012; Nigel and Rice, 2011). 
 Operationally, senior management support can be demonstrated in several 
ways. In a government department that takes cybersecurity seriously, the day-to-day 
operations of issues related to cybersecurity are governed by clear and well-
articulated policies and procedures. These policies and procedures govern the 
behaviour of those who use the organization’s information systems. The policies 
developed and implemented may range from those relating to email, internet use, 
password strength, mobile computing devices, to such issues as access, the 
distribution and destruction of documents, visitor management, etc. Employee 
awareness of these policies and procedures is a strong indication that the 
organization has an effective cybersecurity programme, (Knapp, 2009; Herath and 
Rao, 2009; Kritzinger and Smith, 2008; Rotvold, 2008; and Frank et al., 2008) 
Second, further evidence that cybersecurity matters are taken seriously by the 
organization can be shown by the presence of cybersecurity strategic plans. Well 
thought out strategic plans are distributed and properly diffused throughout the 
organization and can be described by the senior staff who are responsible for matters 
of information security. These plans act as guides for the development of policies 
and procedures, training and awareness programmes, (Elbanna, 2010; Grant, 2003; 
Dutton and Duncan, 1987; and Andrew, 2014). 
The third independent variable is the presence in the organization of 
competent information security staff. Evidence for this includes the possession of 
academic and industry certifications in the cybersecurity/information security 
domain. Moreover, there has to be strong evidence of continuing reminders that 
cyber-threat is an ever-changing phenomenon. Awareness of trends in the domain, 
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including a knowledge of the current threats, tools and techniques used by cyber-
criminals, vulnerabilities in the organization’s infrastructure, and the mitigation 
strategies used are clear evidence of the seriousness of the agency regarding 
cybersecurity. Additionally, these personnel should exhibit deep understanding and 
commitment to cybersecurity policies and procedures, (Rowe et al., 2011 and Cisco, 
2017 and Siponen et al., 2014). 
 Fourth, the organization should conduct effective and culturally sensitive 
staff training programmes for all its employees; and fifth, it should carry out 
adequate number of user awareness programmes. Effective training and awareness 
programmes are comprehensive, measurable and regular. An organization that is 
serious about cybersecurity needs to put great emphasis on training and awareness 
programmes conducted by knowledgeable individuals for all users in the 
organization at set intervals during the year. For these training programmes to be 
effective, they should be culturally relevant to the audience. Further, measurements 
and evaluations should be used to determine the effectiveness of the training and the 
measures taken to improve them, (Greitzer et al., 2007; Pfleeger and Caputo, 2012; 
McCrohan, 2010; Hight, 2005; Kruger et al., 2011; Siponen, 2000; Da Veiga and 
Eloff, 2010; and Aloul et al., 2012) 
 The sixth and final independent variable is the level of technology. It is 
believed that government entities that have invested in modern cybersecurity 
technologies demonstrate their understanding of cybersecurity risks. There are many 
kinds of software and hardware technology already deployed by Abu Dhabi’s 
government entities. The most common technologies used globally include different 
forms of firewall, data encryption, anti-malware, anti-spyware and anti-virus 
scanners, among others. For these tools to be effective, the human element that 
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supports and maintains these systems cannot be ignored, since most of these systems 
have limitations. From these variables, the following hypotheses are derived for 
testing, (Symantec 2016; Hunter, 2013; Choo, 2011; Aloul, 2010; Knapp, 2009; and 
Uchenna et al., 2016) among others. 
1.6 Significance of the Study  
                 The main purpose of this study is to identify the factors that influence or 
affect the cybersecurity effectiveness of Abu Dhabi’s government entities and 
propose a framework as well as a checklist that can be used to evaluate the 
effectiveness of their existing cybersecurity defences. Such a framework and 
checklist could be standardized further to provide a benchmark or baseline measure 
of cybersecurity effectiveness in many public and private sector organizations. The 
researcher investigates the factors that contribute to cybersecurity effectiveness from 
both the literature and practice to provide a wider context for the subject. These 
factors are then collated into a framework that could easily be applied by the senior 
management of such departments to measure their readiness to defend them against 
attacks and also respond to attacks should they occur. This is important because 
society, specifically UAE society, continues to depend on government services that 
are accessible by information systems such as the internet. Any failure of such 
systems due to cyber-attack will negatively impact government services ranging 
from the immigration services at airports, visa processing for professionals and the 
routine issue or renewal of drivers’ licenses to the disruption of critical national 
infrastructure, such as electricity, telecommunications and banking.   
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1.7 Scope of the Study  
  In this study, a critical review of the literature regarding cyber and 
information security mechanisms in the UAE, the GCC countries and globally is 
conducted. Emphasis has been put on identifying the factors needed to evaluate the 
effectiveness of cybersecurity defences in Abu Dhabi’s government entities with a 
broad global perspective in mind. The role of senior management in the design and 
implementation of appropriate cyber and information security strategic plans, 
policies, training and awareness programmes is looked into. Further checks on the 
numbers (if any) of competent cyber and information security professionals in Abu 
Dhabi’s government entities are needed, as a first step in mitigating the cybersecurity 
problem. Additionally, an investigation of the importance of cybersecurity training 
and awareness programmes in the prevention of cyberattacks has been critically 
pursued. Finally, a framework and checklist are proposed that could be used to assess 
the effectiveness of cybersecurity defences for Abu Dhabi’s government entities. 
 
1.8 Justifications for the Research 
Cyberattacks on critical National Infrastructure have grown in complexity 
globally over the recent years with a focus on the United Arab Emirates, ( Saeed et 
al., 2014 and Neuneck and Weizmann, 2013) with recent trends showing a 42% 
increase in global cyberattacks by the end of 2015 (Symantec, 2016).  Additionally, 
global attacks have successfully defeated existing technological solutions by 
exploiting human weaknesses within organizations due to ever increasing knowledge 
gaps in Cyber and Information security (Uchenna et al., 2016). Further, the Abu 
Dhabi Government continues to depend on e-government platforms such the 
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Emirates ID to enhance service delivery, however, the drawback to such a system 
could be the attraction of more sophisticated attacks from multiple sources of the 
world especially from those who may want to exploit the same platform for personal 
gains and so seriously cripple government services that range from, immigration 
services at airports, visa processing for experts, routine issuing or renewal of driver’s 
licenses to disruption of critical national infrastructures such as electricity, 
telecommunications and banking (Shackelford et al., 2014 and Shen, 2014).  
Therefore, with the above input from available literature and consultations 
with subject matter experts in Abu Dhabi government, a study is required to develop 
a non-technology based framework as well as checklist for evaluating cybersecurity 
effectiveness of Abu Dhabi’s government entities hence justifying the reason for 
conducting this study. 
1.9 Research Limitations and Delimitations  
1.9.1 Research Limitations 
Limitations are potential weaknesses or constraints in a study out of the 
researcher’s control that could affect the outcome of the study. This study was 
conducted with the following limitations: 
i. Though cybersecurity is a global challenge that affects public and private 
organizations, this study is limited to Abu Dhabi’s government entities with 
participations from the users, administrators, ICT management and senior 
management  
ii. The study concentrates on the effectiveness of the existing cybersecurity 
strategies and frameworks employed within these government entities. A 
census study approach was taken to gather the research findings about these 
14 
 
 
 
entities but the study results cannot be generalized to other sectors of the 
emirate, such the private sector. 
iii. Though many studies have been conducted on cybersecurity globally, little 
has been surveyed in the UAE, especially regarding government entities. This 
study draws on the few empirical studies that have centred on the Emirate and 
also on global contributions in the area of cyber and information security to 
generate the theoretical foundation and hypotheses for the study. 
1.9.2 Research Delimitations  
This study on cybersecurity effectiveness within the Abu Dhabi’s government 
entities is based on a series of hypotheses grounded on literature, practice and related 
theory. The implementation of the proposed framework and cybersecurity checklist 
is not considered to be within the scope of the study. Furthermore, as highlighted by 
Birtwhistle and his team (2002), survey instruments are distributed with time 
constraints limiting the possibility of maximum response rates. Moreover, the study 
was limited to a population of 535 respondents from Abu Dhabi’s government 
entities. 
1.10 Definition of terms of interest 
In this study, some interesting terms were encountered frequently and are 
applied in several of its discussions. Some of these terms may be defined as follows: 
i. Cybersecurity 
Cybersecurity involves the organization and collection of resources, 
processes and structures used to protect the cyberspace and cyberspace 
enabled systems from occurrences that are mis-aligned from de facto 
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property rights (Craigen et al., 2014). 
ii. Cyberspace 
Cyberspace comprises networks, computer hardware, software and other 
devices capable of storing and exchanging information across borders 
(Kritzinger and Smith, 2008; Obama, 2009). 
iii. Cyber threat 
The possibility of a malicious attempt to damage or disrupt a computer 
network or system. 
iv. Cybersecurity Framework 
A platform for measuring or evaluating how well a security system 
operates. Such frameworks can be used for measuring and or mitigating 
the risks involved in cyberattacks on a country’s critical infrastructure 
(National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Cybersecurity 
Report, 2014). 
v. Training and Awareness Programmes 
This represents formal programmes designed for educating employees of 
an organization about existing global, national or organizational issues, 
such as cyber and information security, corporate policies and procedures. 
vi. Role of Management 
The overall responsibilities of management operate through functions 
such as planning, organizing, staffing, directing, monitoring and control 
to address the critical issues pertaining to an organization, for example, 
cybersecurity issues. 
vii. Technology 
The application of science and use of practical as well as intellectual 
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resources to develop systems and products that address organization-wide 
problems. 
viii. Cybersecurity effectiveness 
Effective response to global and national cybersecurity challenges. 
ix. Experience 
Experience in this context refers to the knowledge or maturity of a subject 
gained through involvement or exposure leading to the acquisition of 
relevant skills over a period of time. 
x. Strategic Planning 
Refers to an organization’s process of defining its strategy or direction to 
allow the efficient allocation of resources. 
xi. Qualification of users 
Denotes the fitness for purpose of users shown by their fulfilment of all 
the necessary conditions, for example, completion of the required skills-
based training or academic level. 
xii. Assets 
 In the context of this study, assets represent any organization’s 
information resources that could be subjected to cyberattacks for example 
all forms of data, software, hardware, networks and utility programs that 
require monitoring in terms of Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability. 
xiii. Critical Infrastructure 
Represents all sectors whose assets are very vital to the UAE’s national 
security. Destruction or attacks on such sectors would pause a devastating 
effect on national security and economic drawback. Examples of UAE 
Critical Infrastructure includes the communications sector, the Energy 
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sector (Oil and Gas sector), International Airports, Transportation systems 
among others. 
1.11 Outline of the Dissertation 
This dissertation has been organized into five major chapters arranged as 
follows.  Chapter One introduces the study on cybersecurity globally and in the 
United Arab Emirates (UAE) in particular. A research problem is defined which is 
grounded on the fact that the UAE has become a target for many cyberattacks in the 
region, as a result of the ever increasing numbers of technologies, economic 
activities and people connected to the internet. The broader goal of the study is to 
propose a framework and checklist for the evaluation of cybersecurity effectiveness 
in Abu Dhabi’s government entities. Keeping in mind the goal of the study, the 
following specific and measureable objectives emerge in this chapter: 1) examining 
the factors contributing to an effective cybersecurity system; and 2)   setting research 
questions and hypotheses. Hypotheses are developed to build a comprehensive 
theoretical framework and underlie the quantitative analysis of this study. In parallel, 
the importance of this study is defined and a summary of the entire thesis is offered. 
In Chapter Two, the literature from several existing studies, journals, and 
published conference papers among others concerning the subject matter is reviewed. 
The researcher examines the cyber threat landscape, defining stages of a typical 
cyberattack and a cyber-forensic cycle. Moreover, the chapter considers the most 
recent cyberattacks in the region and globally, such as the Saudi Aramco and Stuxnet 
worm of 2009 (Cressey and Hayfer, 2012; Pepitone, 2011; and Symantec, 2013) 
among others, as notable references. Furthermore, the literature on existing global 
cybersecurity frameworks and strategies are reviewed to provide a strong foundation 
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for this study, the research design and formulation of the security framework 
(Burgers et al., 2013; Nambiro et al., 2014; NIST, 2014; and Abraham and Nair, 
2015), among others. Additionally, the chapter elaborates the role of strategic 
planning, technology and cybersecurity legislation in the UAE and the GCC 
countries (Choo, 2011; Cisco, 2017; Hunter, 2013; Aloul et al., 2012; Elbana, 2010; 
Grant, 2003, Liedtka, 2000; and Gercke, 2014) are some of the notable references. In 
addition, the researcher reviews challenges to the effectiveness of cybersecurity 
defences globally and seek to provide an insight into some of the solutions to address 
these challenges. Examination of the role of cybersecurity training, awareness and 
education in the prevention of cyberattacks is assessed in detail and the role of the 
culture in the understanding of cyber and information security issues pertaining to an 
organisation is looked into (Siponen, 2000; Kritzinger and Smith, 2008; Rezgui and 
Marks, 2008; Kalberg and Bhavani, 2012; Vroom and Solms, 2004; and Leach, 
2003), among others.  Finally, after a critical review of other study contributions, the 
researcher identifies six study hypotheses to guide further analysis and a research gap 
that formulates the basis for further investigation and analysis. 
Chapter Three presents the methodological approach undertaken to address 
the research questions and study hypotheses. A detailed discussion of the research 
strategy, tools and the research design is presented. The chapter further presents 
various tests conducted to validate and ensure the reliability of the research 
instrument, which include the presentation of the instrument to subject-matter 
experts, reliability statistics involving the examination of values of Cronbach’s alpha 
for all the predefined constructs, and principal component factor analysis against the 
research hypotheses to examine the factor loading scores. In the same chapter, 
previously existing frameworks such as NIST for assessing cybersecurity 
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effectiveness are scrutinized (Tin, 2010). This scrutiny as well as the theoretical 
foundation grounded from literature review contributed to the formation of the 
proposed framework for the evaluation of cybersecurity effectiveness of the Abu 
Dhabi’s government entities. Finally, the study analysis tool and justification for 
choosing it is briefly discussed, together with a description of the pilot survey 
conducted on a midsized organization in Abu Dhabi. In the conclusion of the chapter, 
study limitations and ethical issues are discussed. 
In Chapter Four can be found the data analysis and study results including the 
method of analysis, reliability and validity checks, demographic statistical results, 
and correlation results are presented. Finally, Chapter Five discusses the research 
contributions, presents a checklist for cybersecurity assessment with the aid of key 
check points to evaluate the effectiveness and readiness of a department’s 
cybersecurity programme and suggests recommendations as well as directions for 
future research.  
1.12 Conclusion 
Grounded on the primary review of literature and the researcher’s 
professional experience in the practice for a period of over 17 years, problems were 
identified concerning cybersecurity effectiveness from a management perspective. 
Further, the research problem and research gaps were identified for further analysis, 
the research questions and variables for the study were also presented. In this way, 
the researcher argued to fill these gaps fulfilled by the present study. The main 
research contributions were consequently established. A general outline of the 
research dissertation was added, to provide insight into the research study, analysis 
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and findings. The next chapter presents a detailed review of literature related to the 
study. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, problems affecting the cybersecurity effectiveness of 
organizations and factors that seemed to contribute to organizational cybersecurity 
effectiveness were proposed for this study. In this chapter, the researcher presents the 
research hypotheses showing the different study relationships examined, further a 
critical review of literature on the factors for evaluating the cybersecurity 
effectiveness of Abu Dhabi’s government entities is conducted as a basis for the 
theory behind the research study and to identify gaps for further investigation. 
Specifically this chapter is divided into seven sections with each successive section 
narrowing down the ideas to reveal the gaps that exist and the possible ways of 
filling them. In section one, an overview of the cyber-threat landscape is presented 
and various terminologies relating to cybersecurity are defined. It considers the view 
that cybersecurity is a management issue that requires well-defined senior 
management approaches. The impact of cybercrime on organizational performance is 
highlighted in this section. Further, the most recent trends and research relating to 
cybersecurity threats, defences, and training and awareness programmes developed 
around the world are examined. These provide a wide view of the research problem 
and hence an insight into the factors that can be proposed for the evaluation of 
cybersecurity in Abu Dhabi’s government entities.  
Section two looks at the role of Qualifications and Experience (the 
competence of staff) in building an effective cybersecurity programme for an 
organization. Meanwhile, section three examines the role of management in the 
prevention of cyberattacks while section four discusses the common types of 
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technology and their role in cyber-crime prevention. In section five the role of staff 
training of n the prevention of cyberattacks against an organization is presented. 
 Section six looks at strategic planning and cybersecurity effectiveness. In 
this section, the use of strategic planning tools in addressing uncertain conditions is 
emphasized. Section seven discusses the role of cybersecurity user awareness 
programmes, followed by a discussion of the regulatory issues and various 
cybersecurity frameworks. The literature review chapter ends with an overview of 
the existing research gaps for further investigation in this study. The design of this 
chapter is illustrated in Figure 2 below. 
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                                       Figure 2: Design of Chapter Two   
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2.2 The Cyber Threat Landscape 
The present information age has brought many advantages to society, from 
ease of access to services through Internet enabled devices to communication and 
collaboration over long distances. The UAE Government in particular increasingly 
depends on the power of the Internet to provide services to the people and to other 
governments across the globe (Al-Khouri, 2012). Most financial institutions charge 
extra fees for services provided over the counter, as the expectation is that customers 
should access the same services easily online. This dependency on the information 
infrastructure has brought new and dangerous risks (Kritzinger and Von Solms, 
2010).   
Although the Internet has brought new opportunities to society, it has also 
brought new opportunities to others whose goals are to exploit inbuilt weaknesses 
through cyberattacks (Choo, 2011).  A cyber-attack can be defined simply as “any 
crime that employs a computer network in any phase of the crime” (Kshetri, 2005). 
Senior management’s understanding of the cyber threat landscape is critical to 
government operations as a necessary step in developing corrective and preventive 
measures. The importance of national cybersecurity strategies was captured in a 
speech by President Obama in 2009. He remarked: 
 
“This world cyberspace is a world that we depend on every single day. It is 
our hardware and our software, our desktops and laptops and cell phones and 
Blackberries that have become woven into every aspect of our lives. It is the 
broadband networks beneath us and the wireless signals around us, the local 
networks in our schools and hospitals and businesses, and the massive grids 
that power our nation. It is the classified military and intelligence networks 
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that keep us safe, and the World Wide Web that has made us more 
interconnected than at any time in human history. So cyberspace is real and 
so are the risks that come with it. It is the great irony of our information age, 
the very technologies that empower us to create and to build those who would 
disrupt and destroy. And this paradox seen and unseen is something that we 
experience every day”, (Obama, 2009). 
 
Numerous attacks, for example, malware, phishing, corrupted programs, 
password manipulation, computer session hijacking, denial of service among others, 
have increased greatly in the UAE and the GCC in recent years. Examples of such 
attacks include the August, 2012 attack that affected ARAMCO, the major oil and 
gas company in Saudi Arabia, the Stuxnet worm of 2009 which targeted the 
Programmable Logical Controllers (PLC) of the Iranian nuclear industry, the Lulzec 
Sony pictures attack that seized the bio data of many people (Cressey and Hayfer, 
2012; Pepitone, 2011), the Shamoon Virus that infected over thirty thousand 
(30,000) stations and destroyed business processes for almost a week, among others. 
These ever increasing information security vulnerabilities in vital or critical 
government infrastructure and industrial data can partially be attributed to the large 
amounts of data moving into data centres, increased numbers of mobile subscribers 
and massive Internet connectivity in the GCC region amounting to 88% by the end of 
June 2014. 
Furthermore, Cressey and Hayfer (2012) argue that real time threats are more 
sophisticated and so require continuous monitoring by government and all other 
stakeholders due to the massive threat to data and proprietary information. Much as 
governments try to keep pace with these threats, they have not integrated their 
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security strategies to provide a more complex solution to cyberattacks. These ever-
increasing information security threats call for the development of complex 
cybersecurity defences for Abu Dhabi’s government entities, the UAE and the entire 
GCC region.  
Aloul et al. (2012) have looked at the security concerns of the UAE 
traditional electrical power grid which will soon evolve into a smart Grid system. 
They analyze the vulnerabilities and debate the current and needed security solutions. 
Power Grids normally face attacks on intelligent devices and physical connections 
attacks such as IP spoofing and denial of service attacks. Therefore, if the UAE grid 
fell under a cyber-attack it would pose great danger and loss to the government and 
the entire economy. Furthermore, Kwangjo and Kaist (2012) stress that nuclear 
power plants are very important infrastructure for providing efficient and 
uninterrupted electricity and so require continuous government vigilance and 
protection. The use of such digitized systems brings new vulnerabilities and threats 
over cyber space due to the unbroken dependence on software and networks. 
Therefore, there is need to develop security frameworks that would provide 
guidelines or checklists to users of such critical infrastructure in the UAE’s 
government entities.  
At the same time Assante and Tobey (2011) provide an insight into educating 
the cybersecurity workforce by proposing the need to devise ways of producing 
competent information security professionals who can build, manage and secure 
reliable digital infrastructures as well as effectively identifying plans for such threats. 
They present a model for developing the next generation of cyber workers which 
combines assessments, simulations, customization and support systems. However, 
their model suitability to Abu Dhabi’s government departmental setup may not be 
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assured, since it was found to be less effective for interconnected networks. There is 
need to build a framework which can aid the robust UAE interconnected network 
systems to enable joint detection and control cyber threats; this is the major 
contribution of this dissertation. 
The United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research report (2013), asserts 
that government efforts to protect critical infrastructure and undertake law 
enforcement in the cyber sphere are complicated, due to the fact that most of the 
infrastructure and assets involved are owned and operated by private sector 
organizations with diverse motivations and competing impartialities to protect. This 
complicates the entire legislation and law enforcement process. For instance, civil 
liberties may be mostly concerned about protecting people’s rights instead of 
protecting people’s privacy online.  
Additionally, attackers have raised their levels of organization and research, 
especially in the area of cloud security and desktop virtualization which are 
envisioned to be the hub for the next generation of data storage areas for critical 
organizational data. The cyber criminals have been much inspired by recent political 
instabilities, especially in the Arab region, and monetary support from some 
hacktivist groups. In addition, most recent statistics show a dramatic increase in UAE 
cybersecurity threats; for instance official statistics from the Dubai police show a 
dramatic 88% increase in the number of electronic crime cases reported in 2013 as 
compared to the year before (https://securelist.com/the-rise-of-cybercrime-in-dubai-
and-uae/63682/, accessed, 22
nd
 September, 2017). The cyber investigation 
department of Dubai Police received a total of 1,820 reports in 2015, representing an 
increase of 15% over the previous year (Symantec, 2016). This trend validates a 
continued increase in cybercrime within the United Arab Emirates which signifies a 
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major requirement for cybersecurity research in the region to reduce the existing 
knowledge gap. The trend in Dubai’s cybercriminal cases can be seen in Figure 3 
below: 
              
 
Figure 3: Cyber-criminal Cases in Dubai Source: Symantec, 2016 
From Figure 3 above, the number of cybersecurity threats reported by the 
Dubai police was analysed for a period of five years, from 2011 to 2015. While the 
data show that cyber-crimes have been on the increase in the UAE, they are not 
conclusive as the increase could be attributed to other causes such as increase in 
awareness of the crime, hence more victims reporting it. Still, such data provide the 
justification for the UAE government and Abu Dhabi’s government entities in 
particular to advance their cybersecurity defences.  
The Middle East has been recognized as the most attacked region in the 
world, especially due to the recent shift in economic growth from southwards to 
eastwards. For instance, according to Symantec, 1.5 million people or about 17% of 
the entire population of the UAE were victims of cyber-crime in 2011 and it is 
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claimed that each of the victims suffered an average loss of $283.00 making an 
estimated loss of over $400 million (Symantec, 2016).   
A still more worrying trend has been identified by information security 
researchers in the region/ It is suspected that cyber-criminals were able to record 
magnetic information and PINS from bank ATM machines to create replica cards 
which were used after to scam customers, leading to exposure of their critical 
financial information and losses Hunter (2013). It is further revealed that since bank 
ATM networks are not always connected to the Public Internet, most of the 
fraudsters uploaded the malware codes through insiders Choo (2010). Therefore, 
more work needs to be done by the government to install state of the art technologies 
to cub insider attacks. Further, more work needs to be done especially in training 
innocent users in the importance of protecting critical organizational assets and 
personal data from any form of unauthorised access. A number of challenges exist 
for both space and cyber domains against the existing defensive strategies 
implemented by organizations; daily threats posed by attackers require senior 
management in organizations to set the right priorities especially in resource 
allocation, governance, decision making and the right security culture for all 
employees. Some of the major challenges to cybersecurity defences are presented in 
the next section. 
2.3 Challenges to the Effectiveness of Cybersecurity Defences 
The cybersecurity issue has been critically analysed as a global challenge. 
While there are multiple ongoing efforts that seek to enhance cybersecurity, an 
integrated governmental strategy to meet the challenges has only begun and has not 
been fully implemented. It is envisaged that all strategies demand recognition of risk 
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and the prioritization of resources. Therefore, governments need to focus on key 
national security problems and provide solutions for the enhancement of 
cybersecurity defences.  
The International Telecommunications Union report (2012) revealed a 
number of challenges in the prevention of cybercrime globally. First was 
organizations’ over-reliance on ICTs for the control and management of security 
functions in buildings, cars, aviation services, water and energy supply, which has 
made the systems more vulnerable to different forms of cyber-attack. This over-
reliance means that a cyber-attack could lead to catastrophic results that might be life 
threatening. A good example is the recent “Wannacry” attack affecting several 
London hospitals in May, 2017.  The second challenge is the fact that   there has 
been an overwhelming increase in the number of Internet users to the tune of 3 
billion users world-wide, representing 50% of the global population (Source: Internet 
Live Stats (www.InternetLiveStats.com)).  The large number of the public connected 
to the Internet poses a huge challenge to the authorities in designing and 
implementing adequate preventative measures from attacks that emanate literally 
from anywhere in the world (Aloul et al., 2012; Kwangjo and Kaist, 2012). While 
there are delays in establishing regulations and effective measures in response to 
such threats as they emerge, attackers are able to adjust their techniques quickly to 
combat any technological advancements.  
Elbanna (2010) argues that whereas it is cheap to mobilize cyberattacks, 
technologies for guarding against such crimes have become more and more 
expensive. Therefore, the war against cybercrime should be jointly handled by all 
stakeholders in the UAE region with major support from government. Furthermore, 
the problem can be eliminated by a combination of defensive technologies, 
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continuous in-depth analysis, traditional diplomacy and culturally sensitive 
cybersecurity training and awareness programmes. More still, top management in the 
various government entities, especially the chief executive level (C-Level), need to 
be very vigilant in the planning stages for their organizations by incorporating 
cybersecurity in their strategic plans. 
It has been revealed that new approaches to cybersecurity have emerged, 
based on the analysis of data on successful attacks to replace the counter reactive 
network security methods used in the past. These new approaches encourage 
continuous monitoring of the health of networks with relatively straightforward 
mitigation strategies to provide a basis for better cybersecurity. It is further conveyed 
that most governments have not agreed on the “rules” which can be applied to 
cyberspace nor how to apply the existing “rules” for espionage, crime and warfare. 
Most attackers take advantage of the Internet’s ability to seamlessly cross borders 
and so reside in countries that tolerate their activities and therefore sit outside the 
grasp of national law enforcement (Andrew, 2014). 
It should also be noted that improving primary level security may not solve or 
isolate the cybersecurity problems completely, but merely make them more 
manageable and ultimately easier to solve. Therefore, the prevention of cyberattacks 
against critical national infrastructure should be a continuous effort by all 
stakeholders in government entities. Most organizations that fall prey to attacks are 
found to possess exploitable weaknesses in their operations and security systems. 
Lydon (2013) further reveals that 96% of the breaches occurring in the year 2012 
could have been avoided if the victims had put in place simple or intermediate 
controls.  85% of the penetrations took months to be discovered and if discovered 
were often reported by third parties rather than the victims. 
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The nature of cyberattacks is comparable to the nature of conventional attacks 
by the military. Just like conventional wars, such as the recent Iraq and Afghanistan 
wars, cyberattacks are launched with specific goals in mind. Understanding these 
goals would help management to know who the enemy in cyberspace is. 
Another challenge is the need to understand the motivations and the 
propagators behind cyberattacks. Kshetri (2005) draws from the psychology and 
economic literature to identify the motivations for cyberattacks. He splits the 
attackers into two broad groups: those with intrinsic and extrinsic motivation.  The 
theory of intrinsic motivation assumes that an individual does something because of 
the enjoyment derived from the activity, and not for the result to be achieved in the 
end. In cyberspace this could be compared to an individual or group of individuals 
who enjoy developing malware or viruses for the sake of it.  Extrinsic motivation 
maintains that human behaviour is driven by a goal external to people.  Extrinsically 
motivated individuals are then likely to attack organizations to steal information of 
financial value, or target banks and even individuals to divert funds to accounts 
within their jurisdiction.    
Most human behaviour is probably some variant of the two motivators.  A 
report by the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission of 2013 
identified perpetrators of cyberattacks from China as falling into four categories, 
namely: Military groups, the Intelligence service, Independent actors such as; 1. 
“activists”, 2. “for profit hackers”, 3. “purely criminal hackers”; and 4. “Corporate” 
actors. It is also noteworthy that widely available reports indicate that Russian 
government backed actors were responsible for hacking attempts to influence the 
2016 U.S. Presidential elections (United States Congress, 2017) 
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Whereas two of the groups, military and intelligence, are state sponsored, the 
Independent actors may not be directly sponsored by the state but its members are 
often hired by the state to conduct cyberattacks on its behalf.  With the increase of 
state owned companies in the military-industrial complex and telecommunications 
industries, cyber-attackers in industry aim at gaining intellectual property from their 
Western counterparts illegally.    
2.4 Types of Cyberattacks 
Discussions of the cyber threat landscape in the UAE cannot be accomplished 
without considering the types of attack launched by cyber-criminals as in Table 1.  
Understanding various attacks is particularly critical to those trusted as the guardians 
of data and the infrastructure they use.  Furthermore, senior management who head 
government organizations in Abu Dhabi’s government entities should have a high 
level of understanding of how the various forms of cyberattacks happen and their 
effect on critical national infrastructure. This would aid the development of 
appropriate strategic plans, policies and procedures in the departments to protect 
against cyberattacks and malicious activity. While there are many types of cyber-
attack, most of the disastrous activities are species of Malware and Phishing.  
Cyberattacks increased by 43% worldwide between 2014 and 2015 according 
to Symantec (2016). However, while some forms of attack increased, there were 
noticeable reductions in others. Such changing and extreme changes in the attacks 
imply that senior management needs to be familiar with the ever changing cyber-
landscape to allow effective resource allocation and timely responses. The table 
below summarises the attack landscape for the period 2014 to 2015 as shown in the 
Symantec Report of 2016.  Meanwhile, a report by McAfee in 2014 indicated that 
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more than 307 new security threats were generated every minute and that mobile 
malware samples had grown steadily to about 16 percent during the first quarter of 
2013, while overall malware surging grew by 76 percent over the same year 
(McAfee, 2014). The researchers acknowledged new attempts to attack which take 
advantage of Internet trust models, e.g. secure socket layer (SSL) susceptibilities 
such as Heart bleed and the continued abuse of digital signatures to cover malware as 
legitimate code McAfee Report (2014). Furthermore, the report predicted that in 
2015 and beyond malicious parties would seek to extend their ability to avoid 
detection over long periods, by adopting cyber espionage capabilities for monitoring 
and collecting valuable data over extended targeted attacks. It added that more 
aggressive efforts to identify application, operating system and network 
vulnerabilities were needed, and so was an increasing focus on the limitations of 
sandboxing technologies as hackers attempt to evade applications and hypervisor-
based detection. 
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Table 1: Symantec Internet Security Threat Report 2016 
 
Attack Type 2014 2015 Trend 
Overall Email Virus Rate 1-in-244 1-in 220 Increasing 
Overall Email Phishing Rate 1-in-965 1-in-1846 Decreasing 
Mobile Malware Families Increase 
(% Increase over previous year) 
32% 214% Increasing 
Crypto-ransomware 269,000 362,000 Increasing 
Web Attacks Blocked / Day 493,000 1.1 Million Increasing 
New Mobile Vulnerabilities 168 528 Increasing 
   
 
From Table 1 above, the results show a considerable decrease in Email 
Phishing Rates from 1 in 965 in 2014 to 1 in 1846 in 2015.  However, attacks 
increased via mobile malware to the tune of 214% over the year 2014. Results also 
showed an increase of crypto-ransomware from 269,000 in 2014 to 362,000 in 2015 
Symantec (2016). Detailed discussion of the types of malware follows next. 
2.4.1 Malware  
In recent years, it has become evident that the most significant pieces of 
suspect code are used in many computer systems sitting on critical information 
infrastructure. Abu Dhabi’s government needs to strengthen its security defences by 
establishing and maintaining strong malware incident response strategies, especially 
for critical national infrastructure. Malware is defined as malicious software such as 
a virus, specifically designed to disrupt or damage a computer system or any critical 
communication networks. Malware is ranked as the greatest threat to business, 
government critical infrastructure and individuals Choo (2010). It can be divided into 
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two broad forms; (a) generic malware that targets the general population; (b) 
customized information stealing malware which targets specific institutions.  These 
two forms can further be divided into three major categories. This is mainly based on 
the way in which they enter a computer system and their behaviour once they have 
attacked. These broad categories are as follows 
 
a. Viruses 
A virus is a software program that enters a computer system through self-
replication by inserting copies of itself into host programs or system data files. 
Viruses are often triggered through user interaction processes such as the opening of 
files, running of programs, or exchange of USB storage devices. They can be divided 
into compiled Viruses that are executed by an operating system like file infectors, 
boot sector viruses that affect the Master Boot Record (MBR), multipartite viruses, 
which combine the characteristics of file infectors and boot sector viruses and 
interpreted viruses which are normally executed by running applications. 
 
b. Worms 
Worms are self-replicating programs that execute themselves without user 
intermediation. They are divided mainly into Network Service Worms, which exploit 
vulnerabilities in a network service and Mass Mailing Worms, which are self-
contained such as Trojan horses. Several types of attacker tool may be delivered to a 
system as part of a malware infection or other system compromise. These tools allow 
attackers to gain unauthorized access to or use of infected systems and their data, or 
to launch additional attacks. A popular type of attacker tool is a backdoor. A 
backdoor allows attackers to perform a certain set of actions on a system, for instance 
authenticating themselves by acquiring passwords or executing arbitrary system 
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commands. Typical backdoor malware includes zombies that are installed on a 
system for the purpose of attacking other systems; remote administration tools, 
which are installed on a system to enable a remote attacker to gain access to the 
system’s functions and data as needed; and E-Mail generators which generate 
programs that can be used to create and send large quantities of e-mail, such as 
malware, spyware, and spam. 
 
c. Trojan Horses 
A Trojan horse is a program in which malicious or harmful code is contained 
inside apparently harmless programming or data in such a way that it can get control 
and do its chosen form of damage, such as ruining the file allocation table on a hard 
disk or any other form of external storage device. Progressively, Trojan horses 
constitute the first stage of an attack and their primary purpose is to stay under cover 
while replicating themselves within systems by downloading and installing stronger 
threats, such as a bot. Unlike viruses and worms, Trojan horses cannot spread by 
themselves. They are often distributed to a victim in an email message through 
deceptions such as images or jokes; or through a malicious website, which installs 
the Trojan horse on a computer through vulnerabilities via web browser software 
such as Microsoft Internet Explorer or Mozilla. After it is installed, the Trojan horse 
lurks silently in the infected system, invisibly continuing its misdeeds, such as 
downloading spyware, while the victim continues innocently with normal activities. 
 
2.4.2 Mobile Malware 
The ever rising popularity of mobile devices in payment systems and across 
the counter has increased their value to attackers; hence the increasing attacks 
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outside unregulated third party app stores. While mobile malware continues to 
remain an emerging threat, software that uses aggressive advertising frameworks, 
known as adware, is more persistent. The threats will continue to grow as attackers 
find ways to avoid the protection of the mobile eco-system. Attacks such as the 
Android defender in 2013 are very common for mobiles. Other attacks continued in 
2014, including OlegPliss, an attack on Apple’s iCloud that locked victim’s phones 
by using the “Find-My-iPhone” functionality. Attacks on smart phones have 
increased recently because they present more capabilities in data storage and 
application features (Symantec, 2016). The UAE’s government entities, therefore, 
need to implement strategies for controlling the mobile devices used in all 
government entities. 
2.4.3 Phishing Attacks 
Aloul (2010) looks at “Phishing” as a form of “Social Engineering” Internet 
fraud, aimed at stealing valuable user information such as credit card information, 
social security numbers and user credentials. Such fraudulent activities start by 
creating a fake website that looks exactly like that of a known legitimate organization 
but with a slightly different URL address. In many cases, the attackers target 
financial institutions such as banks, and other big firms dealing in e-commerce 
transactions. An email is sent to thousands of Internet users asking them to access the 
counterfeit websites, which are replicas of the trusted sites, to update their records by 
entering their personal details, including security access codes. These pages 
generally look genuine and the email seems to have come from addresses that are 
identical to the original organization address. However, such email can be falsified 
by a hacker and actually comes from the hacker’s computer. 
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According to Choo et al. (2007) cyberattacks can be “syntactic”, “semantic” 
or “blended”.  Syntactic attacks are those that develop computer code in the form of 
a virus, Trojan horse or worm which is then used to infect other computers by 
exploiting weaknesses in their software or hardware.  Attacks of this kind using 
malware are “syntactic”.  Semantic attacks take advantage of human social behaviour 
and weaknesses to gain personal information which are then used in the cyberattacks.  
Blended attacks, for their part, use “technical tools to facilitate social engineering in 
order to gain privileged information”.  Phishing attacks are a type of social 
engineering. They represent online scams that frequently use unsolicited messages 
purporting to originate from legitimate organizations, particularly banking and other 
finance services, to deceive victims into revealing financial or Personal Identity 
Information (PII) to commit or facilitate other crimes (Choo, 2010). 
The United Arab Emirates was in the frontline of phishing attacks in the 
Middle East and North African countries (MENA) in 2014, with one-third of 
attempts aimed at stealing money according to the latest data collected by the 
Kaspersky Lab study on “Financial Cyber Threats in 2013”. The study reveals that 
over 38.38 percent of phishing attacks in the region were targeted at UAE followed 
by Saudi Arabia (29.31 percent), Egypt (10.16 percent), Qatar (9.64 percent), Kuwait 
(6.29 percent) and Oman (6.21 percent). To combat such complicated cyber and 
information security challenges, organizations need to recruit competent 
cybersecurity staff with the right knowledge and experience to resolve cyberattacks. 
Next we investigate if any relationship exists between the competence of 
cybersecurity staff and the effectiveness of their organization’s cybersecurity 
programmes (Wunderle, 2006). 
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2.4.4 Competence/ Knowledge of Staff and Cybersecurity Effectiveness (H1) 
In order to bridge the existing cybersecurity skills gap and the ever changing 
cyber threat landscape in most organizations, the experience and qualifications of 
professionals should be emphasized. Evidence of quality cybersecurity support staff 
includes the possession of hands on skills in cybersecurity and relevant academic 
qualifications and industry certifications in the cyber and information security 
domain.  Further, there has to be strong evidence of continuing education, given that 
the cyber-threat is an ever changing one with unique attacker profiles created and 
published to the global networks from time to time. Awareness of trends in the 
domain includes knowledge of the current threats, tools and techniques used by 
cyber-criminals; vulnerabilities in the organization’s infrastructure and mitigation 
strategies used; these are clear evidence of the seriousness of the agency in 
cybersecurity.  
The personnel will exhibit deep understanding and commitment to 
cybersecurity policies and procedures in place to ensure the optimum protection of 
the innocent users. However, certification alone should not be the yardstick in 
determining how well a potential candidate will fit into an organization’s 
cybersecurity programme, since many professionals pass the tests and earn the 
certificates but lack experience and job skills. At the end of the day, experience as 
well as certification (qualifications) should be the criterion for hiring most 
cybersecurity professionals.  Rowe et al. (2011) reveal a shortage of about 20,000-
30,000 qualified cybersecurity specialists in the US public sector alone, yet it is one 
of the most financially facilitated countries in its cybersecurity. Authors reveal that 
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only graduates with the right skills and experience will be able to resolve the ever 
rising level of international cyber conflict.  
According to the new cybersecurity workforce study by ISACA’s 
Cybersecurity Nexus (ISACA and RSA Conference, 2016), as enterprises invest 
more resources in data protection, their main challenge still remains that of finding 
top-flight security practitioners with the right skills for the job. “When positions go 
unfilled, organizations have a higher exposure to potential cyber-attack, in “a race 
against the clock”, according to Christos Dimitriadis, ISACA board chair and group 
director of Information Security. The report further reveals that most job applicants 
do not have the hands-on experience and or certifications required to combat today’s 
corporate hackers, leaving the organizations vulnerable to all forms of cyber-attack. 
It is therefore recommended that organizations invest in performance-based 
mechanisms for recruitment, create a culture of talent maximization and staff 
retention and groom employees with tangential skills to fill the available 
cybersecurity positions. (www.isaca.org/Cybersecurity Skills Gap Leaves 1 in 4 
Organizations exposed).  
Evidence of quality cybersecurity support staff includes the possession of 
academic and industry certifications in the cybersecurity/information security 
domain. Further, there has to be strong evidence of continuing education, given that 
the cyber-threat is an ever changing one. Awareness of trends in the domain, 
including knowledge of the current threats, tools and techniques used by cyber-
criminals; vulnerabilities in the organization’s infrastructure and the mitigation 
strategies used are clear evidence of the seriousness of the agency in cybersecurity. 
Additionally, these personnel will exhibit deep understanding and commitment to 
cybersecurity policies and procedures.  This research strongly contends that a strong 
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relationship exists between the experience and qualifications of cybersecurity staff 
(hereafter ‘the competence of staff’) and the cybersecurity effectiveness of their 
organizations. On this basis, we formulate the following hypothesis: H1: There is a 
positive relationship between the competence/knowledge of staff and cybersecurity 
effectiveness.   
Even if organizations recruit competent staff, senior management needs to 
play a great role in the cybersecurity programmes of the organization. Sadly, many 
organizations’ cybersecurity teams continue to struggle to convince senior 
management of cybersecurity issues. Likewise, senior management also struggles to 
effectively articulate cybersecurity strategy and policies to technical cybersecurity 
personnel. It is as though two parts of the same organization were speaking a foreign 
language to one another, and each party had a very little or no knowledge of the other 
party’s language (Cisco, 2017). Therefore, the role of senior management in ensuring 
the effectiveness of the existing cybersecurity programme and information security 
strategy needs to be well understood. In the next section, the role of senior 
management in the cybersecurity effectiveness of organizations is described. 
2.5 Senior Management Support and Cybersecurity Effectiveness (H2) 
Senior management are required to exercise “due care” and “due process” in 
ensuring the cybersecurity effectiveness of their organizations.  To this end, they 
have multiple tools at their disposal that range from the application of management 
tools such as strategic planning to ensure a sufficient budgetary allocation for cyber 
and information security. Strategic planning can be defined as a written plan used by 
an organization to guide its activities so that certain predefined objectives can be 
achieved to ensure improved performance in future (Elbanna, 2010).  These plans 
43 
 
 
 
usually take into account the prevailing economic and technological environment 
under which the firm operates, its strengths and weaknesses which influence how or 
whether to take advantage of the opportunities available under normal conditions as 
well as mitigating any threats that it may encounter  (Glaister and Falshaw,1999). 
Organizations need to include mechanisms for detection, prevention, mitigation, 
response, reconstitution and remediation against the different forms of cyber and 
information security threat into their long term organizational strategic planning, 
strategic policies and frameworks. In this study, we investigate whether senior 
management in various Abu Dhabi government entities have incorporated 
cybersecurity planning into their organizations’ strategic plans, policies and 
frameworks. 
Studies reveal that cyber-crime has an overwhelming effect on a company 
and could damage its positioning in the market place Rees (2011).  In the case of 
government entities, it could lead to criticism and loss of public trust Zhao  (2010).  
As such, the prevention of cyber activities is considered a strategic management 
issue for both the private and public sectors. Dutton and Duncan (1987) proposes that 
strategic planning comprises “markets for strategic issues”. The authors contend that 
these “strategic issues” can either represent problems to the organization if not acted 
upon, or opportunities when acted upon.  Any department or organization that 
expects cybersecurity as a strategic issue and takes appropriate action in response 
will stand to benefit.  Given the incidence of cyber-criminal activities in recent years, 
stakeholders would rather deal with organizations that do not have the negative 
publicity of losing massive amounts of sensitive data.  The stakeholder’s opinion of 
corporate readiness in addressing cybersecurity is therefore critical in the fight 
against the varied forms of cyber and information security challenges globally and 
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the UAE in particular. While an increasing number of organizations in the UAE 
already use strategic planning as a management tool, they have not realised the 
positive impression of its benefits Elbanna (2010) Their use is limited to what Brews 
and Purohit (2007) name “symbolic” or “rational” planning. The former points out 
the overall mission, vision and purpose of the organization. Rational planning starts 
with high level statements set out in the symbolic planning and breaks it down 
further into action plans, time lines and accountabilities. While this kind of planning 
is common among organizations that conduct strategic planning, it fails to deal with 
unpredictable situations that arise following a cyber-attack (Ginsberg, 1997). 
The kind of strategic planning that is better positioned to deal with 
cyberattacks would be either transactive or procreative. Transactive planning 
requires constant feedback from management that further modifies and fine-tunes the 
plan to suit the current situation.  Procreative planning instead “encourages 
product/service innovation and the degree to which plans encourage internal process 
innovation” (Brews and Purohit, 2007). Liedtka (2000) extends the procreative 
planning model further.  In her paper entitled, “Strategic Planning as a Contribution 
to Strategic Change: A Generative Model,” an alternative model of the strategic 
planning process is proposed.  Her theory advocates separating strategic planning 
into two features, cognitive and behavioural.  The author argues that strategic change 
begins with a cognitive framework in the minds of managers, with the creation of a 
gap in their view of the current situation and the image of a future to which they 
aspire. From the above argument, C-level management in various government 
entities needs to create frameworks that incorporate cybersecurity changes and their 
effects on organizations’ information assets. 
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The second process of strategic management advocated by the same study is 
the “behavioural” process, where organizational members must begin to act in new 
ways according to the present situation.  It is these new actions and the lessons 
learned from the new routines that create capabilities which allow the organizations 
to close the ever-increasing gap between “today’s reality and tomorrow’s vision” 
(Liedtka, 2000, pp. 200).  It is further argued that the application of the cognitive 
process leads to an increased level of awareness and attitude changes necessary for 
addressing the information security issues raised. Strategic planning has to be 
thoughtful and conscious; it results in understanding the present situation, projecting 
a desired future outcome and then applying a process to come up with concrete steps 
in bridging the current gaps. 
While the author confirms that many empirical studies show an association 
between strategic planning and performance, as measured by economic indicators. 
The findings of her study, paradoxically do not reveal any relationship between 
strategic planning and cybersecurity. We intend to establish these relationships as 
part of the findings of this study. Since strategic planning is a management tool that 
guides organizations in the management of change in turbulent times and since 
cyber-criminal events can have disastrous results to critical organization 
infrastructure and information assets, we propose a framework that incorporates 
strategic management into the cybersecurity planning for all Abu Dhabi’s 
government entities. 
Meanwhile Rohmeyer (2006) reveals that information security managers are 
expected to work as information mediators between the general management 
departments and the technical departments to ensure smooth information 
dissemination. The authors further claim that high effectiveness in information 
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security management is positively related to the skills and experience of the 
information security officer. According to the (ISACA and RSA conference, 2016) a 
global survey was conducted on 461 cybersecurity managers and practitioners, 
suggesting that 75% of the respondents expected to fall prey to cyberattacks by the 
end of 2016. This implies that Senior Management needs to demonstrate cyber 
resiliency support through proactive measures in policy enforcement, budgetary 
support for cybersecurity technologies and training programmes, among other 
methods to ensure the effectiveness of the programmes. They highlight a struggle to 
acquire enough skilled cybersecurity staff, with over 60% of the recruited individuals 
failing to resolve complex incidents.  
2.5.1 Evidence of Senior Management Support  
Evidence of senior management support includes the presence of a senior 
officer at the rank of Chief Information Officer (CIO) or Chief Information Security 
Officer (CISO) with well-defined authority in information security matters in the 
organization and the presence of cybersecurity strategic plans for the entire 
organization. This person further should have demonstrated an understanding of 
cybersecurity matters in the organization through the deployment of well qualified 
information security teams supplemented by on-going education programmes; the 
implementation of effective policies and procedures; training and awareness 
programmes for all users; appropriate technologies; and the adoption of international 
best practices. 
Further evidence that cybersecurity matters are taken seriously by the 
organization can be shown by the presence of cybersecurity strategic plans. Well 
thought out strategic plans are distributed throughout the organization and can be 
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described by the senior staff which is responsible for matters of information security.    
These plans act as guides for the development of policies and procedures, training 
and awareness programmes. 
 In a government department that takes cybersecurity seriously, the day-to-day 
operations of issues related to cybersecurity are governed by clear and well-
articulated policies and procedures. These policies and procedures govern user 
behaviour in the organization’s information systems.  The policies developed and 
implemented may range from those relating to email, Internet use, password strength, 
mobile computing devices, to issues such as access, distribution and destruction of 
documents, visitor management, etc. User awareness of these policies and procedures 
is a strong indication that the organization has an effective cybersecurity programme.  
From this section we arrive at the following two hypothesis:  H2:  There is a positive 
relationship between senior management support and cybersecurity effectiveness; 
Next we evaluate the role of the technology level in ensuring an effective 
cybersecurity platform. 
2.6 Level of Technology and Cybersecurity Effectiveness (H3) 
2.6.1 Effective Technologies for the Prevention of Cyberattacks 
Government entities that have invested in the latest cybersecurity 
technologies demonstrate better understanding of cybersecurity risks than those 
without cybersecurity investment budgets.  There are numerous kinds of software 
and hardware technology already deployed by Abu Dhabi’s government entities.  
The most common technologies used globally include different forms of firewall, 
data encryption, anti-malware, anti-spyware and anti-virus scanners, among others. 
48 
 
 
 
For these tools to be effective, the human element that supports and maintains these 
systems cannot be ignored, for most of these systems have limitations.   
In the electronic world, even though the access problem has been greatly 
resolved through advanced technologies, for example, the application of database 
and electronic records of management systems when handling most of the business 
transactions, a new encounter is generated when it comes to managing information 
access. Furthermore, as software vendors increase the functionality of mobile 
computing platforms and web services, the availability of data increases drastically. 
However, this rapid increase leads to other challenging issues such as the 
confidentiality and integrity of information. The early design of the Internet focused 
mainly on shared access and trust, with security measures as an afterthought. Many 
of the designed Internet protocols depend on trust between individuals to give their 
services, which may not be very effective especially for today’s complex traffic, 
involving highly sensitive transactions between people and institutions. Such 
challenges pose significant demands for highly secure software and hardware 
platforms to maintain the appropriate level of confidentiality, integrity and access to 
critical data (Conklin, 2006). 
Technological advancement is a key issue of concern, especially when it 
comes to the prevention and mitigation of cyber and malware attacks. However, as 
more vigilant corporations continue to implement more effective security defences in 
the UAE, threat actors have progressively stepped up their attacks on government 
entities, middle-tier and small organizations, many of which may not have security 
devices to match those of larger businesses. Small firms often consider themselves 
too insignificant to attract threat actors which is clearly a misperception. It is 
important to note that sophisticated opponents often target small and medium-sized 
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organizations as a means to gain a base on the interconnected business ecosystems of 
the larger organizations that partner with the smaller ones. This dangerous situation 
is compounded by the fact that big companies often make little effort to monitor the 
security of their partners, suppliers, and supply chains, (Price, 2015). Organizations 
need to invest heavily and periodically upgrade their cybersecurity technology if they 
are to match the onslaughts of cybercrime.  
 It is critical for cybersecurity experts and C-Level officers within government 
entities and the private sector to understand the risks associated with new 
technologies deployed within their organizations. The ever increasing threats to 
cyber and information security, at the level of the individual, the firm, and 
government and critical infrastructure, make security everyone’s obligation. Abu 
Dhabi’s government needs to ensure that the highest level of security is embedded in 
all national identification documents such as the Emirates identity card, driver’s 
licence and labour card. More still, management needs to determine appropriate 
levels of risk tolerance, security requirements and the necessary technical safeguards 
to ensure the protection of such highly sensitive documents. 
Based on some great technological advances, the Cyberspace Policy review 
by PwC identified vulnerabilities in cybersecurity as systemic risks introduced into 
infrastructure, defence, and personal property resulting from the widespread adoption 
of and dependence on various technologies. The more a nation relies on cyberspace 
as a critical part of its national infrastructure, the more responsibility it has to protect 
it.  In addition, the Internet is constantly changing the way we live and conduct our 
business. These changes occur both in ways that we currently experience (e-
commerce, real-time information access, e-learning, expanded communication 
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options, among others) and in ways that we have yet to experience or understand 
(Price, 2014).  
 A growing percentage of Internet and information access is through 
broadband connections, now that most users and organizations are increasingly 
interconnected across physical and logical networks. Network and system 
connectivity has broadened; the volume of electronic information exchanged through 
cyberspace has thus increased to include multimedia, process control signals and 
other forms of data. Several software and hardware solutions to protect organizations 
from cyber and information security vulnerabilities such as malware attacks have 
been widely deployed in industry and government entities across the globe and the 
UAE. However, the question whether these technologies are effective in doing their 
job remains unanswered. It is critical to focus on the rapid detection of security 
intrusions and an effective, timely response to malware incidents. Therefore to 
address this concern, Abu Dhabi’s government needs to reposition its security 
strategy by establishing a close link between technology, processes, people skills and 
appropriate risk management activities. Several people including some in 
government still see information security as mainly a technical problem and believe 
that by simply buying the right software and hardware platforms, they will resolve 
the issues and security concerns involved. However, this may not be the case, since 
information security involves people, processes, and technology; hence, a balance 
between these integral parties needs to be struck. 
 Most organizations are no longer certain if their present technologies, 
methods and strategies are still adequate to prevent future cyberattacks. The 
sophisticated technologies which have been developed globally by many 
organizations may not be a solution to the prevention of low level attacks by new 
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viruses that continually damage protected systems worldwide, affecting millions of 
systems.  
 There are numerous kinds of technologies deployed to protect firms from 
different forms of cyber and malware attacks. Some of these technologies like 
biometric systems are meant to provide edge protection to entry points while others 
provide assurances against data modification. The most common technologies used 
globally include the different forms of firewalls, data encryption, anti-malware, anti-
spyware and anti-virus scanners, among others.  Other technologies provide means of 
recovery in case of successful attacks being launched (Rees, 2011).  Regardless of 
these technologies deployed, their sole purposes include the following: 
 
a. Confidentiality of information by ensuring that information or data is only 
accessible by an authorized persons.  
b. Integrity that is acquired by ensuring that information or data can only be 
modified by only the authorized persons and no-one else and that no theft of 
information occurs. 
c. Availability by ensuring that information systems will not be disrupted or 
users denied access as a result of malicious behaviour such as a cyber-attack. 
 
Most of the cyberattacks across the Internet are opportunistic rather than 
attacks targeting specific business entities or government entities. An opportunistic 
attack occurs when an attacker targets several parties by using one or many of the 
common ways to attack such parties, in the hope that some of them will prove 
vulnerable. In an opportunistic attack, an attacker has many targets and will not care 
much who the victims are, but how of them fall into the trap. Organizations have also 
started realizing that new technologies assumed to prevent cyberattacks have their 
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own drawbacks and vulnerabilities. It must therefore be acknowledged that more 
than simply investing in new technologies, organizations must develop complete 
strategies, solutions and methods to combat security problems. Furthermore, the 
question of the adequacy of the available software and hardware solute, such as 
password protection, secret key encryption, public key Encryption, Secure Sockets 
Layer (SSL)  Access Control Lists (ACLs) and other security protocols still remains 
an issue of great concern (Bronk and Eneken, 2013). 
2.6.2 Software Solutions 
Several software solutions exist globally which make a considerable effort to 
detect, prevent, mitigate and protect organizations from different forms of cyber-
attack. We review some of the common ones below: 
 
2.6.2.1 The Use of Encryption Codes 
 Encryption is the process of encoding messages (or information) in such a 
way that spies or hackers cannot read it. In an encryption scheme, the message or 
information is encrypted by an encryption algorithm, turning it into an unreadable 
code. This is usually done by means of an encryption key, which specifies how the 
message is to be encoded. Encryption at a very primitive level protects data privacy 
and their integrity. But more use of encryption brings more challenges to 
cybersecurity. Encryption is also used to protect data in transit, for example, data 
being transferred via networks (e.g. the Internet, e-commerce), mobile telephones, 
wireless microphones, wireless intercoms, etc. Hence, by encrypting the code one 
can know if any information has been leaked. 
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According to the Emerging Cyber Threats Report (2015), encryption could be 
a solution in online transactions, although it is still difficult to apply effectively, since 
most governments have continued to resist its deployment due to their great fear of 
failing to gather the necessary evidence. Furthermore, it is clear that while the 
privacy concerns of most sensitive users and technology companies lie in data 
collection, government officials and security conscious citizens are most worried 
over the loss of visibility into the activities of malicious actors. The major concern is 
the relationship between technology and privacy since every new technology poses a 
new privacy threat to an organizations. Encrypting data before it moves into the 
cloud may be a key solution for compromising data since the user could access them 
only after a complete decryption process. However, we are not sure if the existing 
encryption algorithms may not be easily compromised by attackers with superior 
counter algorithms. 
 
2.6.2.2 Anti-Virus Software 
Antivirus software is a computer program that detects, prevents, and takes 
action to deactivate or remove malicious software programs from host computers or 
any other electronic devices.  Such malicious programs include spyware, viruses, 
worms and Trojan horses.  The most common antivirus programs include an auto-
update feature that enables the program to download profiles of new virus definitions 
so that it can check for them as soon as they are discovered. The antivirus software 
products discover malware mainly by looking at certain characteristics of known 
instances. Such sets of characteristics are known as signatures. Signatures are highly 
effective for identifying known malware and are also often a good means of 
identifying new modifications of known malware, such as a macro virus that has 
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been altered slightly from the original. The major antivirus vendors usually release 
signatures for a significant new threat within several hours, a remarkable feat 
considering that each vendor must analyse the threat, write a signature, test it, and 
distribute it, along with documentation. Because signatures are based on known 
threats, they are not capable of identifying completely new malware. To address this, 
antivirus software vendors have incorporated heuristic techniques into their products; 
these techniques are designed to identify unknown instances of malware by 
examining many characteristics of files.  
2.6.3 Hardware Solutions 
  Several hardware solutions for the prevention, detection, response, counter 
attack and surveillance to combat the various forms of cyber-attack have been 
developed. The question is whether these existing technologies can be enough to 
combat the cybersecurity problems in society. Some of these existing technologies 
are discussed in detail in the next section of this study. 
2.6.3.1 Firewalls 
A firewall is a software program or piece of hardware that helps screen out 
the hackers, viruses and worms that try to reach a computer over the Internet. All 
messages entering or leaving the Internet pass through the firewall presented, which 
examines each message and blocks those that do not meet the specified security 
criteria. Hence firewalls play an important role in detecting malware. Today 
Firewalls have become the staple of network security architectures, primarily 
providing access control to network resources, and they have been successfully 
deployed in the large majority of networks such as those of government 
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organizations and individual users. Firewall and Intrusion Detection (IDS) together 
are adopted more frequently. Network attacks are a crucial element in providing 
networks with the reliability required in today's competitive environment. However, 
while most firewalls provide effective access control, many are not designed to 
detect an attack at the application level (Uchenna et al., 2016). 
When most people think of network security, they think of firewalls. 
Firewalls are widely deployed as a first level of protection in a multi-layer security 
architecture, primarily acting as an access control device by permitting specific 
protocols (such as HTTP, DNS, SMTP) to pass between a set of source and 
destination addresses. Integral to accessing policy enforcement, firewalls usually 
inspect data packet headers to make traffic flow decisions. In general, they do not 
inspect the entire content of the packet and cannot detect or prevent malicious code 
embedded within normal traffic. Firewalls offer excellent protection against network 
threats, but they are less than complete protection against these threats by 
incorporating physical security, host security, and user education into am overall 
security plan.  
2.6.3.2 Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) 
Intrusion detection is a set of techniques and methods that are used to detect 
suspicious activity at both the network and host levels. Intrusion detection systems 
fall into two main categories: signature-based intrusion detection systems and 
anomaly detection systems. Intruders such as computer viruses, have signatures that 
can be detected using software. The IDS tries to find data packets that contain any 
known intrusion-related signatures or anomalies related to Internet protocols. Based 
upon a set of signatures and rules, the detection system is able to find and log 
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suspicious activity and generate alerts. Anomaly-based intrusion detection usually 
depends on packet inconsistencies present in the protocol header parts. In some cases 
these methods produce better results than signature-based IDS do. 
Network IDS products inspect the entire contents of every packet traversing 
the network in order to detect malicious activity. This content inspection technique 
provides deeper packet analysis than a firewall or a router. Intrusion Detection 
Systems are effective when sophisticated attacks are embedded in familiar protocols, 
such as an HTTP session, which would normally pass a firewall undetected. It is not 
surprising that the processing power required for an Intrusion Detection System is an 
order of degree higher the for a firewall product. 
Just as a firewall has many shortcomings, Intrusion Detection System (IDS) 
also has many, such as low detection ability, lack of an effective response 
mechanism, poor manageability, etc.  However, used together, the cooperation 
between IDS and firewalls can improve the network security to a great extent. On the 
one hand, IDS monitors the network, provides a real-time detection of attacks from 
the interior and exterior, and automatically informs the firewall as well as 
dynamically altering the rules of a firewall once an attack is found; on the other, the 
firewall loads dynamic rules to hold up the intrusion, controls the data traffic of IDS 
and provides security protection for it (Uchenna et al., 2016). 
An extension of the IDS is the Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) which is 
used for both detecting intrusion activities or threats and managing responsive 
actions in these systems throughout the network. IPSs monitor real time packet 
traffic with malicious activities or which match specific profiles and will trigger the 
generation of alerts; they can drop or block this traffic in real time as it passes 
through the network. The IPS’s main counter measure is to stop an attack in 
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progress. IPS can be termed the extension of IDS which exercises access control to 
protect computers from exploitation. IPS is an intelligent device that is capable of 
not only detecting malicious activities, but also taking preventive actions to secure 
the host or the network.  Many organizations fail to address employee insider 
vulnerabilities as well as the assessment of third party partners and supply chains. 
This is specially demonstrated by their failure to strategically invest in cybersecurity 
to ensure that it is in line with their business objectives (UNDP, 2012).  
From this section we see that those departments that have invested in current 
cybersecurity technologies demonstrate an understanding of cybersecurity risks.  
Given that effective technology is necessary for the successful prevention of 
cyberattacks, the following hypothesis can be formulated: H3. There is a positive 
relationship between the technology deployed and cybersecurity effectiveness. 
Apart from deploying state of the art technologies for protection against all 
forms of cyber-attack, organizations need to put in place periodic training 
programmes for staff to develop essential competences, reveal new attacker 
techniques and security vulnerabilities and thus ensure continuous knowledge 
sharing and development. Therefore, in the next section we discuss the role of 
training for cybersecurity staff and the awareness of users in ensuring the 
effectiveness of their organizations’ cybersecurity system. 
2.7 The Role of Cybersecurity Training Programmes (H4) 
Effective training and awareness programmes are comprehensive, measurable 
and regular. An organization that is serious about cybersecurity needs to put great 
emphasis on training and awareness programmes conducted by knowledgeable 
individuals across all user departments in the organization at set frequencies during 
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the year. For these training programmes to be effective, they should be culturally 
relevant to the audience.   
Meanwhile, the Oxford English Dictionary provides a definition of the key 
words in the phrase “training and awareness” that helps in formulating the 
conceptual foundation of this section. The dictionary looks at training as “the action 
of teaching a person or an animal a particular skill or type of behaviour” and 
“Awareness” as “knowledge or perception of a situation or fact” 
(http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/).  From the dictionary definitions of the two 
concepts, it can be inferred that Information Security Training consists of thoughtful 
activities conducted by an organization to teach skills or behaviours to its employees 
so that they gain an understanding of threats against their electronic information and 
the systems around them.  This understanding helps them to take appropriate action 
to prevent the threats from materialising.  Since the “understanding” that leads to 
appropriate action requires an attitude change, any initiative by a company to create 
this awareness among its employees requires careful planning, implementing and 
measuring for it to make the needed attitude change. 
Employees are the weakest link when it comes to incidents involving 
information security and the insiders of the organization  (Vroom and Von Solms, 
2004; Da Veiga and Eloff, 2010; and Wilson and Hash, 2003).  An “insider” is an 
individual who currently or at one time had authorization access to an organization’s 
system, data or network. While 48% of cybersecurity breaches were accidental, 17% 
were intentionally committed and 35% malicious (Vroom and Von Solms, 2004).  
According to these authors, companies ignore insiders and instead focus on external 
threats. They spend money on the technical side but pay little attention to the human 
factor.  Focusing on technical solutions to prevent cyberattacks is, however, not 
59 
 
 
 
enough since effective cybersecurity defences require users to be fully aware of and 
to use the available security measures within the organization. 
An increasing number of security breaches in organizations can be attributed 
to insider attacks by employees by either neglect or choice. Most employees consider 
information security issues to be the sole responsibility of the IT department (Dutton 
and Duncan, 1987). However, there is no way that IT departments alone can ensure 
data security. The failures to prevent or minimize security breaches due to end-users’ 
non-compliance are evidence of failed or non-existent programmes to promote 
information security awareness.  Still, since training and awareness programmes 
issues are non-technical, it is easy for information security managers and senior 
management to ignore their importance; they may instead focus on technologies such 
as firewalls and intrusion detection systems (Rezgui and Marks, 2008). 
The last two decades have seen advances in security technologies.  Twenty 
years ago, only one kind of firewall existed; today there are hundreds (Schultz, 
2005). Given the abundance of useful technology that exists, one would then think 
that achieving suitable levels of security would be minor. Surprisingly, however, 
many organizations that have an abundance of technical controls nevertheless 
experience a big number of security related breaches (Schultz, 2005, p.425). The 
primary reason why there has been an increase in breaches of information security is 
that information security is a people problem, not a technical one.  While millions of 
dollars to protect them from external cyberattacks are being spent by organizations, 
the greatest threats to information systems are from within organizations whose users 
lack basic knowledge and training. However, the focus should not change from the 
external to the internal threat landscape, but rather that equal emphasis should be 
placed on both.  According to Leach (2003), 80% of major security breaches could 
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result from poor security solutions.  An effective information security training 
programme should take into account the fact that user behaviour and attitudes will 
need to change if the incidence of insider attacks is to reduce. 
Several surveys complemented by various media reports in the recent past 
reveal that current or former employees and contractors are second only to hackers as 
the main offenders behind the increased cyberattacks against USA organizations 
(Greitzer et al., 2008).   The kinds of crime associated with these insider threats 
include spying, disruption, terrorism, fraud, blackmail and dishonesty. The authors 
contend that in order to help staff, management and personnel understand the risks 
posed by insider attacks, training and awareness programmes targeting different roles 
and responsibilities should be conducted.  The methodologies to be used to design 
effective training and awareness programmes should be drawn from “philosophical 
and theoretical roots to theorists such as Jean Piaget, John Dewey and Lev 
Vygotsky.” They argue that this is necessary because the effort requires complex 
knowledge and skills to be communicated, such that the users “constructed” or 
discovered meaning that was new to them.  According to this view, a traditional 
teacher-centred approach will not be successful, as it does not take into account the 
behavioural or attitudinal changes necessary to have a long term impact. 
The success of information security training and awareness programmes 
depends on how effective they are in changing user behaviours towards information 
security. According to Leach (2003)  there are five behaviours that present internal 
threats to organizations;  (a) Lack of security common sense, where a user does 
something “dumb” such as opening an executable file or email attachment; (b) a user 
forgetting to apply simple security procedures such as failing to back up files; (c) a 
user taking inappropriate risks because he did not accept the level of risk involved, 
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e.g. leaving a laptop unattended in an open office; (d) Wilful acts of negligence 
where users failed to follow necessary security  processes, e.g. mailing a highly 
sensitive document  outside the organization without any protection; (e) Deliberate 
attacks against the company’s interests. All these behavioural issues need to be 
addressed through training and awareness programmes that may be organized from 
time to time, especially for the less experienced users of the Internet and information 
systems. 
Several authors (Greitzer et al., 2007; Pfleeger and Caputo, 2012) agree  that 
the key to developing an effective information security training and awareness 
programme requires an understanding of human behaviour.  In their paper 
“Leveraging behavioural science to mitigate cybersecurity risk” they pose the 
following questions: 
(a) Which aspects of human behaviour offer the most promise in making 
cybersecurity processes and products more effective?   
(b) What role should education and training play?  
(c) How can we encourage good security practices without unnecessarily 
interrupting or annoying users? How can we create a cyber-
environment that provides users with all the functionalities they need 
without compromising enterprises of national security? 
Hight (2005) argues that training and awareness programmes explain the 
employee’s role in the area of information security by showing the users what they 
can do to protect their organization’s critical data and instilling in those who manage 
critical information a sense of responsibility. A further analysis reveals that people’s 
mistakes cannot be solved by the simple addition of technology but through a joint 
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effort and participation between the IT communities of interest, the business 
community and the nationals through training and awareness, along with critical 
government and top management support.  Meanwhile (Pfleeger and Caputo, 2012) 
maintain that in order to prevent cyber threats, the whole development cycle of 
technologies from concept design, development, implementation and usage need 
built-in information security components. They use insights from the behavioural 
sciences to develop their theory in response to the questions raised above.   
The areas of behavioural science which were found relevant to cybersecurity 
included: 
 
(a) Recognition easier than recollection 
People are more likely to remember passwords consisting of images rather 
than alpha-numerical characters. While this theory is currently being applied 
for user-computer authentication, its use is still not widespread. 
(b) Interference 
This theory states that frequent changes to a memorized item always interfere 
with recalling the newer version of the same item. This has been applied to 
studies where it was shown that login failures increased with the frequency of 
required password changes.  However, login failures fall where a system 
allows for multiple trials to enter a password.  A system that is less strict in the 
number of attempts therefore experiences fewer login failures. 
To further their theory, (Pfleeger and Caputo, 2012) investigated other areas 
from psychology, behavioural medicine and other disciplines that affect the 
behaviour related to reasoning and bias and have a potential for improving 
cybersecurity. For example they found that a theory in cognition called the 
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“identifiable victim effect” would have relevance to cybersecurity.  This theory looks 
at a tendency of individuals to “offer greater aid when a specific, identifiable person 
(the victim) is observed under hardship, when compared to a large, vaguely-defined 
group with the same need”.  According to this theory, users are bound to choose a 
stronger password for their online banking, for example, when they personally know 
of someone whose bank account has been recently hacked. 
The implications of this theory for training and awareness programmes was 
captured in a study conducted by McCrohan (2010) provided insights into how the 
security awareness of the organization can be improved by educating users about the 
threats. They hypothesized that:  
i. If users have greater degree of awareness about threats to information 
systems, they will engage in behaviours that enhance security. 
ii. An appeal based on threats to the online banking activities of the participants 
will result in enhanced behaviour. 
They further indicated that if individuals are; (a) informed of threats facing 
their online activities; (b) informed of their ability to mitigate security threats; and (c) 
provided with detailed information on how to create strong passwords, they will be 
more inclined to do so. In this thesis we determine the role of information security 
training and awareness programmes and their contribution to cybersecurity 
effectiveness, especially in Abu Dhabi’s government entities.  
To test the effect of threat awareness on weak passwords, an experiment was 
created by employing two levels of threat information: High and Low.  The primary 
hypothesis of the study was that the strength of passwords at Time 1 would not differ, 
but that high information treatment would have a greater effect on the strength of 
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passwords at Time 2. Participants were randomly assigned to either the High or Low 
information group.  They were then asked to log into a website created for the study, 
where they were directed to create passwords to access the information for the study. 
The password created before any experimental manipulation was the key pre-
treatment dependent variable of the study.  The low information security group was 
then given basic information about security, while the high information security 
group was treated with stories and evidence of the cybersecurity exploits of online 
personal banking of millions of people worldwide. After two weeks the groups 
resumed again and were directed to change their passwords as the old password had 
expired.  The study found that the group treated with high information on security 
breaches improved the strength of their passwords by over 46% between Time 1 and 
Time 2.  They attributed this positive shift to the awareness training given to them. In 
this study we conducted a pilot study on cybersecurity training and awareness by 
training a selected target group on issues of cyber and information security. The 
objective was to investigate the role of culture in the design of appropriate cyber and 
information security training and awareness programmes, as well as checking the 
impact of training on cybersecurity effectiveness.  
2.7.1 Training and Cybersecurity Effectiveness (H4) 
The worldwide increase in ICT security threats has mostly been due to the 
increased amount of electronic data, increased number of mobile terminals, well 
organized groups, difficulties in tracing attackers and limited knowledge of IT 
security amongst ordinary people (Aloul et al., 2012). This has led to the introduction 
of cyber laws in many countries, including in the United States, the Middle East and 
the UAE. Unfortunately, cyber threats are likely to succeed due to differences in 
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cultural attitudes between different groups of people globally. The author argues 
further that while organizations continue to train their professionals in technology 
very little effort has been put into general cybersecurity training and awareness, 
which creates a major risk to the employees when a cyber-attack occurs. 
The Gartner Group reports that security training and awareness produces 
more Return on Investment (ROI) than any other activity in information security, yet 
most organizations have approached this area as one of low priority. Usually when a 
budget crisis occurs in an organization the area of information security that is most 
likely to be cut is that of information security training and awareness. Schultz (2005) 
explains this to the difficulty of determining the direct benefit of training and 
awareness. He claims that employees who receive security awareness sessions will 
afterwards be less vulnerable to social engineering than others.  This however does 
not happen often, as most training programmes are inferior and not aligned to the 
organizations’ business goals. 
Information security effectiveness requires a change in organizational culture 
and behaviour (Vroom and Von Solms, 2003). An information security culture can 
be defined “as a way things are done in the organization to protect its information 
security assets” (Da Veiga and Eloff, 2010). Organizational culture includes the ideas 
shared by work colleagues and communicated between each other. Culture is the 
single most important factor which accounts for success or failure of an information 
security programme. The ideal culture would be where it comes as second nature for 
staff to follow the guidelines of the organization.  Leach (2003) believes that the 
behaviour of users can be improved through a variety of interconnecting methods 
which together work to create a strong security culture and strengthen the way 
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security influences the behaviour of others. We need to instil a security culture 
amongst departmental employees as a way of improving cybersecurity effectiveness.  
The contribution of culture to organizational change has been thoroughly 
studied. For instance Schein (2004)  defines culture as: 
The pattern of basic assumptions that a given group has invented, discovered 
or developed in learning to cope with its problems of external adaptation and 
internal integration and that have worked well enough to be considered valid, 
and therefore to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, 
think, and feel in relation to these problems (p 1). 
Furthermore the author divides culture into three layers. The first level is the 
“artefacts” of the culture. These are the visible elements that relate to that culture. In 
the information security domain these would be the firewalls, monitoring tools, 
published policies and procedures. Next are the “espoused” or shared values. These 
are semi-visible. In information security these would the strategies dictated by senior 
management (Vroom and Von Solms, 2003). 
The final and deepest levels of culture are the basic tacit assumptions which 
are hidden and occur at the individual level. These assumptions are the underlying 
beliefs and values of the staff of the company.  Between the various layers, there is 
constant interaction. The organizational culture could therefore have a huge impact 
on the information security of the firm.  The benefits of changing culture to engage 
in security automatically in daily life would positively affect the success of the 
organization. Information security culture consists of a subset of information security 
behaviours and information security components. This culture develops when users 
interact with information security components. To cultivate an acceptable level of 
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information security, organizations should ensure that a comprehensive and adequate 
set of information security components is implemented.  Examples of components 
include the human element, the processes used and the technical controls 
implemented. Organizations should furthermore ensure that employees’ interactions 
are in line with the requirements of the information security policies implemented. 
Katz (2005) carried out a comprehensive survey on wireless networks at 
thousands of access points in Dubai and Sharjah between 2008 and 2010; the results 
show that 32% of the access points were unprotected, while the others used weak 
security techniques. The biggest threats to people are phishing attacks, where an 
email may be sent to thousands of Internet users requesting them to access fake 
websites which could be replicas of well-known trusted websites. Many people enter 
their personal details in the belief that the sites are authentic when they actually came 
from a hacker’s computer.  It is taken for granted that Middle Eastern cyber criminals 
are increasingly targeting innocent UAE residents with advanced hacking methods 
such as phishing scams. This has led to increased IT security in major operators such 
as telecom companies, banks and UAE government entities. However, people are the 
weakest link in any security system and are still unprotected.  
Governments need to play a leadership role in instituting a cybersecurity 
culture amongst nationals through approaches that include training and awareness, 
culturally sensitive cybersecurity policies and education. Meanwhile, Seibert (2002) 
looks at culture as an organized group of learned responses with ready-made 
solutions to problems faced by people through interactions with others in the same 
society. This bond of interaction compels them to consider cultural awareness when 
designing cybersecurity training and awareness programmes. It is further revealed 
that culture shapes how people in a society respond to the effects of cyber-attack. 
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Unfortunately, over 85% of the UAE population is foreign, which implies that 
several cultures and cultural norms have been imported into the region. Such people 
come from different regions, Asia, Africa, Europe, and the Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC) countries, among others. As a result, a multi-cultural society has been created 
in the UAE which necessitates a culturally sensitive cybersecurity training and 
awareness programme.  
         Whitmer (2007) developed a cultural sensitivity and awareness checklist for the 
medical field, but this checklist can be extended to culturally sensitive cybersecurity 
awareness campaigns. It includes cultural identification, language barriers, selecting 
a communication method that suits the target society, if possible incorporating a 
language translator in the session who understands beliefs such as religious and 
spiritual beliefs and trust, among others.  
Different cultures have different training and awareness needs. Therefore, all 
cyber and information security training programmes should be tailored to the cultural 
setup of different communities in the region by carrying out a Pre-Training and 
Awareness Needs Assessment for different groups of individuals or cultures in the 
region. This would aid the design of appropriate training and awareness programme 
with clearly defined roles and responsibilities. Awareness programmes need to teach 
people information security issues such as confidentiality, integrity, availability and 
non-repudiation, the need to be aware of what needs to be protected. More still, they 
need to understand why they need to take cyber and information security seriously, 
why they should protect the critical national infrastructure, who the enemy in 
cyberspace is, what they gain from proactive participation in the security of their 
organizations and communities, how a secure environment assists them in the 
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accomplishment of tasks and finally why they are key stakeholders in the fight 
against cyber threats and cyber terrorism. 
As organizations expand the use of advanced security technologies, hackers 
attempt to break into their internal security by using the weakest links or less-
informed computer users. Users are the biggest security threat to the IT-security of 
any organization and therefore continuous training and awareness programmes are 
needed to help change their view of information security in the organization. 
Business success depends upon the continuity of operations and information 
provided to the business processes by information systems. The growth, excellence 
and efficiency of the business could be damaged by threats to and misuse of 
information. But awareness programmes would help in setting measures and ways of 
educating users in how to behave and benefit from information without jeopardizing 
its confidentiality, integrity and availability. Lack of awareness and mishandling of 
information could expose it to competitors or corruption.  
Cybersecurity training and awareness help individuals in decision making 
especially during uncertain situations and promotes a security-aware culture within 
organizations, hence reducing human error which could pose a major threat to the 
security of most organizations. However, technical solutions are unlikely to prevent 
security breaches and cyber threats within the government entities in UAE. 
Therefore, we need to introduce and maintain a culture where positive security 
behaviours are valued. The usability challenges associated with information security 
need to be well understood and resolved. This means that security functions need to 
be meaningful, easy to locate, visible and convenient to use. It is important to 
acknowledge the influence of individual cultural differences, personality traits, 
cognitive abilities, bias and heuristics which all affect how individuals perceive 
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security risks. These are important because they explain why individuals make 
certain decisions and why specific behaviours may be observed. The culture and 
climate that people come from has a significant impact on values, attitudes and 
behaviours as well as providing a great impact on the way they see cybersecurity 
issues in the community and within their organizations.  
Furthermore, Kruger et al. (2011) looked at how cultural factors impact the 
security knowledge and behaviour of different people in society. It is argued that 
cultural differences may manifest themselves at different levels of security 
awareness. The authors assessed the level of awareness, knowledge and behaviours 
amongst students in two selected universities in South Africa. Their main objective 
was to identify how cultural differences affect students’ understanding of security 
issues in society. Their findings revealed that some cultural factors such as one’s 
mother tongue and place of origin show a significant impact on the awareness levels 
of security issues among selected students. It is therefore worthwhile to perform a 
study to investigate the validity of these findings and confirm that peoples’ culture 
cannot be taken lightly when designing appropriate cyber and information security 
training and awareness programmes in the UAE and throughout the globe.  
The idea has been proposed that informal behaviour and acts of 
communication have a fundamental role in disclosing the characteristics of people.  It 
is stated that the process of communication creates a central hub in any information 
system. Furthermore, patterns of learning and culture as well as norms form 
constituent elements of informal behaviour; therefore, complete management of 
information security can only be ensured if the behavioural aspects of individuals 
and groups have been well understood. This necessitates establishing the validity of 
these findings, especially in a multi-cultural environment such as the United Arab 
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Emirates where the largest percentage of the active labour force comprises 
immigrants from several countries, notably from Asia, Africa and Europe.  
As a preliminary, the researcher conducted a pilot study to investigate the role 
that culture plays in cybersecurity. In this study a total of fifty (50) employees was 
randomly selected from a mid-sized organization in Abu-Dhabi (UAE) representative 
of the study population, and divided into two groups.  The first group, comprising 
employees from similar cultural backgrounds (in India only) was treated to a 
cybersecurity training programme that was culturally sensitive conducted in their 
first language (Hindi), while the other group, consisting of employees from a 
multitude of different cultural backgrounds (Ugandans, Philippines and Nepalese) 
undertook a generic training programme  conducted in English. A pilot survey was 
conducted following the above treatment. The pilot involved the provision of pre-
and-post-training assessments with the help of questionnaires tailored to cyber and 
information security awareness especially of various issues to do with the region. 
Details of this survey are discussed in Chapter Three of this thesis.  
It is claimed that governments develop security policies which specify the 
correct behaviour by employees even when they are not aware of the risks involved 
and do not fully understand the correct security behaviour within their society 
(Humaidi and Balakrishnan, 2013). Furthermore, the authors argue that the cultural 
systems of a society shape a variety of their psychological processes. The values that 
distinguish a country’s culture can be categorised into individualism versus 
collectivism and power distance, among others. For instance, in the case of 
individualistic cultures such as Western ones, people tend to describe themselves in 
terms of their internal attributes, for example, goals, preferences and attitudes, while 
in more collectivist cultures such as those typically found in the Middle East, 
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individuals tend to express themselves in terms of their relationships and social 
group memberships. These individuals tend to avoid behaviours that cause social 
disruption. The behaviour of people can be changed by influencing what they 
consciously think about or by shaping the behaviour that is focused on more 
automatic processes of judgement and influence without changing people’s thinking.  
It is revealed that influential tactics in specific situations may be counterproductive, 
hence invoking fear amongst in many different people in a society. Too many 
messages concerning certain security sensitive issues may hinder behavioural change 
within a multi-cultural setup. 
2.7.2 Effective Training Methods 
According to Siponnen, (2000), several methods of conducting cybersecurity 
training exist, for instance, “selling” information security to people through 
campaigns which provide  good measures for improving people’s attitudes although 
they may lead to unwanted results in terms of motivation and attitude.  For this 
reason, they should be used carefully together with awareness programmes to 
provide good incentives for end users and for refreshing people’s minds.  Education 
should increase people’s insights and answer the question, “why?” – this should 
increase motivation. Training should increase skills and competence and corresponds 
to “how?”  Since the “why” part is important, employees should not be content with 
answers such as “you just have to do it”, “this is our policy”, etc.  Their motivation 
and attitude are not likely to improve this way. The creation of an information 
security awareness programmes as a means of minimizing end-user errors requires a 
systematic approach. 
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Several cybersecurity awareness campaigns have been carried out globally to 
alleviate the cyber and information security awareness problem For instance, a 
cyber-streetwise campaign (2014) was carried out in the United Kingdom (UK) to 
concentrate on online users at home and some business ventures. In this campaign 
businesses were advised to adopt five basic measures to boost their online security 
and safety, for instance, the use of strong passwords, installation of strong antivirus 
software, and checking privacy settings on social media, patching systems whenever 
new updates became available, among others. In this campaign positive messages 
were used to influence the behaviour of online users.  
Similarly, a parents’ corner campaign was carried out in Africa with the 
intention of coordinating the work done by governments, industries and civil 
societies with the objective of protecting children and educating parents online. It 
emphasized that “people are not always who they say they are”, the need to think 
before posting anything online and also that “friends must protect friends”, among 
others. All these efforts in the UK and Africa provide an insight into solutions to 
online risk and behavioural change for UAE citizens online and for Abu Dhabi’s 
government entities. It is extremely important to decide the target group of an 
awareness campaign, match the cultural theme of the message recipients and their 
cognitive and motivational characteristics with the intended contents. However, 
simple transfers of knowledge and awareness campaigns alone may not be sufficient 
to end the entire problem in the UAE. Therefore, an appropriate framework 
incorporating all other mechanisms would be greatly valued if it allowed the 
government to combat the ever escalating problems of cyber and information 
security. The government needs to organize security campaigns, avoid tactics that 
may cause fear among users, emphasize security education and provide a feedback 
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mechanism for obtaining the real-time concerns of people as well as instituting an 
online security culture amongst all UAE residents.  
Meanwhile, Rezgui and Marks (2008) provides an insight into a study by 
EDUCAUSE which found that higher education organizations with information 
security awareness programmes were considered more successful and more advanced 
in information security than those without. 39% of the higher education programmes 
examined in the USA had an information security awareness programme. 75% 
viewed their information security awareness programmes as among the top three in 
this area.  Based on this study of information security awareness programmes, the 
authors made recommendations that could be applied to higher education in the 
UAE. 
 
(a)  Establish information security policies and procedures that are tailored to 
the government policies which should be achievable and understandable. 
(b) Conduct campaigns of best practice in information security awareness and 
advertise information security awareness and materials throughout the 
campus. 
(c) Train all users in information security best practice.   While training should 
be regular, basic training for all users should be compulsory. 
(d) Practice reward and punishment management 
(e) Carry out continuous evaluation. 
 
In the meantime, Herath and Rao (2009) conducted a study on the role of 
penalties and perceived effectiveness on encouraging information security behaviour 
in organizations. To do this, they developed a framework that evaluated the relative 
importance of three incentive mechanisms:  penalties, social pressure and perceived 
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effectiveness. They observed that prevention measures are a useful primary strategy 
for reducing computer crime, but as the level of punishment increases, individuals 
become less likely to carry out the desired behaviour.  Increasing the level of 
punishment from verbal warning to the employee to the threat of job loss or heavy 
fines would seem to prevent wilful breach. They hypothesized therefore that 
“Increased severity of penalty will be positively associated with intentions to comply 
with organizational security policy.” 
Furthermore, they observed that not only the promise of penalty but also the 
certainty of it could have an impact on the security misbehaviour of an organization.   
For this to be effective, a set of monitoring and detection mechanisms is necessary to 
make certain that employees are acting according to information security policies. 
Monitoring can be done through a combination of activities such as random walks, 
computer history logs, network logs etc. If the employees are aware of monitoring 
and detect the efforts being made, they are more likely to obey policies.   Leach 
(2003) divides the factors that influence security behaviour into two distinct groups. 
The first group are those that influence the users’ understanding of what behaviour 
the company expects from them.  The second group of factors are those that 
influence the user’s personal willingness to constrain his behaviour within the 
accepted and approved norms.  The user’s understanding of which behaviours are 
expected of him is formed from what they are told; what they see being practised by 
others around them and their experiences deriving from decisions they have made in 
the past. What the users are told makes up the company’s body of knowledge. The 
effectiveness of the body of knowledge in conveying what constitutes security 
behaviour varies according to its accessibility; completeness; the clarity of the stated 
security values; and the uniformity of those values.  
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What employees see is heavily influenced by the behaviour of their peers.  
They build their security attitudes and set their own security behaviour according to:  
i. The values and attitudes demonstrated in the behaviour of senior 
managers. 
ii. The consistency between the companies’ stated values and the evident 
behaviour of their peers. 
iii. Whether other company practices, e.g. HR, reflect its security values. 
iv. Whether the company demonstrates that good security practices are 
important through a system that monitors security behaviours, rewards 
good and punishes bad. 
Users’ security common sense and decision making skills are seen over a 
period of time.  Each person builds his own personal history of security decisions 
according to the feedback received. 
The factors that influence the user’s personal willingness to constrain his 
behaviour within these norms and his willingness to conform are affected by 
personal values and standards; the users own sense of obligation and the difficulty in 
complying. 
Most employees believe in the high value of principles and agree to shared 
values and sensible rules.  Tensions arise when there is conflict between individual 
values and company values. Employees feel a psychological pressure to behave 
according to company expectations, to limit their behaviour willingly and to stay 
within the bounds of accepted practice.  If a member of staff feels that he is well 
treated, recognized and rewarded, then he will gladly respond in kind and act in the 
company’s best interests. Another factor is whether the company makes it easy to 
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comply with its standards and procedures and whether there are temptations of 
personal gain for people who do not comply.  Even when staff recognize that security 
controls are implemented for good reasons, they have very little tolerance for 
controls that are not effective, efficient or clear.  The author identified the following 
keys to better security behaviour: 
(a) Behaviours demonstrated by others - What people see in practice around 
them influences their attitude and behaviour more powerfully than what they 
are told. 
(b) User’s security common sense and decision making skills - A user’s own 
security decisions, once made, become a part of his personal body of 
knowledge and are carried into the future. 
(c) User’s psychological contract with their employers - If a company ensures 
that its overt behaviour supports rather than opposes its body of knowledge, 
and it helps staff to develop and strengthen their security common sense, it 
will reduce the number and seriousness of users’ security errors. 
 
Rotvold (2008) conducted a study to discover the current state of security 
training within organizations by surveying 144 organizations of different sizes.  Sixty 
percent of the organizations surveyed reported that their organizations offered security 
awareness training.  Of these, 44.7% reported that training was mandatory and 
attendance was tracked 72.8% of the time. Given these reported numbers, the actual 
percentage of employees receiving security awareness training may have been quite 
low.  Training was most frequently offered once a year (45%) and the training was 
conducted by IT staff 58% of the time, followed by management, which conducted 
the training 28% of the time. The top delivery methods for security awareness training 
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were face-to-face sessions (54%), e-mail messages (53%), online training (47%), 
presentations (32%), newsletters (29%), and posters/flyers (28%). The most common 
general topic in information security training was security policy. The top training 
topics were “acceptable use (89%), e-mail (85%), passwords (78%), backup and 
recovery (71%), antivirus (70%), software installation and licensing (67%) and 
disaster recovery (58.2%)”.    
A study of the effectiveness of user awareness and training on cybersecurity 
matters in Australia found that “information security awareness programmes and 
campaigns can work to embed a collective culture of personal belief system that 
promotes compliance with computer security policies, procedures and protocols” 
(Nigel and Rice, 2011). It is this “personal belief” that Liedtka (2000) calls 
“behavioural process” which is the internalization of the cognitive process that leads 
to the increase in awareness and attitude changes needed for addressing the 
information security issues raised.  This “personal belief” shift can be effective only 
where the strategic planning approach applies both the “cognitive process” that 
creates a “gap” or awareness of the present status and the future expected status of 
the cybersecurity situation of the firm. The first part will be a “top-down” push of 
information security which begins with a proper regulatory framework, progresses to 
executive decisions that create proper information security policies for the firm and 
ends with user awareness that brings about the desired “personal belief” shift in the 
user.  These components work together to create enhanced protection from cyber-
crimes. 
Meanwhile Abawajy (2014) emphasizes that as the number and frequency 
increase of cyberattacks designed to take advantage of unsuspecting personnel, the 
significance of the human factor in information security management should not be 
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underestimated. Therefore, information security awareness programmes geared 
towards human related vulnerabilities are of paramount importance. His study 
analyses the effects of various methods of information security awareness, training 
and delivery used to improve end users’ awareness of cyber and information security 
related issues by looking critically at such methods as web based training material 
and other training, with a major focus on determining the method most preferred by 
the end users. Further analysis was put into text based, game based and video based 
delivery schemes to determine user preferences. The study findings reveal that a 
combination of such methods would yield greater results and it was stressed that state 
of the art technology based security solutions alone would not provide overall 
enough security measures to defend critical organization assets from a wide range of 
ever changing security threats. Managing the human side of information security 
should be just as carefully done as the technical side. Therefore, reducing human 
related security vulnerabilities is of paramount importance to the organization’s IT 
security posture. 
Abawajy (2014) analyses several other delivery methods, which include 
electronic resources and paper resources, instructor led delivery methods that involve 
formal presentations, seminars and workshops facilitated by government, local and 
external parties, online delivery methods such as email broadcasting, blogging, 
simulation based and multimedia techniques, among others. The survey reveals that 
only 5% preferred the game method, 50% preferred video based delivery methods 
while 33% preferred the text based model of delivery. The drawback is that most of 
the respondents preferred the video delivery of data followed by text based data  
transfer. Video data delivery consumes most of the bandwidth and could cause a 
major blow in case of cyberattacks as indicated by Figure 4 below. 
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Figure 4: Information Delivery Techniques. Source: Abawajy (2014) 
Other work was conducted by (Knapp, 2009), who identified the correlation 
between user information security awareness programmes and perceived security 
effectiveness. Their findings reveal that programmes need to make all the employees 
of an organization share responsibility for the security of information and 
information systems. Employees need to understand their responsibilities, 
organizational policies and procedures to protect a government organization’s critical 
assets. Abawajy (2014) though agreeing with this claim also stresses that security 
awareness training provides the most cost effective method for handling 
cybersecurity issues globally. Since employees are the weakest point in any security 
programme, organizations should design appropriate cybersecurity training and 
awareness programmes for their employees to ensure the effectiveness of the 
available security defences and technologies.  
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2.7.3 Results of Effective Training Programmes 
 
Evidence has been provided in the literature for the importance of user 
training and awareness, together with other factors for cybersecurity effectiveness. 
An organization may have implemented the best technology and supported it by the 
most experienced technical team, but without effective user awareness and training 
programmes, its cybersecurity defences may still fail.  The actions of a single user 
can compromise the data and infrastructure of the entire organization. A successful 
user training and awareness programme is said to comprise the following results and 
traits: 
 
(a) Users who are committed to the use of strong passwords as a matter of 
routine. 
(b) Users who exhibit behaviour and attitudes which are aligned to the 
organization’s overall cybersecurity policies, procedures and guidelines. 
(c) Users who possess general common sense in their security behaviour. For 
example, they do not open email attachments with an executable file; they 
back up their important files with a predefined routine schedule; they connect 
personal devices such as smartphones, mobile phones and other electronic 
devices to corporate networks; they do not email a highly sensitive document 
outside the organization.  
From these arguments, the following hypothesis is formulated:  H4: There is 
a positive relationship between cybersecurity training of staff and 
cybersecurity effectiveness. 
Next we discuss how strategic planning contributes to an effective cybersecurity 
programme. 
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2.8 Strategic Planning and Cybersecurity Effectiveness (H5) 
2.8.1 Strategic Management Theories and Principles 
Several statistical studies reveal a positive association between strategic 
planning and organizational performance. For instance Brews and Purohit argue that 
the degree of instability of the environment increases the amount of planning a firm 
does. They infer that “planning increases as instability increases” (Brews and 
Purohit, 2007). The rapid increase of cyber-criminal activities worldwide presents a 
kind of “unstable” environment which requires strategic planning (Grant, 2003).  
Such instability in cyber-crime is assumed because attackers who commit cybercrime 
can be anywhere in the world when their actions cause damage  to an organization’s 
information and communication infrastructure (Rees,  2011). An organization’s 
ability to deal with such attacks requires flexibility and the capacity to respond 
quickly to rapidly changing situations. Therefore, Abu Dhabi’s government entities 
need to take proactive measures to protect critical infrastructure from such illegal 
activities speedily. The organizations that would prevent the effects of cyber-crime 
and malware attacks are those that “anticipate and address environmental turbulence 
through strategic planning” (Rudd, 2008). 
Given that the situations where most businesses and government entities face 
many  noticeable threats such as cyber and information security attacks on critical 
national infrastructure, it has become necessary for entrepreneurs, top management 
and the UAE government to dedicate greater effort and research to the explanation 
and choice of the most adequate strategies and security frameworks.  Doing so would 
help respond to such critical challenges and ensure improved security thus making 
investment in the region more competitive and the entire government safer. In the 
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effort to construct robust and effective security frameworks and clear strategies, we 
need to analyze and reason out many important issues.  
Since cyberattacks can seriously disrupt or even paralyze segments of critical 
infrastructure, governments including that of Abu Dhabi need to devise strategies to 
combat their effects. This can be achieved through appropriate strategic management 
theories and the application of principles or frameworks that guide the control and 
prevention of these attacks. According to Finland’s Cybersecurity Strategic Report 
(2013) government entities should mobilise the highest level of cybersecurity 
management to provide political guidance and strategic guidelines. The authors of 
this report argue that cybersecurity management represents strategic sensitivity, 
collective commitment and resource flexibility from a government. They further 
reveal that in order to prevent cyber threats that could endanger the security of the 
state, it is important to review legislative restrictions as well as those arising from 
international obligations. Such obstacles include obligations related to data 
protection, disclosure and the exchange of information between authorities by paying 
more attention to the basic rights of privacy, confidentiality and the integrity of 
electronic communications. They also propose an annual review of cybersecurity 
strategies by security committees but they provide no insight into the best 
management principles and practices for performing such a review. Our hope is that 
the findings of this thesis will contribute to the best management principles and 
practices for reviewing cybersecurity policies and strategies periodically by the UAE 
Government entities and Abu Dhabi’s government in particular. 
Elbanna (2010) provides a detailed discussion of strategic planning in the 
UAE. He focuses mainly on the importance of Strategic Planning to departments in 
the public and private sectors and the development of a profile of organizations in the 
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UAE with respect to their practices of strategic planning and management. However, 
he does not consider the inclusion of cybersecurity threats in the strategic planning 
and policy making topics. This creates a gap that we need to fill with the findings of 
this study. Furthermore, Lydon (2013) claims that cyberattacks on industrial 
operations have become of great concern, although industry management 
increasingly demands real-time communication between automation and business 
systems. From this submission, the requirement for robust management systems and 
theories to shield these important systems from the cyberspace enemies becomes 
important. 
 At the 4
th
 Cybersecurity framework workshop, held in  September 2013 at 
the University of Texas, Dallas, it was agreed that an organization’s management of 
cyber-risks required a major focus on key functions such as “Know”, “Protect”, 
“Detect”, “Respond” and “Recover” as a major practice to combat cybercrime. Their 
framework from the contributors recommended incentives such as cybersecurity 
insurance, and grants for public recognition and cybersecurity research. The 
European Network and Information Security Agency report (ENISA, 2012) notes 
that several member states have developed cybersecurity strategies while others had 
brought their strategies close to publication. Some of the completed frameworks 
identified by the reports include Estonia, Finland and Slovakia in 2008. 
The strategy guides the procedure for protecting critical information 
structures. It explores existing regulations to clarify whether and where any 
additional powers are required to secure IT systems. For instance, to mention 
Germany alone, it provides basic security functions certified by the state and also 
supports SMEs by setting up a new task force, among several other reported 
initiatives. 
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Gercke (2014) makes a detailed report on cybercrime to guide both developed 
and developing nations towards the co-ordination of national legal frameworks and 
an appreciation of the growing cyber threat to the stability of the state. He provides 
detailed information on the way in which crimes are committed and the activities 
undertaken by International and regional organizations in fighting them. This report 
contains a detailed analysis of the legal approaches, procedure laws, digital evidence 
and the responsibility of the Internet providers, as stated in the ITU Global 
Cybersecurity Agenda (GCA). The author focuses on strengthening international 
cooperation in the fight against cybercrime, coordinating financial support for 
training activities, the organization of meetings of law enforcement experts, 
strengthening dialogue with industry and monitoring the changing threats from 
cybercrime to evaluate the need for further legislation.  Unfortunately the main focus 
of this entire report was on the United States Government and Europe, leaving out 
other important regions such as the Middle East. Given that the world economic 
centres have been moving eastwards, most of the cyber and information security 
vulnerabilities have shifted largely in the same direction. We therefore focus on the 
existing cybersecurity defences in the Gulf States while putting major emphasis on 
Abu Dhabi’s government entities, with the aim of filling any existing gaps that may 
be cited regarding cyber and information security. 
According to the latest world internet statistics, the United Arab Emirates 
reached the tune of 91.9%  by the end of 2016 (World Internet Statistics, 2016). This 
percentage places the country third of all the Middle Eastern countries and 
seventeenth globally in terms of Internet usage. Furthermore, the report shows that 
the UAE had the highest rate of smart phone penetration in the world. Such statistics 
present a major concern to national cybersecurity and require an urgent response 
86 
 
 
 
from government, especially in terms of developing frameworks for appropriate 
prevention of cyber-crime in the region. It is further revealed that UAE government 
websites were attacked in July 2013, but that this attempt was successfully tackled by 
the UAE Emergency Response Team (ae-CERT) which managed to minimise the 
impact of these attacks. At the same time, it reveals a weakness in the existing 
cybersecurity defences and security strategies in place. Since the government has put 
more focus on delivering services to all residents mainly through e-government 
portals, more attention should be given to securing cyberspace, possibly requiring 
strong cybersecurity frameworks to be prepared for the government entities.  
Lydon (2013) argues that, despite the rapid increase in the use of Information 
and Communication Technologies (ICTs) and the expansion in Internet access, many 
political, legal and societal aspects of cyberspace have not been fully understood by 
most governments and military bodies. They show massive dependence on networks 
which are major sources of vulnerability. The report reveals that many non-state 
actors in cyberspace, such as politically motivated groups, have expanded to 
complicate the many government efforts to end cybercrime. The report did not 
suggest a framework for cybersecurity defences which could be applied by 
government entities in this fight.  In a later section, we review some of the best 
practices from other countries to develop the best strategy for Abu Dhabi’s 
government entities and ensure the effective implementation of our proposed 
framework. 
This section of the literature review argued that, since cybersecurity issues 
are issues for management, there must be a relationship between the role of 
cybersecurity strategic planning and the cybersecurity effectiveness of Abu Dhabi’s 
government entities.  We therefore propose the following hypothesis:  H5: There is a 
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positive relationship between the presence of cybersecurity strategic plans and 
cybersecurity effectiveness. 
People are the new attack vector for any organization; therefore they need to 
formulate the first line of defence for any security vulnerabilities. It is not easy for 
users to be aware of all the potential cyber and information security pitfalls at work. 
Even if they follow the right security protocols, they usually forget about the 
simplest targets for cyber intrusion, such as Wi-Fi connected mobile phones, tablets, 
computers and IT devices of all kinds used to access corporate data. Therefore, 
continuous user awareness programmes need to be in place to remind employees of 
their role in ensuring an effective cybersecurity programme for their organization, as 
discussed further below. 
2.9 Role of Cybersecurity User Awareness Programmes (H6) 
Employee awareness is a fundamental component of every programme in an 
organization. This comes down to how organizations engage their employees and 
generate awareness through appropriate communications programmes. Effective 
security awareness demands top-down commitment and communication, a tactic that 
is often lacking in government entities.   While information security training and 
awareness is a minor topic in information security research, it plays a critical role in 
any organization’s defence against cyber-attack. Therefore, as organizations expand 
their use of advanced security technologies, hackers attempt to break into their 
security through the organization’s weakest security link, the less-informed computer 
user (Whitmer, 2007). Users are the biggest threat to the IT security of any 
organization, therefore, continuous cybersecurity awareness programmes must be run 
to change their perception of cyber and information security. Furthermore, cultural 
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and attitude changes in the operations of government employees are required to make 
IT security and the ethical use of IT resources as ubiquitous as technology, since it 
involves changing the way that employees perceive IT security (Aloul, 2010). 
 Siponnen (2000) defines information security awareness as “a state where 
users in an organization are aware of their security mission”. A more comprehensive 
definition is given by (Kritzinger and Smith, 2008) who state that “information 
security awareness is about ensuring that all employees in an organization are aware 
of their role and responsibility towards securing the information they work with”. 
Meanwhile, Rezgui and Marks (2008) explore the factors that influenced user 
security awareness at Zayed University in the United Arab Emirates. Their main 
intention was to identify how “thoroughness, cultural assumptions, beliefs, and social 
conditions” affected the way that staff and students behaved towards information 
security. Overall, the authors infer that while the university placed more emphasis on 
perceived external threats, there were signs of “lack of information security 
awareness in the institution indicated by the widespread acts of user errors, software 
failures, social engineering problems and data leakage problems”. They assert that 
these problems were likely to have had a direct relationship with the lack of 
information security awareness programmes at the university. As a result of this 
discussion, we propose the following hypothesis:   
H6: There is a positive relationship between awareness of users about cyber security 
and cybersecurity effectiveness. 
Next we discuss the importance of legislation in strengthening an 
organization’s cybersecurity programme. 
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2.10 Regulatory Framework and Cybersecurity Effectiveness 
Regulatory frameworks allow the establishment of laws and regulation 
necessary for ensuring that public and national interests are protected. This is 
especially important for critical national infrastructure such as major communication 
lines (e.g. power smart grids, transport systems and public institutions) among others. 
National laws on privacy, the confidentiality of personal information and data 
provided to financial, health and government entities can be enforced only by 
ensuring compliance among departments and nations. In addition, international 
cooperation is required to effectively deal with cyber and information security 
problems. For example the European Cybercrime Centre was created in Europe to 
serve as the continent’s information hub on cybercrime through the development of 
cutting edge digital forensic capabilities that support investigations for the EU and 
capacity building to fight cybercrime through training, awareness raising and the 
delivery of best practice on cybercrime investigations. 
Regarding the UAE, it was not until 2006 that its Federal Government came 
up with a law against cybercrime Federal Law No. 2, (2006). This law focused 
mainly on the prevention of Information Technology Crimes. It came into existence 
at a time when issues of information security were being recognized as a global 
threat which required each country to legislate against  cybercrime (Al-Bawaba, 
2012). The International Convention on Cybercrime, which the UAE law complies 
with, was established to harmonize cyber-laws among different countries, Council-
on-Europe, (2002).  In the case of the UAE, Federal Law No. 2, (2006) was amended 
in 2012 to incorporate measures that support the investigation and prosecution of 
cybercrimes. The new law criminalizes the use of any information communication 
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and technology (ICT) tools or the World Wide Web (Internet) to commit an array of 
crimes, punishable by imprisonment and or a fine from government through the law 
enforcement departments and the monitoring team. The Articles in the Federal Legal 
Decree No.5, 2012 on cybercrime covers content, conduct commercialism and 
contact. Some of the primary offences include breach of privacy, defamation, 
publication of illegal content, hacking and phishing attacks. Others include identity 
theft, credit card fraud, and money laundering and threatening national security. It is 
further reported that the United Arab Emirates government regularly examines the 
Internet to blacklist all websites that may contain sensitive material such as 
pornography or child abusive contents, improper religious statements, racial 
statements, gambling materials, terrorist activities and anti – Islamic statements (Al-
Bawaba, 2012; Seibert, 2002).   
In the USA laws established following the crash of the giant Enron Company 
late last century have resulted in executives being held fully responsible for 
compliance to the laws and regulations that pertain to information security. If a 
cyber-attack results in the loss and release of private health information, for example, 
executives must demonstrate that both “due care” and “due diligence” were taken to 
protect this information, for the failure of which they will be held personally 
responsible and liable (Nigel and Rice, 2011).  It is senior management’s 
responsibility in this country to ensure that their organizations are fully compliant 
with the UAE Federal Laws on cybersecurity so as to demonstrate “due diligence” 
and “due care”.  In this thesis, we ask if existing government entities have 
incorporated awareness of the federal law in their strategic plans. While these laws 
form one basis for cybersecurity policies to be established in the corporation, further 
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steps must be taken to ensure that all employees of the company are aware of the 
issues surrounding cybersecurity.  
The UAE government has also established other agencies to support efforts to 
prevent cybercrime. The national security awareness campaigns launched in 
November, 2007 by the ae-CERT to protect citizens and information online and 
provide an online identity platform tried to safeguard some of the government critical 
information by blocking most of the immoral and illegal websites from access in the 
region. This mechanism has temporarily reduced the issue of child abuse and 
pornography. Furthermore, on 22
nd
 July, 2013 the Telecommunications Regulatory 
Authority (TRA) successfully defended users from a series of cyberattacks that 
targeted some government websites. Meanwhile, the Computer Emergency Response 
Team ae-CERT managed to neutralize the problem with minimal damage.  However, 
popups, phishing attacks, denial of service, ignorance of users about security threats, 
among others, remain a major challenge that require urgent government intervention.  
The Telecommunications Regulatory Authority (TRA) is mandated to 
implement the Internet Access Management (IAM) policy on behalf of the UAE 
government by monitoring the online content available to users in the UAE and 
thereafter to alert the teams for website maintenance and implementation of the 
traces and possible impact of anything that might create a security vulnerability in 
any portal. The content proscribed by the IAM policy includes various forms of 
malicious code and any Internet content relating to terrorist cybercrime, among 
others. The TRA in its IAM enforcement role monitors advertisements online, 
including the advertising of medical products and services. The TRA also regulates 
the services of the major telecommunication operators in the UAE who are licensed 
to provide users with access to the Internet. This is done through appropriate 
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licensing clauses aimed at blocking online content that might be regarded as 
offensive or show traces of malicious codes.  A widely reported example of such 
incidents was in 2009, when the TRA banned access to a cartoon clip on YouTube 
which was alleged to contravene religious and nationalist sentiments.  
Another agency that was recently established to oversee electronic 
security is the National Electronic Security Authority (NESA). NESA is a federal 
authority responsible for developing, supervising and monitoring the 
implementation of cybersecurity in the UAE’s strategies, policies and standards. 
Their major role is to safeguard the UAE online environment and contribute to 
the collective achievement of national goals. It is committed to ensuring that all 
UAE government bodies are made fully aware of their responsibility to meet the 
requirements of the stated polices of national interest.  The regulation establishing 
this agency is Federal Law No. 3, 2012, also known as the E-Security Authority 
Law, which was created as a further reinforcement to the Federal Legal Decree 
No. 2, 2006 on cybercrimes and other regulations and programmes, including the 
establishment of the UAE Computer Emergency Response Team (aeCERT) and 
various public awareness campaigns in the region (Lydon, 2013). 
The UAE government through support departments such as NESA has also 
established special cyber-crime units to confront cybercrime in and beyond its 
territorial jurisdiction. Furthermore, the government established dedicated police 
departments committed to solving high-technology crime in the UAE. Other 
measures taken to challenge cyber-crime in both public and private sectors include 
but are not limited to public awareness and the adoption of common agreements with 
other countries, especially the GCC member countries, the European Union and the 
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United States. If the cybersecurity problem is to be solved across Abu Dhabi’s 
government entities, strict legal action against any form of malicious threat or crack 
in information security should be implemented by the government authorities 
concerned.  In addition to regulation, there is a need to ensure that appropriate cyber 
and information security frameworks are in place to help the government to 
implement policies across various departments in the Emirate of Abu Dhabi. 
Even with these new agencies and regulations, in the present technological 
and social atmosphere, the UAE has suffered numerous challenges in the process of 
striving to fight its cyber and information security problems in the region. One 
challenge is to determine how cybersecurity investigations should be conducted. 
Even with the governments’ computer law crimes, there are few prosecutions for loss 
or damage caused by cybercrimes.  
Most offenders take advantage of the anonymity of cyberspace to conceal 
their identity. Moreover, it is challenging to apply these laws effectively in 
prosecuting cases without deep insight and actual evidence of digital crime. 
However, the Internet-of-things penetrates beyond territorial borders and so 
legislators may not have full control over some criminals if they were protected by 
laws in other territories. Cybercrime investigators need to acquire credible digital 
evidence so that courts of law can prosecute the perpetrators (Vacca, 2002).  A 
number of models and frameworks exist to allow a choice of strategies for 
cybersecurity effectiveness and readiness in various organizations. Some of these 
models are discussed in the next section. 
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2.11 Existing Cybersecurity Models and Frameworks 
This section of the literature review sets the theoretical foundation for 
proposing a cybersecurity framework.  The use of “edge” devices, cloud applications 
and the increase of regulatory requirements have created a need for most 
organizations to advance their security frameworks and re-think traditional 
approaches in order to stay ahead. Organizations need new strategic frameworks to 
address numerous trends across the IT landscape that will secure data, mobile 
devices and cloud computing environments, among others. The major challenge is to 
address disruptive technologies and trends, for example, everything connected with 
social computing and at the same time manage inherent risks (Burgers et al., 2013; 
CGI Group Report, 2014). 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Porous Security Perimeter Source: (Source: CGI Group Report, 2014, 
page 5) 
Figure 5 illustrates an intensively connected IT infrastructure environment, 
which combines data flows from mobile devices, critical infrastructure and cloud 
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computing. All these combined deliver sensitive data to internal and outsourced data 
centres along a common backbone which could be vulnerable to attacks. Such highly 
connected and distributed network environments require frameworks that provide 
mechanisms for protecting critical data. This is a typical layout for an interconnected 
UAE government department that uses the e-government portal to offer services to 
the public. 
Meanwhile, Nambiro et al. (2014) assessed the cybersecurity problem in 
selected ministries for the Government of Kenya. The authors provide both 
descriptive and inferential analysis of cybersecurity assessment in a typical 
government setup. They claim that cyberattacks are highly sophisticated to the extent 
of troubling many organizations in identifying where the greatest vulnerability lies. 
They further reveal that Kenya, together with other African governments, lacks its 
own global networks and is thus very vulnerable to cyberattacks since they have to 
use communication platforms under the control of external authorities.  While this 
study provided useful insights into the way that IT personnel can respond to 
cyberattacks, it does not address the problem of dealing with typical users. There is 
need to put in place an all-embracing model that considers the requirements of 
different categories of people in a single robust framework for cybersecurity 
effectiveness. In this dissertation, we develop a cybersecurity framework that 
considers all users regardless of technical ability. 
Their study reveals that 72.1% of the respondents agreed that their 
organizations did not have secure cybersecurity infrastructure and 62.8% did not 
conduct risk assessments or IT security audits. They go on to propose a cybersecurity 
assessment framework based on Karl Pearson correlations between the cybersecurity 
challenges and cybersecurity state as indicated in Figure 6 below. 
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Figure 6: A Framework for Assessing Cybersecurity Challenges 
Results from their study reveal that lack of awareness of cyber and 
information security issues formed the greatest threat to the effectiveness of 
cybersecurity in many organizations and government entities. This was followed by 
insufficient cybersecurity legislation, inadequate funding and hastily changed 
technologies all informing the cybersecurity status of the organization.  The authors 
argue that so long as cybersecurity frameworks fail to emphasize adequate legislation 
as well as cybersecurity training and awareness, organizations or government entities 
will be highly vulnerable to different forms of attacks (Nambiro et al., 2014). The 
cybersecurity assessment framework above proposed for the Kenyan Government 
may be applicable as well to the UAE government in prioritizing and emphasising 
the most urgent security issues across the Emirates. This would provide a sense of 
direction to government planners and legislators when they allocate resources and 
compile the government security budget across all departments. 
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As already addressed elsewhere in this thesis, it should be noted that the 
application of strategic management tools to prepare for and respond to uncertainties 
resulting from cybersecurity risks against UAE government entities also raises 
awareness of the risks. These then lead to actions being taken organizationally to 
prevent such attacks. Furthermore, cybersecurity attacks are usually against critical 
national infrastructure, implying that senior management has the responsibility of 
demonstrating both “due care” and “due diligence” as established in Federal Law No. 
2, 2012 (Al Bawaba, 2012).  
Abraham and Nair (2015) also developed a predictive framework for 
cybersecurity analytics by applying an attack graph mechanism. Their main aim was 
to incorporate informed risk-management decision taking in the dynamic attributes 
associated with vulnerabilities that might change over time. They assert that the most 
challenging issues regarding security in government systems is their failure to 
develop mechanisms to combine the security of all systems in a network in order to 
assess the overall security of the interconnected network. In their study, they point 
out situational awareness as a universal concept needed to provide organizations with 
the ability to identify, comprehend and forecast the integral features of a system. 
They propose a situational awareness model below to address this concern as 
illustrated in Figure 7 below. 
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Figure 7: Cybersecurity Situational Awareness Model. (Source: Abraham and Nair, 
2015) 
The situational awareness model proposed in Figure 7 above splits the 
cybersecurity problem into four major levels (Levels 1-4).  The illustration on the left 
represents a specific action that could be performed after a cybersecurity incident 
while the table on the right suggests technological strategies which could be applied 
to each level. For instance, Level-1 deals with the identification and interpretation of 
cyberattacks through the application of intrusion detection techniques and other 
security monitoring tools; Level-2 deals with techniques to understand and analyse 
the cybersecurity problems through the application of security visualization tools and 
risk assessment techniques; Level-3 considers  mitigation of the cybersecurity risks 
once the problems emerge.  Finally, Level-4 forecasts incidents by using predictive 
models that suggest appropriate corrective and preventive actions by management 
and higher authorities in different organizations. This situational awareness model 
may also be useful to the Abu Dhabi’s government entities.  
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Previous studies show that attackers have radically reviewed their approaches 
and therefore developed ways of exploiting the vulnerabilities of most recent 
technological innovations through “Zero day” attacks. As a benchmark, governments 
need to put in place security teams to focus on activities beyond the expected or 
predefined. It is also important to deploy mechanisms for predicting vulnerability 
trends and all forms of anticipated security gaps through stochastic models and 
observing the life cycles of attacks (Bass, 2000).   
Other work on situational awareness reveals that situational awareness plays 
a major role in an organization’s decision making process. For instance, 
Evangelopoulou et al. (2014) analysed the safety techniques of applications to the 
networking environment by concentrating on network Intrusion Detection Systems 
and the human factors involved. The proposed three levels in situational awareness 
are  Perception, Comprehension (to give a more comprehensive picture of what is 
happening by combining existing knowledge and new information) and Projection 
(which deals with the ability to make predictions based on knowledge assimilated). 
Other factors that may influence situational awareness such as experience and 
knowledge were also looked into.  These writers add that efficiency, safety and 
security are the primary goals in this regard, causing a need for situational awareness 
measurement. Some of the most commonly used situational awareness techniques 
identified are Situational Awareness Global Assessment Techniques (SAGAT); the 
use of Simulations, Situational Awareness Rating methods (SART); the use of 
Rating Scales (1 – 7) and a Situation Present Awareness Model (SPAM). Such 
situation awareness techniques can be applied to Abu Dhabi’s government entities to 
assess how far people understand the cybersecurity situation. If more people 
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understood this, they would be ready to provide the correct responses to the cyber 
and information security challenges affecting their organizations.  
Situational awareness techniques may also aid the participants in evaluating 
their situational awareness level and therefore increasing the quality of service (Ahn 
et al., 2013). For instance, Simulators can be used in the aviation industry and 
practices to measure the awareness levels of flight captains; or health informatics for 
training and evaluating medical practitioners, among others. Similar techniques can 
be applied to Abu Dhabi’s government entities to evaluate the readiness of the 
trained cyber and information security professionals in cases of cyber incidents 
occurring, to enable them to take preventive and corrective action.  Furthermore, the 
situational techniques can be implemented for cyberattacks by using receiver 
operated characteristic analysis, based on recognition of an attack, faulty perception 
of a current attack and the perception of no attack.  
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) developed a 
voluntary risk-based cybersecurity framework which involves a set of industry 
standards and a set of best practices to help organizations manage cybersecurity 
risks. The subsequent framework was created through collaboration between the 
government and the private sector and uses a common language to address and 
manage cybersecurity risk. This is done in a cost-effective way based on business 
needs but without placing additional regulatory requirements on businesses. Its major 
focus is on business drivers of cybersecurity activities and it considers cybersecurity 
risk as within the organization’s risk assessment process. In the present study, we 
incorporate some of these good practices in the NIST framework and several other 
frameworks globally, as discussed in the literature, in order to formulate a framework 
for evaluating cybersecurity effectiveness in Abu Dhabi’s government entities. The 
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framework for critical infrastructure support was released in February, 2014 after 
President Obama’s Executive order 13636 of 2013 to formulate a framework that 
harmonizes consensus and standard industry best practices to provide a flexible and 
cost effective approach to enhancing cybersecurity and assist business owners or 
operators to manage cybersecurity risks (Shackelford et al., 2014). 
The fact that cyberattacks can seriously disrupt or even paralyze segments of 
critical national infrastructure implies that an offensive posture or action is required 
to confront the many forms of cyber and malware attack. Furthermore, appropriate 
strategic management theories and principles are needed to guide the control and 
prevention of these attacks (NIST, 2014). To this end, we have analysed the risk 
management process in a typical organization from executive, business and 
implementation levels through a life cycle assessment, as shown in the Figure 8 
below: 
 
Figure 8: Decision Flows in an Organization. (Source: NIST (2014) Framework 
Report) 
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 The decision flows presented in Figure 8 above show that the executive level 
staff communicates priorities, available resources and overall risk tolerance to the 
business/process level. The business / process level inputs this information into the 
risk management process and then collaborates with the implementation or 
operations level to communicate the business’s needs and create a profile. The 
implementation or operations level in return communicates the progress of profile 
implementation to the business/process level. Meanwhile, the business/process level 
uses this information to perform an impact assessment. Therefore, understanding 
cybersecurity risks presents management with an opportunity to make informed 
decisions and devise relevant corrective and preventive actions for the entire 
organization. Several authors have advocated inclusion of the NIST technology 
framework in cybersecurity strategies due to its technological capabilities and risk 
based approach to information security, as detailed in the next section. 
2.11.1 NIST Technology Framework and Cybersecurity Effectiveness 
Shen (2014) reveals that the NIST framework is flexible, technologically 
neutral and can be used by organizations of any size, level of sophistication or degree 
of cyber risk. The author adds that the framework is based on Tiers separated from 
the core to provide organizations with a means of ranking their own cybersecurity 
management practices. The Tiers range from Tier1 (Partial) to Tier 4 (Adaptive), 
representing increasing levels of rigour and sophistication in an organization’s 
cybersecurity practices. It is claimed that organizations can use the framework to 
provide a basic review of their cybersecurity practices by comparing their present 
cybersecurity activities with those outlined in the core of the framework; this will 
allow the establishment or improvement of the existing cybersecurity programme. 
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For instance, they can create a current and target profile, communicate cybersecurity 
requirements with stakeholders through a common language and identify 
opportunities to revise or create new standards, guidelines and practices. Thus, the 
framework is applicable to legislation, contracts, insurance and litigation.  
Furthermore, the framework is voluntary and was published as a living 
document to allow updates and reviews globally with the aim of improving it to keep 
pace with ever changing technology, threats and environmental needs. In this study, 
we integrate this framework with additional strategies to generate a new frame for 
Abu Dhabi’s government entities. The NIST technology framework is illustrated in 
the Figure 9 below. 
 
Figure 9: NIST Technology Framework, Source NIST, (2014) 
Figure 9 above shows the NIST technological framework proposed to resolve 
cyber threats through identification, protection, detection, response and recovery 
from cyberattacks. For instance Shackelford et al. (2014) affirms that the NIST 
Framework harmonizes industry best practices by providing a flexible and cost 
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effective approach to enhancing and assessing the cybersecurity of an organization 
by providing five key functions, namely, (i) Identify (What assets need protection?)  
(ii) Protect (What safeguards are available?)  (iii) Detect (What techniques can 
identify incidents?)  (iv) Respond (What techniques can contain the impact of 
incidents?) (v) Recover (What techniques can restore capabilities?) as illustrated in 
Figure 9 above. The framework further provides implementation tiers to illustrate 
how organizations can manage cybersecurity risks in their enterprise risk 
management practices,  
The NIST framework is not a checkbox compliance exercise but a result of 
work conducted by over three thousand (3000) business leaders and IT experts over a 
period of two years with the aim of securing critical infrastructure as compared to 
high existing standard such as COBIT, SAS, COSO and ISO 27001. Furthermore, 
Ola (2015) emphasizes that every Small and Medium-sized Business (SMB) needs to 
use the NIST cybersecurity framework, since it allows organizations to assess risks 
based on industry best standards and practices, which helps them prioritise cyber 
investment decisions and their management of cyber risks. They stress that C-level 
management must participate and take a central role in identifying cyber risk. 
Additionally, the (Price, 2014) report shows that the framework offers potential 
advances to organizations across industries by offering voluntary guidelines for 
taking a risk-based approach to cybersecurity. They could proceed by integrating 
leading industry practices developed by internationally prominent bodies such as the 
ISO and offering benefits beyond improved cybersecurity for example, effective 
collaboration and the communication of security posture with executives to improve 
cybersecurity practices and threat intelligence. Therefore, if organizations adopt the 
NIST framework at the highest possible risk tolerance level, they would be better 
105 
 
 
 
positioned to comply with cyber and privacy regulations. It is therefore evident that 
integration of the NIST cybersecurity framework with the additional strategies 
proposed in the present study would provide a stronger platform from which to 
evaluate the cybersecurity effectiveness of the Abu Dhabi’s government entities.  
 Teodore et al. (2015) reveals that the NIST technology framework provides a 
platform for evaluating critical infrastructure and predicting cybersecurity risks by 
providing a set of core activities required for implementation. They assert that human 
resources, processes and technology form a major pillar supporting an organization’s 
cybersecurity. However, the authors also reveal some drawbacks to the framework: 
the failure to provide a standard reference for organizations to follow and the 
concealed cybersecurity maturity gaps in for example employee skills, among others, 
may hinder its effectiveness.  
The researcher hopes that proposing a new framework that incorporates key 
factors proposed in this study like cybersecurity training, cybersecurity awareness, 
the role of management, laws and regulations, qualifications of the information 
security staff and experience of users, among others, would yield a stronger 
framework for assessing cybersecurity effectiveness in Abu Dhabi’s government 
entities.  
 It is revealed that, even if the cited incentives in the use of the framework 
existed, their effectiveness in improving critical infrastructure cybersecurity would 
need continuous refinement with future versions integrating new strategies such as 
legal requirements and the government’s role. The cybersecurity framework 
proposed in this research draws from other frameworks and models reviewed in 
literature such as NIST in addition to several factors to contribute a new framework 
for evaluating cybersecurity effectiveness of Abu Dhabi government entities. The 
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framework does not consider human and organizational factors like, culturally 
sensitive training and user awareness programmes, support from senior management, 
presence of experienced and competent staff and modern technological 
countermeasures all in an updated framework coupled by the use of strategic 
management tools to create conditions for enhanced information security across the 
different entities. Therefore, the study intends to strengthen the human and 
organizational factors discussed in literature together with the risk based 
technological strategies proposed in the NIST (2014) technology platform to 
formulate a strong framework and checklist for evaluating cybersecurity 
effectiveness of Abu Dhabi government entities. Meanwhile, the International 
Organization for Standardization (ISO), the International Electro technical 
Commission (IEC) and the UAE’s National Electronics Security Authority (NESA) 
in collaboration with the Abu Dhabi Systems and Information Centre (ADSIC) 
proposed more standards with several strategies for evaluating cyber and information 
security status in organizations as briefly discussed in the next sections. 
2.11.2 The ISO 27000 Information Security Management Standards 
The ISO 27000 family of standards offers a set of specifications, code of 
conduct and best practice for organizations to ensure strong IT service management. 
It includes standards like ISO/IEC 27001: ISMS which offers specifications for an 
effective Information Security Management System, ISO/IEC 27002, which provides 
the code of conduct and the recommended best practice by detailing 114 security 
controls organized into 14 sectors and 35 control objectives as well as the ISO/IEC 
27005 which provides guidelines for Risk Management. These standards were 
developed by the joint committee of the International Organization for 
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Standardization (ISO) and the International Electro-technical Commission (IEC) 
with the objective of defining requirements for successful ISMS delivery through a 
process based approach by Establishing, Implementing, Monitoring and Maintenance 
of an ISMS grounded on a Plan Do Check Act (PDCA) model. However, many 
organizations lack mature management systems with little knowledge on Information 
security governance and evaluation of existing mechanisms coupled with the lack of 
skilled resources to conduct risk analysis to enable the implementation as well as 
maintenance of strong Information Security Management System justifying the need 
for a simpler framework to address such concerns. Further, the ISO 27001 standard 
allows organizations to explicitly asses their internal processes with a major aim of 
presenting to International bodies for certification. This approach implies that 
organizations focus mainly on jumping the bar for international competitiveness 
ignoring performance evaluation of their internal cybersecurity systems by limiting 
the scope to operational standardisation of those well performing functional units 
other than evaluating the strength of their organization-wide Cyber and Information 
security defences, policies and frameworks with senior Management taking a lead. 
This is a major focus of this study research theoretical framework were the research 
proposes a simpler framework that Abu Dhabi government entities can embark on to 
evaluate and address the missing link in the performance of cybersecurity systems. In 
the next section we briefly discuss the ADSIC II and NESA information security 
framework guidelines in comparison to this study. 
2.11.3 The UAE National Electronics Security Authority (NESA) Standards 
The UAE Federal Law No. 3 and No. 5 of 2012, established the National 
Electronic Security Agency (NESA) as a federal body tasked with protecting the 
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UAE’s national critical infrastructure and improving National Cybersecurity through 
development of standards, policies and suggestive legislation as well as guidelines 
for securing digital data in all critical sectors of the UAE economy.  These standards 
were developed with a benchmark on major International standards for information 
security like the NIST (2014) Special Publication 800-53: recommended security 
controls for federal information systems & organizations, ISO/IEC 27001: ISMS and 
ISO/IEC 27002 code of practice for information security management. Compliance 
to these standards is mandatory and is determined by ADSIC whose primary 
responsibility is to check compliance to the standards by all government entities in 
the emirate of Abu Dhabi.  
NESA’s threat based approach to information security is managed by 
mapping controls to the 24 most recent threats gathered from industry reports since 
2012, Alqatawna (2014). Controls in the framework were ranked as P1 representing 
the highest to P4 representing lowest impact with definitions for both Management 
and Technical oriented controls across 12 domains as shown in Figure 10 below. 
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Figure 10: NESA Information Security Standard 
Source: ADSIC standards Ver 2.0, Page 5 
From Figure 10 above, the NESA framework on information security 
incorporates a domain on Awareness, Training and Communication of information 
security issues to all stakeholders and emphasizes the recruitment of well qualified 
Information security professionals to the level of CISO in every government entity. 
This is in support of this study, however, the checklist developed by ADSIC to 
implement the proposed framework in Figure 10 is very long and rather complex the 
12 domain controls distributed on over 300 pages which makes it very difficult for 
organizations to implement or quickly asses their cybersecurity systems and provides 
little input towards evaluating relationships between competence of staff, role of 
management, level of technology and strategic planning as compared to 
cybersecurity effectiveness of Abu Dhabi’s government entities. This study is 
intended to bridge this gap by contributing a simplified framework and checklist 
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specifically for assessing the effectiveness of organization wide cybersecurity 
systems for Abu Dhabi government entities. 
Meanwhile, the Software Engineering Institute (SEI) at the Carnegie Mellon 
University developed a model for software development as early as 1980s. This 
model was named the Capability Maturity Model Integration (CMMI) developed 
with the aim of formulating a path for improving organizational software 
development processes. The model was formally published in 2002 as CMMI Ver 
1.1. (Dong-Young and Gerald, 2010). The CMMI model is widely applicable to 
government entities especially when conducting process based assessment for stable 
and mature improvement. The model provides a framework mainly used in software 
development and maintenance processes based on actual practices that reflect the 
needs of individuals performing software process improvement through a hierarchy 
of five maturity levels that lay successive foundation for continuous process 
improvement, the maturity levels include; 1) Initial, 2) Managed, 3) Defined, 4) 
Quantitatively Managed,  and 5) Optimizing. These levels are further broken down 
into several process areas to reflect areas where an organization needs to focus more 
in case of operational process improvement. This research borrows the five maturity 
levels from the CMMI model to generate a scoring and measurement technique 
based on Likert scale (1-5) for assessing and interpreting organizational 
cybersecurity effectiveness in terms of the six factors identified for organizational 
cybersecurity effectiveness in Abu Dhabi Government entities. The modified CMMI 
model applicable for this study is as seen in the Figure 11 below: 
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Figure 11: Modified Capability Maturity Model Integration (CMMI) Model 
The researcher modified the Capability Maturity Model Integration (CMMI) 
in the Figure 11 above to come up with  a measurement and scoring scale which Abu 
Dhabi government entities can use to verify the level of cybersecurity effectiveness 
(CSE) in their organizations through which  Level 1 indicates that the organization 
has taken initial steps towards implementing measures that contribute towards CSE; 
Level 2 indicates that these measures are repeatable and; Level 3 indicates that these 
CSE measures are defined and can be referenced, Level 4 shows that the 
organization has a well-managed CSE operations while the  highest level of CSE in 
an organization is Level 5 which will demonstrate the department has fully complied 
with all the factors for cybersecurity effectiveness.    
 From the above discussions, the researcher has identified several factors and 
strategies for ensuring an effective cybersecurity system. Based on that, the 
following hypotheses are proposed for this study: 
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2.12 Research Hypotheses 
H1:  There is a positive relationship between the competence/knowledge of 
staff and cybersecurity effectiveness. 
H2:  There is a positive relationship between senior management support and 
cybersecurity effectiveness. 
H3:  There is a positive relationship between level of technology and 
cybersecurity effectiveness 
H4:  There is a positive relationship between cybersecurity training of staff 
and cybersecurity effectiveness. 
H5:  There is a positive relationship between the presence of cybersecurity 
strategic plans and cybersecurity effectiveness 
H6: There is a positive relationship between awareness of users about cyber 
security and cybersecurity effectiveness 
Furthermore, the researcher has identified and responded to several issues and 
problems hindering the effectiveness of organization’s cybersecurity 
programmes. These problems are presented in the research gap 
illustrated in the next section. 
2.13 Research Gap 
Several cyber and information security frameworks and models reviewed in 
literature, provide detailed insights into the research problem and the techniques for 
combating existing information security challenges wherever they occur. For 
instance, Nambiro et al. (2014) proposes a cybersecurity status assessment 
framework for government ministries in a developing country by applying Karl 
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Pearson correlation coefficients. However, implementation details for this framework 
provide no clear description of its defence capability.  While the NIST (2014) 
Technological Framework has been highly rated, particularly for providing 
appropriate technological cybersecurity defences to organizations globally 
(Shackelford et al., 2015; Teodoro et al., 2015; Price, 2014; Sage, 2015; Hiller and 
Russell, 2015; and among others)  it fails to include other important factors to ensure 
a strong cybersecurity evaluation system. The framework presents a technologically 
centred model whose major focus is on the business drivers of cybersecurity 
activities and the consideration of cybersecurity risk as part of an organization’s risk 
assessment process. The framework is a risk-based compilation of the guidelines 
designed to help organizations to assess their current capabilities and draft prioritised 
roadmaps for improved cybersecurity practices. The authors of the framework had as 
their major goal the improvement of risk based security, but they did not did not fully 
address other critical strategies concerning cyber and information security challenges 
to organizations such as culture sensitive user training and awareness programmes, 
support from existing laws and regulations, support from senior management and the 
competence level of information security staff. Even though we agree that the NIST 
technology framework provides a strong technology centred and risk-based approach 
through the five key functions (Identify, Protect, Detect, Respond and Recover) the 
researcher argues that other non-technologically focused strategic factors are very 
critical for organization’s cybersecurity system and therefore cannot be taken lightly 
when evaluating cybersecurity effectiveness of an organization. The researcher 
therefore proposes a cybersecurity framework, together with a checklist, that 
incorporates all these human and organizational factors that are strategically 
important for cybersecurity effectiveness of Abu Dhabi’s government entities.  
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2.14 Conclusion 
In this study, we have critically reviewed the literature concerning the 
cybersecurity landscape globally, including technologies, strategic planning 
methodologies and several cybersecurity frameworks and models, together with 
some strategies for an effective cybersecurity system. Most of the authors 
concentrate on technological and situational awareness mechanisms for evaluating 
cybersecurity effectiveness and eliminating associated risks (NIST, 2014; Burgers et 
al., 2013; Abraham and Nair, 2015; and Nambiro et al., 2014). However, these 
mechanisms provide little help for the ever-increasing number of uninformed users, 
analysis of the existing legal framework and its implication for cybersecurity 
effectiveness or consideration of senior management’s role in preventing 
cyberattacks. We have studied the existing literature on the concept of cybersecurity 
from a broad perspective through the discussion of several studies and frameworks 
concerning cybersecurity defences, major attacks on organizations’ critical 
infrastructure, technologies for implementation, and prevention of these attacks, the 
role of cybersecurity education, and training and awareness.   Based on the above 
discussions in the literature, it is evident that several gaps exist regarding 
cybersecurity and effectiveness and therefore we propose further investigation and 
analysis of the phenomenon. In the next chapter we present the methodology used to 
conduct further research for the study.  
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Chapter 3: Research Methodology 
3.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, we present a comprehensive study and the approach taken to 
the research problem concerning the evaluation of cybersecurity effectiveness in Abu 
Dhabi’s government entities. The principal objective is to discuss how the underlying 
study has been conducted, how the data were collected, analyzed and validated 
through reliability statistics. This chapter is presented according to the design 
illustrated in the flowchart in Figure 12 below: 
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Figure 12: Design of Chapter Three 
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Well defined theories and frameworks on cybersecurity in the UAE, the GCC 
and elsewhere were consulted through which a detailed review of related literature 
was conducted to generate a conceptual model. The following hypotheses were 
formulated for this study: 
H1: There is a positive relationship between the competence/knowledge of 
staff and cybersecurity effectiveness. 
H2:  There is a positive relationship between senior management support and 
cybersecurity effectiveness. 
H3:  There is a positive relationship between level of technology and 
cybersecurity effectiveness 
H4:  There is a positive relationship between cybersecurity training of staff 
and cybersecurity effectiveness. 
H5:  There is a positive relationship between the presence of cybersecurity 
strategic plans and cybersecurity effectiveness 
H6: There is a positive relationship between awareness of users about cyber 
security and cybersecurity effectiveness 
 
From the above hypotheses we formulated a study framework to guide the 
research process and the analysis of the relationships between variables. The latter, 
together with the literature review laid a foundation for discussing and formulating a 
cybersecurity framework which was used to assess the effectiveness of the 
cybersecurity strategies used by Abu Dhabi’s government entities. The formulated 
study framework can be seen in Figure 13 below: 
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Figure 13: Proposed Study Framework 
From Figure 13, the lack of Cybersecurity Effectiveness (CSE) has been 
identified as the key management problem facing organizations worldwide and Abu 
Dhabi’s government entities in particular. This lack of cybersecurity effectiveness 
creates a knowledge gap in the organizations and is hence a researchable problem for 
this study. To fill it, a research framework was formulated, based on a theoretical 
foundation in the literature upon which a number of independent variables were 
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formulated against the dependent variable Cybersecurity Effectiveness (CSE).  
Analysis of these relationships between variables contributed to several outcomes, 
findings and recommendations including the proposed Integrated Cybersecurity 
Framework for Abu Dhabi’s government entities. The variables used in the study 
were theoretically and operationally defined to provide an insight into the 
measurement of variables and our expectations of the study results. 
3.2 Definition and Measurement of Variables 
In order to guide the analysis of the study all the variables in the study 
framework and research hypotheses were theoretically and operationally defined 
with theoretical definitions based on the literature,  and operational definitions which 
were seen from our perspective in analysing and measuring the variables to answer 
the research questions and deliver appropriate study results. A five point Likert scale 
was used for measuring responses in this research instrument. Below we define the 
variables considered in the study: 
 
Independent variable 1 (INDV1): Competence of information security staff 
Hypothesis H1. There is a relationship between the Competence/knowledge of  
staff and cybersecurity effectiveness. 
3.2.1 H1 Theoretical Definition 
Gilbert (1978) sees “competence" as a combination of practical and 
theoretical knowledge, cognitive skills, behaviour and values used to improve 
performance; or as a state of being adequate or well qualified, having the ability to 
perform a specific role. For instance, management competency may be determined in 
terms of systems thinking, emotional intelligence and having the skills to influence 
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or negotiate the highly technical cyber- and information security matters under 
review. This hypothesis focuses on the qualifications and experience of cyber- or 
information security staff employed in government entities and the way in which it 
impacts on their cybersecurity knowledge and skills as well as the effectiveness of 
their individual departments.  
3.2.2 H1 Operational Definition 
In this study, we strongly believe that staff with specialized qualifications and 
considerable amounts of experience (say, > = 5 years) in the cyber- and information 
security domain in a government department demonstrates more knowledge and 
understanding of cybersecurity issues affecting their organizations than do staff 
without specialized cybersecurity qualifications and with little or no experience in 
the security domain in a government department. That is, the higher the qualification 
and experience of cybersecurity staff, the higher the competence level. In this case 
we propose using a correlation technique to analyse this relationship.  
Experience of cybersecurity staff should be based on the number of years 
served in government department while qualification should be based on an 
employee’s attainment of internationally recognized cyber and information security 
certificates such as Certified Ethical Hacker, Certified Information Security 
Professional (CISSP), Certified Information Security Manager (CISM) and Cisco 
Certified Internetwork Expert (CCIE) Security, among others. Descriptive and 
Inferential statistical tests such as Mean and Standard deviations, Frequency 
distributions, Cross tabulations, ANOVA and linear regression analysis were 
conducted to test this study hypothesis. The ANOVA test was used to compare 
means of more than two groups on the continuous variable, post-hoc comparisons 
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were used to find out any significant differences between groups to check the 
condition for homogeneity of variance if p-value = 0.05. Further, linear regressions 
were conducted to find out the impact of staff competence on cybersecurity 
effectiveness (CSE).  
Independent Variable 2 (INDV2): Senior management support 
Hypothesis H2. There is a relationship between senior management support and 
cybersecurity effectiveness. 
3.2.3 H2 Theoretical Definition 
It is claimed in several studies that cybersecurity is a management issue that 
requires management intervention and commitment (Kritzinger and Van Solms, 
2010; Al Bawaba, 2012; Rotvold, 2008; and Nigel and Rice, 2011). Therefore, 
management support to cyber and information security programmes in and outside 
the organization is predicted to provide higher effectiveness for it. That is to say, 
senior management needs to understand the cybersecurity risk and its implications 
for the organization to enable staff to make informed decisions at the earliest through 
strategic thinking and governance. Senior management support in this study context 
is operationally defined in the next section. 
3.2.4 H2 Operational Definition 
Senior management support is evaluated by the presence or absence of well 
qualified cyber and information security staff; presence of policies, procedures and 
strategic plans which have incorporated cybersecurity planning; and the presence of 
approved cybersecurity budgets among others. “The more the support from senior 
management, the more the cybersecurity effectiveness”. Descriptive and inferential 
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statistics like computations for mean and standard deviations, cross tabulations, 
ANOVA including Levene’s test of homogeneity of variance at p - value (p = 0.05) 
to check if there exist  any statistical significance between groups of departments.  
ANOVA and linear regression to be used in determining the influence of the 
participants‘ sector on the construct support from senior management, Multiple 
comparisons through post-hoc analysis using Tukey HSD test at p-value = 0.05 
Independent Variable3 (INDV3): Level of technology  
Hypothesis H3. There is a relationship between the level of technology and 
cybersecurity effectiveness  
3.2.5 H3 Theoretical Definition 
There is a claim in the literature that organizations that invest heavily and 
deploy strong cybersecurity technologies in their departments’ critical infrastructure 
demonstrate greater cybersecurity effectiveness (Symantec, 2016; NIST, 2014; 
Gercke, 2014; and Hunter, 2013). Such technologies include the deployment of 
strong anti-virus software, firewalls, Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS), and 
Intrusion Protection Systems (IPS), among others.  
3.2.6 H3 Operational Definition 
The more organizations deploy strong cybersecurity technologies, the greater 
their readiness to combat cyberattacks and the greater the cybersecurity 
effectiveness. Therefore, government entities which deploy appropriate technology 
for detecting and preventing cyberattacks, will be more effective than those that do 
not deploy these technologies. From the responses obtained from the survey 
instrument, it is apparent that all the government entities in Abu Dhabi have invested 
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heavily in technology. As viewed from the standpoint of the NIST (2014) 
framework, a technology framework already exists for identifying, detecting, 
responding to and preventing cyber intrusion; hence the present study focused on 
adding other human and social factors to technology and measuring them to evaluate 
the cybersecurity effectiveness of all the departments. Descriptive and inferential 
statistics like computations for mean and standard deviations, cross tabulations, 
ANOVA including Levene’s test of homogeneity of variance at p-value (p = 0.05) to 
check if there exist  any statistical significance between groups of departments.   An 
F-test at statistical significance p = 0.05 was conducted to determine the coefficient 
R
2 
and determine its variation with the independent variable of cybersecurity 
effectiveness, ANOVA and Linear regressions also conducted to check statistical 
significance between study groups as related to the dependent variable cybersecurity 
effectiveness. 
Independent Variable 4 (INDV4): Training of staff 
Hypothesis H4. There is a relationship between the cybersecurity training of staff and 
cybersecurity effectiveness. 
3.2.7 H4 Theoretical Definition 
Effective employee training programmes in cybersecurity refers to 
programmes that provide staff with information, new skills, or professional 
development opportunities in the domain of cyber and information security. The 
literature mentions that staff who undergo appropriate cybersecurity training and 
awareness programmes demonstrate better understanding of cybersecurity issues and 
gain more job skills, leading to cybersecurity effectiveness in their organizations 
(Siponnen, 2000; Hight, 2005; Greitzer et al., 2007; Whitmer, 2007; Kritzinger and 
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Smith, 2008; and McCrohan, 2010). The researcher analysed and validated this 
theoretical claim.  
3.2.8 H4 Operational Definition 
The more cyber- and information security training programmes employees 
undertake, the more knowledge they acquire and the more effective they become; 
hence the cybersecurity effectiveness of their organizations. We compared the 
cybersecurity knowledge of employees who have attended the required training 
programmes to those who have not on a 5 point Likert scale. Descriptive and 
inferential statistics like computations for mean and standard deviations, cross 
tabulations, ANOVA including Levene’s test of homogeneity of variance at p - value 
(p = 0.05) to check if there exist  any statistical significance between groups of 
departments.  ANOVA and Linear regressions were conducted for groups of 
departments to establish the relationship with the dependent variable, cybersecurity 
effectiveness (CSE). Further, we used Levene’s statistical test to determine the 
homogeneity of variance and check the p-value within and between the departments 
or study groups and also compute the means and standard deviations so as to 
compare departmental sectors against the study construct and the independent 
variable. 
Independent Variable 5 (INDV5): Presence of Cybersecurity Strategic Plans 
Hypothesis 5. There is a relationship between the presence of cybersecurity strategic 
plans and cybersecurity effectiveness. 
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3.2.9 H5 Theoretical Definition 
Strategic planning is an organization's process of defining its strategy, or 
direction, and making decisions on allocating its resources to pursue this strategy. 
Strategic plans help organizations to improve their cybersecurity arrangements 
(Elbanna, 2010; Grant, 2003; and Andrew, 2014), but departments that incorporate 
cybersecurity in their strategic plans would be more effective. 
3.2.10 H5 Operational Definition 
The more organizations incorporate cybersecurity into their strategic planning 
programmes, the greater their cybersecurity effectiveness. That is to say, if the 
management of a government department considers cybersecurity in all its strategic 
planning, policies and frameworks, then we expect more cybersecurity effectiveness 
in the department. Descriptive and inferential statistics like computations for mean 
and standard deviations, cross tabulations, ANOVA including Levene’s test of 
homogeneity of variance at p - value (p = 0.05) to check if there exist  any statistical 
significance between groups of departments. We considered inter-variable 
correlation coefficients for the different groups in the study population and 
conducted a linear regression analysis to check the statistical significance of the 
study construct at p = 0.05 
 
Independent Variable 6 (INDV6): Awareness of Users 
Hypothesis H6. There is a relationship between the awareness of users about 
cybersecurity and cybersecurity effectiveness 
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3.2.11 H6 Theoretical Definition 
User awareness programmes are deliberate efforts by organization to 
influence user thinking and behaviour regarding cybersecurity issues. They are 
designed to create consciousness in users of the correct behaviours to support the 
organization’s cybersecurity efforts. These programmes instil the security principles 
that help change user behaviour while helping the organization manage cybersecurity 
risks. 
3.2.12 H6 Operational Definition 
Employee awareness of department policies and procedures is a strong 
indication that the organization has an effective cybersecurity programme. That is 
“the higher the awareness of users about the organization’s policies and procedures, 
the higher the cybersecurity effectiveness of the organization”. Descriptive and 
inferential statistics were obtained through cross tabulations, post-hoc analysis using 
Tukey’s HSD test, linear regressions and ANOVA test  to determine the significance 
of the results of Levene’s test for homogeneity of variance at p = 0.05. Smaller 
values of R
2 
represent smaller variations in cybersecurity effectiveness against the 
factor. 
 
Next, we discuss the research paradigm employed in this study. 
3.3 Research Paradigm 
Gallagher et al. (2003) define a paradigm as "a world view". The authors 
view it as a basic set of beliefs or assumptions which guide a researcher’s 
investigation.  It is envisaged that every researcher approaches research with many 
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interlocking and sometimes contradicting philosophical assumptions and standpoints.  
Yet a paradigm has been defined on the basis of aspects relating to social reality. 
Social reality is made up of the materials that construct the social world and impact 
on people’s lives, providing them with opportunities and negotiating restrictions, 
such as individuals’ motives and social interactions. Meanwhile Creswell and Miller 
(2000) indicates that the research design process begins with philosophical 
assumptions which enquirers treat as a foundation for making decisions when they 
carry out a study. That is to say, researchers convey their own paradigms, or sets of 
beliefs, to the research project, and these inform the conduct and writing of the study.  
In conducting social science research, two principal and divergent traditions 
exist, namely positivism and social constructionism. The positivist approach in the 
natural sciences stresses the use of organized methods combining deductive logic 
from existing theories with precise empirical observations of individual behaviors, to 
formulate and test the study hypotheses. Social constructionism, however, focuses on 
explaining why people have different experiences (Hair et al., 2009). In the present 
study we employed the positivist paradigm since the logic is based on a critical 
review of existing theories and frameworks in the literature and in practice. It is 
proposed that the positivist paradigm underpins quantitative methodology owing to 
its deductive nature (Tubey et al., 2015).  Meanwhile, the approach used for 
conducting research is discussed in the next section. 
3.4 Research Strategy 
Several strategies and frameworks in the literature were qualitatively assessed 
to generate empirical support in formulating a study framework for the present work 
(NIST, 2014; Nambiro et al., 2014; Shen, 2014; Burgers et al., 2013; and Abraham 
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Nair, 2015). A detailed discussion of the tools, the research design and the data 
collection methods is presented. In addition, the units of observation representing the 
study population, sampling technique employed, reliability and validity of the 
research instrument as well as the questionnaire used to gather findings of the study 
are discussed. 
While the main strategy in this study was to use a survey approach for 
collecting data, first a pilot study was conducted in a mid-sized organization to 
establish the role of awareness programmes in cybersecurity issues among 
employees. This was necessary to validate whether culturally sensitive cyber and 
information security training programmes affect the design of appropriate 
cybersecurity programmes.  The intention was to examine the relationship between 
employee training programmes and employee awareness programmes on 
cybersecurity effectiveness in organizations, with reference to research hypotheses 
H4 and H6.  
Staff in a midsized organization were randomly divided into two groups.  
Group one consisting of Indians treated to a cybersecurity training program that is 
culturally sensitive conducted in Hindi while the second group consisting different 
nationalities from Uganda, Nepal, Pakistan and the Philippines undertook a generic 
one conducted in English.  A survey was conducted following the treatments. Results 
showed a significant difference in the two dispositions. It was revealed that the group 
which undertook a culturally sensitive approach demonstrated better understanding 
of cyber and information security issues better than the generically trained group 
after a period of one month.   
Following the pilot study, we chose the survey approach, since surveys are 
easy to manage, effective for a fairly large population and can be administered in 
129 
 
 
 
several ways, such as on line, on paper, via a mobile surveys or a mixture of these. 
Both online and paper surveys were administered to the target population of 946 
respondents in Abu Dhabi’s government entities to ensure optimum response rates. 
We employed a quantitative approach to analyze the strata and this formed the basis 
for a discussion of study results and findings. We analyzed the qualifications and 
experience (competence) of the information security staff in the Abu Dhabi’s 
government entities, reviewed the existing user training and awareness programmes 
and the cybersecurity technologies deployed and examined their relationship with the 
cybersecurity effectiveness of the selected government entities. 
 Finally, we examined the relationship between the current laws, management 
support and cybersecurity effectiveness as well as the existence of supportive 
strategic plans to enhance cybersecurity effectiveness. After a detailed study of 
several cybersecurity defense frameworks, and drawing from existing frameworks 
such as NIST (2014) and Nambiro et al. (2014), the researcher proposes a framework 
that could be utilized by the Abu Dhabi government entities to evaluate their 
readiness to defend against cyberattacks. 
3.5 Research Design 
The research design presents a framework created to seek answers to the 
research questions above. It defines the study type (namely, descriptive or 
correlational) and sub-type (namely, a descriptive-longitudinal case study), research 
question, hypotheses, independent and dependent variables, experimental design, 
and, if applicable, data collection methods and the plan for the statistical analysis 
proposed.  The design was seen as a blueprint for the logical structure of the 
research, which helped to identify the grouping levels of the participants and the data 
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collection techniques (Rovai et al., 2014). The relationships between the variables 
were studied without controlling participants or study conditions through 
experimental or non-experimental techniques.    
Survey research was employed to present the findings of this study. It was 
structured analytically by presenting its dependent, independent and extraneous 
variables. The variables used in this study were classified as shown in the Table 2 
below. 
Table 2: Study Variables 
 
Variable name Type 
Competence/Knowledge of cybersecurity 
Staff 
Independent 
Support from Management Independent 
Level of Technology Independent 
Training of Staff Independent 
Presence of Strategic Plans Independent 
Awareness of Users Independent 
Cybersecurity Effectiveness (CSE) Dependent 
       
3.5.1 Population of the Study 
The study population consisted of all the 126 Abu Dhabi government 
agencies as listed on the e-Government portal (https://www.Abu Dhabi.ae).  These 
agencies, which were the units of our observation, are organized into the types of 
service they provide to the public. The 8 service types are as follows:  
Type 1:  Social and Civic 
Type 2:  Culture and Recreation 
Type 3:  Department of Transport 
Type 4:  Economic affairs 
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Type 5: Health Authority of Abu Dhabi 
Type 6: Education Department 
Type 7: Public Order 
Type 8: Science and Technology 
From the target population of 126 we randomly selected at least two (2) units of 
observation from each of the eight categories or Types listed above. These units of 
observation (Departments) had the following characteristics.  First, the smallest ones 
had up to 100 employees, the medium-sized ones from 100 – 500 employees and the 
large ones had over 500 employees. Second, some of the small entities had one or 
two branches only, while the larger ones had offices in all major urban centres of the 
Emirate. What was common to most of these entities was that their employees were 
mostly UAE nationals.  
In total, 32 units of observation were randomly selected to represent the 8 
types. The results obtained from these units of observation were generalized to the 
population of the 126 government agencies.  
3.5.2 Respondent Sample Selection Methodology 
In each of the 32 units of observation in the sample, the researcher aimed at 
administering the questionnaire to 30 respondents. The total number of respondents 
targeted was thus 960. The entities were categorized under the eight types of service 
offered (as seen above). The researcher in consultation with the 10 Experts in Abu 
Dhabi government entities selected on the basis of subject knowledge and experience 
and two academic professors selected the sources of data (respondents).  These 
respondents were selected from each of the 32 entities with a major focus on 
managerial level and staff with the following titles: Executive Director (CEO or 
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GM), Department Manager (CIO/CISO, Consultant, IT Manager etc.) and Section 
Manager (Officer, Team member etc.). From the 960 questionnaires distributed to 
the entire population, a total of 535 was completed and returned. The actual 
respondents to the survey questions remain unnamed because of confidentiality 
agreements, which were needed to ensure their maximum cooperation with the 
research. Figure 14 below illustrates the sample selection methodology used in the 
study. 
 
Figure 14: Sample Selection Methodology 
 
From Figure 14, there are 126 government entities in the Abudhabi 
government (the universe of this study) divided into eight types. The researcher 
sampled 32 entities from the universe with at least 2 entities from each entity type to 
avoid sampling bias. Further, from each of the 32 entities in the sample, a minimum 
of 30 respondents was expected to answer the survey questionnaire. After 
administering the survey, 535 questionnaires were completed and returned from 
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which only 467 were clean for further analysis. The next section discusses how the 
respondents sample was selected to ensure objective responses. 
3.5.3 Definition of the Respondents 
Further, Table 3 and figure 15 below shows how the 960 targeted respondents 
were distributed across the 32 government agencies sampled for the study. These 
respondents constitute our target population (N= 960). From the 32 units of 
observation sampled, all the Executive Directors or equivalent (32), all CIO/CISO 
(32) and all IT Managers (32) were targeted. The total targeted from this group of 
senior management was 96. The remaining 864 included employees in other ranks or 
positions within the organizations, such as business, HR and operations from all the 
sampled organizations representing each of the 8 department types across the 
Emirate. From this targeted population, a total of 535 respondents in the 32 units of 
observation selected for the survey completed and returned their questionnaires to the 
researcher for further analysis as indicated in Table 3 below. 
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Table 3: Definition of the Study Population, Source: Primary Data 
 
Department 
Types 
Total 
Number 
of 
Departme
nts 
(n1=126) 
Depart
ments 
in 
Study 
(n2=32) 
Total 
Executive 
Director or 
Equivalent 
(n3=32) 
Total 
CISO/
CIO 
Total 
IT 
Manage
rs  
n5=32) 
Total Non-
Manageme
nt Staff 
(n6=27) 
Targeted 
Population 
(n3+n4+n5) 
Returned 
Question
naires 
Social and 
Civic 
44 9 9 9 9 243 270 196 
 
 
Culture and 
Recreation 
19 4 4 4 4 108 120 72 
 
 
Transport 9 3 3 3 3 81 90 44 
 
 
Economic 
Affairs 
22 5 5 5 5 135 150 62 
 
 
Health 2 2 2 2 2 54 60 26 
 
 
Education 6 3 3 3 3 81 90 49 
 
 
Public Order 
and Safety 
6 3 3 3 3 81 90 39 
 
 
Science and 
Technology 
8 3 3 3 3 81 90 47 
 
 
Total N 126 32 32 32 32 864 960 535 
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Figure 15:  Distribution of the Study Population in Abu Dhabi  
Several methods and techniques were applied to gather the research findings 
and analyze the study results. After a thorough cleaning of the study strata, 68 cases 
of missing values were detected in the final data coding sheet. These cases were 
removed before a final analysis, leaving a final complete data set of 467 for further 
analysis, as detailed in Chapter Four. Meanwhile, some of the tools and approaches 
in the study are discussed in the next section. 
3.6 Methodological Approach 
3.6.1 Research Instrument 
A carefully written and structured questionnaire was used to gather responses 
from the target study population. It used a five point Likert scale to guide 
respondents in choosing the appropriate answers that would allow their views to be 
interpreted.   This tool was selected for the present study since it allows respondents 
to record in numerical form the degree to which they agree or disagree with a series 
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of statements, making it easy to perform statistical analysis.  The questionnaire used 
was structured into sub sections, each comprising questions relevant to a specific 
study hypothesis or area of focus, as detailed in Table 4 below. 
                                      
Table 4: Questionnaire Structure 
 
Questionnaire Focus 
area or Variable 
Test Questions (QN) Target Hypothesis 
Demographic Data QN1, QN2, QN3,  QN5, 
QN6, QN7 
Questions used to describe the 
study population and 
understanding participants 
backgrounds 
Competence/ 
Knowledge of staff 
QN4, QN8, QN9, QN10, 
QN11, QN12, QN13, 
QN14, QN15, 
QN17,QN18 
H1: There is a positive 
relationship between the 
competence/knowledge of staff 
and cybersecurity effectiveness. 
 
Support from 
Management 
QN31, QN32, QN33, 
QN34, QN35, QN37, 
QN41, QN42, QN29  
H2:  There is a positive 
relationship between senior 
management support and 
cybersecurity effectiveness. 
 
Level of Technology QN19, QN20, QN22, 
QN23, QN24, QN25, 
QN26, QN46, QN47, 
QN48, QN49 
H3:  There is a  positive 
relationship between level of 
technology and cybersecurity 
effectiveness 
 
Training of Staff QN54, QN55, QN56, 
QN58, QN59, QN60 
H4:  There is a positive 
relationship between 
cybersecurity training of staff and 
cybersecurity effectiveness. 
 
Presence of Strategic 
Plans 
QN37, QN38, QN39, 
QN40 
 
 
H5:  There is a positive 
relationship between the presence 
of cybersecurity strategic plans 
and cybersecurity effectiveness 
 
 Awareness of Users QN4 (demographics), 
QN8 (demographics), 
QN40, QN50, QN51, 
QN52, QN53, QN57 
H6: There is a positive 
relationship between awareness 
of users about cyber security and 
cybersecurity effectiveness 
 
Laws and Regulations QN18, QN30  
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Table 4 above shows how the questionnaire items were distributed across the 
factors of cybersecurity with respect to the different study hypotheses and variables. 
The items used to measure the constructs were selected with inputs from the 
consulted 10 experts and in consultation with several international cyber and 
information security standards like (ADSIC II Information Security Guidelines, 
2013, ISO / IEC 27001; 2013; ISMS standard, ISO/ IEC 27032; 2012; Cybersecurity 
Standard, NIST (2014) Framework guidelines and ISO / IEC 27035, International 
Standard for incident Management checklists). 
An online version of this instrument was initially administered through 
Survey Monkey to a limited sample to obtain initial results that could be used to 
further improve the questionnaire before the actual field survey commenced. From 
the results of this limited study, it was determined that changes had to be made, to 
improve the clarity of the questions and the response rate of the target population. 
The corrections included adding an Arabic version and allowing for hard copies to be 
distributed. A copy of the survey questionnaire can be found in Appendix A of this 
dissertation. A further discussion of the questionnaire design can be seen in the next 
section. 
3.6.2 Questionnaire Design 
Questions in the research instrument were selected basing on review of 
previous studies, review of industry literature and input from cybersecurity 
professionals consulted across Abu Dhabi government entities. A total of 57 
questions were developed considering the requirements of the different pillars or 
variables in the study.  For example, questions for “Support from Management” had 
statements regarding the importance of setting aside a budget for cybersecurity; 
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while those ones concerning “Awareness of Users”, asked whether the respondent 
agreed with statements on the importance of regular planned cybersecurity 
awareness programs in the organization among others. Most responses in the survey 
questionnaire were scored on a 5 - Point Likert scale to capture responses of users to 
the different questions in which a score of 1 indicated “Strongly Disagree” and a 
score of  5 “Strongly Agreed”.  These responses from the target population were 
coded into a Statistical Tool for further analysis, generation and Interpretation of 
results.  For example consider the following tables showing how questionnaire items 
were selected by study variable. Other items can be seen in the Appendix B. 
Table 5 and Table 6 below present a sample of how the questionnaire items 
were carefully selected to address the research questions and study hypotheses. For 
every question in the survey instrument, the researcher reviewed related literature 
and with consultations from 10 subject matter experts in cyber and information 
security and 2 academic professors identified questionnaire items to suit the study 
constructs and answer the research questions. A sample of such questions are as seen 
below. 
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Table 5: Showing sample Questionnaire Items for the Variable Competence/ 
Knowledge of Staff 
Research Question Study 
Hypothesis 
Literature highlights Survey Instrument Questions 
1. Are the existing 
information 
security 
professionals in 
government entities 
well qualified and 
experienced to 
detect and stop 
cyber-attacks?   
 
There is a 
relationship 
between the 
competence/kn
owledge of 
staff and cyber 
security 
effectiveness 
(H1) 
 
It is claimed that only graduates 
with the right skills and 
experience will be able to 
resolve the ever rising level of 
international cyber conflict ( 
Dale et al., 2011) 
 
As enterprises invest more 
resources in data protection, 
their main challenge still 
remains that of finding top-flight 
security practitioners with the 
right skills for the job (CSX, 
Feb, 2017) 
Organizations’ cybersecurity 
teams continue to struggle to 
convince senior management of 
cybersecurity issues.  
Survey Questions: 
2. How many years have you 
worked in the government 
sector? 
8. A cyberattack is a perceived 
threat to network security. 
9. Our employees do not know 
when their computers have 
been attacked by a virus. 
01. A cyberattack can be 
perceived as a threat to data 
and information. 
00. A Virus attack is a type of 
a cyber-attack. 
04. Untrustworthy employees 
or disgruntled IT insiders can 
initiate a cyberattack against 
the organization.  
 
  
140 
 
 
 
Table 6: Questionnaire Items for the Senior Management Support Variable 
Research 
Question 
Study 
Hypothesis 
Literature highlights Survey Instrument 
Questions 
2. To what extent 
does senior 
management 
support the 
establishment 
and 
implementation 
of cybersecurity 
defense 
strategies 
There is a 
positive 
relationship 
between senior 
management 
support and CSE 
(H2) 
Senior management are 
required to exercise “due care” 
and “due process” in ensuring 
CSE of their organizations 
Haris, (2010). 
 
Prevention of cybersecurity is 
considered a strategic 
management issue, top 
management support improves 
effectiveness of organization’s 
cybersecurity programmes 
through prioritization, funding 
and enforcement of security 
policies  (Dutton and Duncan, 
1987; Knapp, 2009) 
 
Senior management  needs to 
take proactive measures in 
policy enforcement, budgetary 
support for cyber-security 
technologies and training 
programs (Deloitte Touch, 
2016) 
 
Survey Questions: 
49. All Abu Dhabi 
government 
organization should 
have a budget 
allocated to strengthen 
cyber-security 
measures. 
21. Our organization 
has invested adequate 
funds to promote 
countermeasures 
against cyberattacks. 
20. Our organization 
has invested adequate 
funds towards 
increasing employee 
education as a 
protection from cyber-
attacks. 
24. Disaster recovery 
is not considered as a 
protection from 
cyberattacks, but 
rather a pre-
determined plan in 
case of a 
cyberattack. 
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Table 6: Questionnaire Items for the Senior Management Support Variable 
(Continued) 
 
Research 
Question 
Study 
Hypothesis 
Literature highlights Survey Instrument 
Questions 
3. To what extent 
does senior 
management 
support the 
establishment 
and 
implementation 
of cybersecurity 
defense 
strategies 
There is a 
positive 
relationship 
between senior 
management 
support and 
CSE (H2) 
Senior Management 
participation in 
information security 
initiatives has a 
significant effect on 
employee attitudes, 
behaviours and 
cultural values 
towards compliance 
with information 
security policies and 
strategies in place (Hu 
et al., 2012)  
 
22. It is important to 
have cyber-security 
incorporated in 
organization's strategic 
plans. 
23. All employees in our 
organization are aware of 
the strategic plan 
implemented to protect 
against cyber-attacks. 
26. Senior management 
has an important role in 
developing information 
security policies for our 
organization. 
23. The Head of 
Information Security of 
our organization reports 
directly to the highest 
official in our 
organization 
20. It is important to 
separate the roles of IT 
management and 
Information Security 
management in our 
organization. 
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3.7 Analysis Tool 
The study employed the IBM 21 Statistical Package for Social Sciences 
(SPSS) as the main data analysis tool, especially used for coding and interpretation 
quantitative data. This is because SPSS provides a mechanism for statistical analysis, 
including data access and preparation, graphics, modelling and analytical reporting. 
The tool provides the following advantages: 
 
 Faster and easier basic function access, such as descriptive statistics (i.e. 
mean, standard deviation or median). Compared to Ms. Excel’s built-in 
functions, SPSS provides these basic statistical elements in pull down menus 
in addition to a wider variety of graphs and charts which can create complex 
graphs, such as contingency tables. 
 Easier to find statistical tests. While Excel has a wide range of statistical tests 
built-in, the pull-down menus in SPSS make for faster access. 
3.8 Validity and Reliability of the Research Instrument 
The research instrument used in this study was initially tested for validity and 
reliability to ensure inter variable consistency against the study constructs. A 
reliability test for variables was conducted by examining values of Cronbach’s alpha 
(α: 0.5 ≤ α ≤ 1) and factor analysis in order to eliminate variables with low factor 
loadings against the required constructs and research hypotheses. A new instrument 
was generated after eliminating all questions that did not fit well in specific sections 
of the research instrument.  Validation of the study provided a means to critically 
evaluate and objectively review the results of the main study on cybersecurity. The 
findings were presented to a panel of academic and industry experts, nominated 
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according to subject knowledge and experience in the security industry, who were 
asked to judge and comment on issues pertaining to the research problem. This 
presented an opportunity to obtain some independent views on the viability of the 
findings which enabled us to add value by decoding and interpreting unexplained 
phenomena. The intention was to eliminate all the questions that could not load well 
against the study hypotheses. Some of the techniques employed in this study include 
the following. 
3.8.1 Content validity 
The research instrument under consideration was further reviewed by three 
(3) experts in cybersecurity practice from different companies and two (2) academic 
professors from the UAEU to check the clarity of the questions. Unclear or 
ambiguous questions were revised and complex items re-worded. Furthermore, 
ineffective and non-functioning questions were omitted from the final survey 
instrument. Consultations were made with two more senior information security 
professionals from a mid-sized organization in Abu Dhabi to review the instrument 
and provide a level of expert support. In addition, more than one person was asked to 
conduct the field survey and data collection, to ensure investigator triangulation. 
Several surveys were followed up to mitigate the impact of unreturned questionnaires 
and to reduce dropout rates. Finally, the sequence of questions in the questionnaire 
was aligned with the study constructs. 
3.8.2 Internal validity 
Both manual and electronic versions of the research instrument were 
delivered to different respondents to help increase the response rate. Participatory 
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and collaborative measures were also employed to ensure that respondents reached a 
consensus, especially for the more technical and challenging sections of the 
instrument. Additionally, the sharing of ideas especially on the subject matter made 
them clearer to the respondents, which later ensured more accurate results.  
3.8.3 Convergent validity 
 Convergent validity of the scale suggested that all items of the same scale 
should be related to each other (Zikmund et al., 2010). In order to establish 
convergent validity, the average factor loading of all items of the same scale should 
be greater than 0.70. Therefore, in order to establish convergent validity of the study 
scales, the researcher calculated the average factor loadings of all scale items used in 
the study. The results indicated that the average factor loadings of all scales were 
greater than 0.70 and thus convergent validity is established as presented in Table 7 
below. 
Table 7: Convergent Validity of Scale Items 
Scales Average Factor Loading 
Competence of Staff 0.771 
Level of technology 0.701 
Support from mgt. 0.770 
Training of staff 0.751 
Strategic plan 0.763 
Awareness of users 0.705 
Cybersecurity Effectiveness 0.704 
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3.8.4 Reliability of the Research Instrument  
Reliability measures the inter-item consistency of the instrument. The most 
common indicator to measure inter-item consistency is Cronbach’s alpha coefficient. 
Ideally, the minimum value of Cronbach’s alpha of a scale should be 0.70 or above 
(DeVellis, 2003). However, in case of short scales, the Cronbach’s alpha value of 
0.50 is also acceptable (Pallant, 2013).  In our study, the Cronbach’s alpha values of 
all scales are greater than 0.70 (see Table 8) and therefore reliability is established 
for all dependent as well as independent variables and we can rely on the data 
obtained using these scales.  
A new instrument was generated after elimination of all questions that 
couldn’t fit well in specific sections of the research instrument. Validation of the 
study provided the means to critically evaluate and objectively review the results of 
the main study on cybersecurity. Findings were presented to a panel of academic and 
industry experts, nominated according to subject knowledge and experience in the 
security industry to ascertain their thoughts and judgement on issues pertinent to the 
research problem. This presented an opportunity of obtaining independent views on 
the viability of the findings which provided a platform for value addition by 
decoding and interpreting unexplained phenomena. 
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Table 8: Reliability of Scales 
 
Variables Alpha 
1. Cybersecurity Knowledge (CK) 0.921 
2. Support from Management (SM) 0.926 
3. Level of Technology (LoT) 0.899 
4. Cybersecurity Effectiveness (CE) 0.747 
5. Training of Staff (TS ) 0.839 
6. Strategic Planning (SP) 0.815 
7. Awareness of Users (AU) 0.712 
Detailed results from the reliability tests conducted and the Exploratory 
Factor Analysis (EFA) conducted on the study constructs are shown in Chapter Four 
of the study.  
3.9 Research Limitations 
Since cybersecurity presents a sensitive issue of discussion everywhere, most 
of the interviewees hesitated to reveal critical security information pertaining to their 
organizations. In addition, the researcher was limited to a few existing research 
studies and frameworks on cybersecurity especially concerning Abu Dhabi’s 
government entities and even the entire UAE region. This study has been mainly 
confined to evidence gathered from other regions such as the USA, Europe and 
Africa, whose security status and or objectives may not be the same as in the Middle 
East or the United Arab Emirates. Other limitations of concern in this study included 
the fact that most of the highly security-sensitive government entities and/or C-level 
officers were difficult to access in time.  As a mitigation strategy, the researcher 
designed two sets of surveys, one electronic and the other on paper for distribution to 
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each government department with the help of the research assistant and the Survey 
Monkey tool. This enabled us to gather feedback from a representative sample for 
data analysis and discussion. 
3.10 Ethical Issues 
The process of accessing the selected study population in Abu Dhabi’s 
government entities was facilitated through personal contacts who acted as 
doorkeepers and obtained consent to use their departments as part of our case study. 
We made an initial informal request to access individual departments and followed it 
by a formal letter presenting the research topic and purpose of the questionnaire. 
Formal authorisation from the UAEU had been acquired; provided an introductory 
letter which was attached to all questionnaires for specific government entities. Once 
access had been officially obtained, the respondents were identified and contacted 
through formal emails to make arrangements to receive the survey instrument both in 
hard copy and online via the Survey Monkey tool. Each informant was apprised of 
the research under study and the purpose of the survey. Guarantees were given to all 
respondents that the data would be used solely for the purposes of the dissertation 
and that information would not be disclosed to any third parties but would be kept 
confidential. Furthermore, individual names would not be revealed after the 
completion of the survey instrument.  
3.11 Conclusion 
In this chapter, the research strategy, paradigm (positivism) and the data 
collection tools, approaches and methodology (quantitative), including the 
questionnaire structure and presentation of the research instrument were reviewed. 
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Further, the study population, the respondents’ sampling methodology, sample 
design, definition of respondents and the research variables were defined. In the 
same chapter the reliability and validity of the research instrument were looked into, 
employing Cronbach’s alpha test to assess the reliability of the measurement scale. It 
found all the study variables to be internally consistent with the study construct, 
having values of alpha > = 0.59; the details are presented in Chapter Four. 
Meanwhile, ethical research considerations were maintained for the entire study and 
a correct data collection process was followed. The survey instrument was sent to a 
sample of 960 respondents constituting the study population in the selected 8 
departmental categories of Abu Dhabi government offices. Of these, 535 completed 
and returned questionnaires representing 56.6% of the population were further 
validated, yielding a final total of 467 questionnaires to be retained for data analysis 
after cleaning and the elimination of duplicated and incomplete questionnaires, as 
further discussed in the next chapter.  
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Chapter 4: Analyses and Interpretations of the Data 
4.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, we presented the main strategy and research 
paradigm considered for this study. Specifically, the chapter justified the positivist 
paradigm and the quantitative methodology that was used for analysing the variables 
identified for this study of the cybersecurity effectiveness of Abu Dhabi’s 
government entities. Additionally, it also presented a definition of the study 
variables, the population, sample size and a discussion of the data collection tools 
and approaches. The validity and reliability of the survey items to scale were 
assessed, together with ethical issues. 
This chapter now turns to a detailed analysis of the data collected from the 
study population with the aim of testing the identified study hypotheses, interpreting 
the study results obtained from these analyses and answering the research questions. 
We used the statistical package for social sciences IBM SPSS 21 in conducting the 
data analysis. In the first step, we cleaned the data by assessing their normality, 
dealing with missing values, identifying aberrant values and detecting outliers. In the 
next step, we performed exploratory factor analysis (EFA) and calculated the 
reliabilities of the scale values, followed by a discussion of the descriptive statistics. 
Finally, ANOVA, cross tabulation and linear regression were carried out to test the 
research hypotheses and interpret the results. The following flow chart in Figure 16 
presents the design used for structuring chapter one. 
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Figure 16: Design of Chapter Four  
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4.2 Data Screening 
Before conducting the data analysis, the strata was cleaned to eliminate 
duplication and any form of errors due to missing or erroneous values. The screening 
process was performed through the following steps;  
i. Dealing with missing values  
ii. Identifying aberrant values 
iii. Finding outliers/Assessing data normality  
 
4.2.1 Missing Value Analysis 
Missing values in a data set is a common phenomenon in social and 
behavioural sciences (Hippel, 2004 and Enders, 2001). Missing values in huge 
quantity are of serious concern in final data analysis and may generate biased and 
unreliable results and when some values are missing, certain statistical tests cannot 
be performed. Therefore, it is highly recommended to analyze missing values in a 
data set before conducting analyses (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2007).    
All of the study variables have some missing data. From a total of 535 cases, 
the result of the missing value analysis showed that the last 68 cases had more than 
60% missing data (Table 9). Given the large amount of missing values in these 68 
cases, they were removed before conducting a final analysis. The rest of the missing 
values in some variables were nominal and were filled in by using the method known 
as “replace with series mean”. After removing the cases with many missing values 
and filling in a small number of missing values in the remainder, our data set became 
free of any missing values. All of the next analyses were performed on all 467 of the 
remaining cases.  
152 
 
 
 
Table 9: Case-wise Missing Value Analysis 
 
 Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 00 467 87.28 87.28 87.28 
  36 29 5.42 5.42 92.70 
  41 09 1.68 1.68 94.38 
  47 19 3.55 3.55 97.93 
50 11 2.05 2.05 100.00 
  Total 535 100.0 100.0   
 
 
4.2.2 Aberrant Values 
Aberrant values are those abnormal values that are beyond the normal range. 
For example items in the current study were measured on a Likert scale of 1 to 5 thus 
any value greater than 5 or lesser than 1 would be considered an aberrant value. 
Similarly the categorical variables are measured in terms of 1 and 2, so any value 
outside this range would be treated as an aberrant value. Aberrant values usually 
arise during data entry and may cause serious issues in data analysis because they 
influence the mean of the variable under scrutiny. Therefore it is of the utmost 
importance to carefully detect and treat these values before the final data analysis.  
In order to identify the aberrant values in our data file, descriptive statistics 
was run with minimum and maximum values of the items. Very few aberrant values 
were found and they were corrected by identifying the relevant cases.  
4.2.3 Normality of Data 
Screening the normality of the data is essential for conducting robust 
statistical analyses. The normality of the data can be calculated either by statistical or 
graphical methods (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2007). The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test and 
the Shapiro-Wilks tests are often used to assess the normality of data. The reason is 
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that when the data under scrutiny are compared to a normal distribution with the 
same mean and standard deviation, a p-value greater than 0.05 confirms the normal 
distribution of the data. Although both techniques are used for normality tests, they 
become unwieldy and impractical when the dataset for graphical analysis is large. 
Thus, we chose the statistical technique to test normality, since the data file of the 
present study contains 467 cases.  
In the first step Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk tests of normality 
were applied.  If the results from these two tests are significant (P < 0.05), then the 
data are not normally distributed. If, however, the results are non-significant (P > 
0.05), then the data are normally distributed. The results of both the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk tests shown in Table 10, below, indicate that the values 
were significant (P < 0.05), confirming that these data were not normally distributed.  
Table 10: Test of Normality 
 
  
Kolmogorov-Smirnov
a
 Shapiro-Wilk 
Statistic Df Sig. Statistic Df Sig. 
CE_mean1 0.146 467 0.000 0.887 467 0.000 
CK_mean1 0.119 467 0.000 0.926 467 0.000 
RoT_mean1 0.092 467 0.000 0.964 467 0.000 
SM_mean1 0.093 467 0.000 0.976 467 0.000 
TS_mean1 0.105 467 0.000 0.933 467 0.000 
AU_mean1 0.095 434 0.000 0.957 467 0.000 
SP_mean1 0.090 467 0.000 0.981 467 0.000 
 
Note: CK = Cybersecurity knowledge/competence; SM = Support from 
Management, RoT = Role of Technology, CE = Cybersecurity effectiveness, TS = 
Training of staff, SP = Strategic Plans, AU = Awareness of users. 
In addition to the above tests, it was thought important to examine two 
measures of distributions, skewness and kurtosis. Skewness assesses the symmetry of 
the distribution. That is, if the distribution of the data is stretched to a right or a left 
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tail, then the distribution is considered “skewed”. A skewness value greater than +1 
or lower than -1 counts as skewed distribution. Meanwhile, kurtosis checks whether 
the distribution is too peaked. Data distribution is considered too peaked if the 
kurtosis value generated is more than +1; if it is less than -1, we conclude that the 
distribution is too flat and if the values of skewness and kurtosis are close to zero 
then the data in question are considered normally distributed. In the present research, 
the normality of the data was examined using SPSS statistical software. As shown in 
Table 11, both tests revealed a p-value of less than 0.05, indicating that the data were 
not normally distributed.  
Regarding the skewness measure, as reported in Table 11, below, it is 
approximately -1, which reveals that the distribution of the data was skewed and the 
kurtosis value of approximately +2 indicated that the distribution was too peaked. 
Therefore, both measures affirmed that the data of the present study were not 
normally distributed. The values of both skewness and kurtosis for all items fell 
between +1.5 and, -1.5 the recommended values. These values established the quasi 
normal distribution of the study’s data set. 
 
 
Table 11: Values of Skewness and Kurtosis 
  CE_mean CK_mean RoT_mean SM_mean UTA_mean SP_mean 
Skewness -1.399 -1.043 -0.652 -0.323 -1.039 -0.411 
Std. Error 
of 
Skewness 
0.113 0.113 0.113 0.113 0.113 0.113 
Kurtosis 1.131 1.225 1.429 -0.156 1.134 0.232 
Std. Error 
of Kurtosis 
0.225 0.225 0.225 0.225 0.225 0.225 
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Finally, the outliers in data were identified by using Mahalanobis distance 
measuring method, as suggested by Tabachnick and Fidell (2007). These writers 
argue that cases with a Mahalanobis alpha level of 0.001 should be considered as 
outliers. By following Tabachnick and Fidell (2007) guidelines, a critical chi-square 
value was calculated by using five independent variables. It was found that no case 
had less than 0.001 value, confirming that no outliers were found.       
4.3 Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) 
 The first step in exploratory factor analysis is to check the adequacy of the 
data (Pallant, 2013). For this purpose two tests are commonly used by social 
scientists. These are Bartlett’s test of sphericity and the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) 
measure of sampling adequacy. Bartlett’s test of sphericity should be significant if p 
< 0.05, while the KMO value should be not less than 0.6 for good factor analysis. In 
the present study, the data fulfilled both these requirements, as shown in Table 12 
  
Table 12 : KMO and Bartlett's Test 
 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy. 0.859 
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity 
Approx. Chi-Square 2681.508 
Df 190 
Sig. 0.000 
 
 
Factor analysis was conducted on all the variables studied:  “cybersecurity 
knowledge/competence”, “support from top management”, “role of technology”, 
“awareness of users”, “training of users”, “presence of strategic plans” and 
“cybersecurity effectiveness”. To present data more simply, Principal Component 
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Analysis (PCA) was used. Varimax rotation was adopted in order to minimize the 
chance of cross loading items on more than one factor. Following Comrey and Lee 
rule of thumb (1973), items having a loading of 0.45 and a cross loading higher than 
0.32 were dropped. 
Factor analysis was run on 57 cybersecurity items and combined into seven 
factors (Table 13). These factors were labelled “competence/knowledge of staff”, 
“support from top management”, “level of technology”, “training of staff”, 
“awareness of users”, “presence of strategic plans” and “cybersecurity 
effectiveness”. The first factor, “competence/knowledge of staff” contained ten 
items. Two factors, “support from top management” and “the role of technology” 
consisted of twelve items each. Eleven items combined to make up the fourth and 
fifth factors, labelled “training of staff” and “awareness of users”. The fifth 
independent variable “presence of strategic plans” comprised four items. Finally, the 
dependent variable, “Cybersecurity effectiveness” had seven items. 
Following Comrey and Lee rule of thumb (1973), four items in total were 
deleted due either to small loading value or high cross loading on more than one 
factor. Two items were eliminated from the “cybersecurity effectiveness” factor and 
two items were removed from the factor “support from top management”. These two 
factors were left with five and ten items respectively and the fifty-two items were 
considered in the final results. A complete typology classification is given in Table 
13. 
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Table 13: Exploratory Factor Analysis 
 
Items 
Component 
1. Support from 
Management 
2.Competence/ 
Knowledge of staff 
3.Level of 
Tech. 
4.Training of 
Staff  
5.Cybersecurity 
Effectiveness 
6.Strategic Plans 7.Awareness 
of users 
SM2 0.862             
SM7 0.854       
SM8 0.843       
SM9 0.838       
SM1 0.837       
SM4 0.814       
SM3 0.770       
SM6 0.659       
SM10 0.624       
SM5 0.615       
CK2  0.843      
CK1  0.840      
CK5  0.780      
CK6  0.755      
CK4  0.755      
CK8  0.739      
CK7  0.732      
CK10  0.725      
CK9  0.678      
CK3  0.675      
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Table 13: Exploratory Factor analysis (Continued) 
Items 
Component 
1. Support from 
Management 
2.Competence/ 
Knowledge of staff 
3.Level of 
Tech. 
4.Training of 
Staff  
5.Cybersecurity 
Effectiveness 
6.Strategic Plans 7.Awareness 
of users 
RoT11   0.811     
RoT6   0.806     
RoT3   0.774     
RoT7   0.763     
RoT10   0.759     
RoT4   0.714     
RoT5   0.693     
RoT8   0.692     
RoT12   0.692     
RoT1   0.622     
RoT2   0.536     
RoT9   0.400     
TS5    0.835    
TS11    0.815    
TS7    0.774    
TS8    0.725    
TS4    0.695    
TS6    0.666    
CE3     0.750   
CE4     0.737   
CE7     0.717   
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Table 13: Exploratory Factor analysis (Continued) 
Items 
Component 
1. Support from 
Management 
2.Competence/ 
Knowledge of staff 
3.Level of 
Tech. 
4.Training of 
Staff  
5.Cybersecurity 
Effectiveness 
6.Strategic Plans 7.Awareness 
of users 
CE6     0.671   
CE5     0.667   
CE2     0.592   
SP3      0.819  
SP1      0.779  
SP2      0.730  
SP4      0.724  
AU9       0.801 
AU2       0.728 
AU3       0.652 
AU10    0.462   0.590 
AU1         0.352   0.357 
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Factor analysis is graphically presented in form of scree plot.  Scree plots 
show the eigenvalues against all factors and helps to determine which factors to 
retain. In this case, the scree plot showed that the curve starts to flatten from factor 
seven onward. Further, the eigenvalue of all the factors after factor seven were below 
one. Therefore only seven factors were retained as indicated in Figure 17 below. 
 
                                      Figure 17: Scree Plot showing Factors to Retain 
 
4.3.1 Total Variance Explained 
Eigenvalues reflect the number of factors extracted for factor analysis. The 
result of selecting eigenvalues showed that 7 factors explain 55% of the variance and 
the remaining factors remain insignificant. In this case, the first factor accounts for 
17.10% of the variance, the second 10.49%, the third 9.84%, the fourth 5.47%, the 
fifth 5% and sixth 4.67% of the total variance. Individual and cumulative factor 
variance is explained in Table 14 below.   
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Table 14: Total Variance Explained 
 
Component Initial Eigenvalues   
  Total % of Variance Cumulative % 
1 10.10 17.10 17.10 
2 6.18 10.49 27.57 
3 5.81 9.84 37.42 
4 3.23 5.47 42.89 
5 2.95 5.00 47.90 
6 2.76 4.67 52.57 
7 2.00 3.90 54.57 
 
After successfully completing the factor analyses, we were closer to 
understanding the respondents’ characteristics and we then moved towards testing 
the hypotheses. 
4.4 Respondents’ Characteristics 
4.4.1 Sector Representation 
Data were collected from 467 respondents working in eight different 
government sectors namely, social and civic, culture and recreation, transport, 
economic affairs, health, education, public order and science and technology. The 
highest representation was from the social and civic department, which contributed 
38.54% of all respondents. Those from the culture and recreation department form 
the second biggest category, with 14.1%. Of the eight departments in total, the 
respondents from the health department showed least representation, 5.14%. A 
complete breakdown of the respondents’ profile with reference to their sector 
representation is given in Figure 18          
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Figure 18: Sector-wise Distribution of Respondents Managerial Level 
4.4.2 Respondents’ Managerial Level 
 The respondents were categorized into five different levels, ranging from 
officer to consultant. The data show that 32.76% participants belonged to the 
executive or director level, the category that contributed most to the total. It shows 
that most of the respondents participating in the survey were at senior management 
level. A complete breakdown is given in Figure 19. 
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Figure 19: Managerial Level of Respondents 
4.5 Group Comparisons of Demographic Variables 
4.5.1 Respondents' Managerial Level and Education 
 Cross tabulation between respondents’ education level and their managerial 
level is shown in Table 15. Cross tab analysis shows a direct relationship between 
education level and managerial level, that is; the higher the education level, the 
higher the managerial level. Respondents with high school education in officer or 
team lead level are mostly low in number and no one with this level of education 
attains the higher managerial levels, for instance director or consultant. Most of the 
senior level positions are filled by respondents with bachelors’ and masters’ degrees.    
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Table 15: Respondents' Managerial Level and Education 
Variable Category 
Managerial Level 
Total 
Officer 
Team 
Lead 
CIO Director Consultant 
Freq % Freq % Freq % Freq % Freq % Freq % 
              
Education 
Level 
High 
School 
11 21 14 26 7 7 - - - - 32 7 
Diploma 9 17 6 11 11 11 6 4 - - 32 7 
Higher 
Diploma 
3 6 1 2 3 3 8 5 3 3 18 4 
Bachelors 25 48 30 55 73 70 100 65 52 51 280 60 
Masters 4 8 4 7 10 10 34 22 47 46 99 21 
Doctorate 0 - - - - - 5 3 1 1 6 1 
Total   52  52 100 55 100 104 100 153 100 103 100 467 
 
   
 
4.5.2 Respondents' Industrial Category and Size 
 The respondents’ industry and their respective size in terms of number of 
employees are cross tabulated in Table 16. The overall representation is highest from 
the social and civic sector with 180 participants out of 467 and 66 came from the 
culture and recreational sector, the second highest group. It is noted that 135 
respondents were from small organizations, i.e. those having fewer than 100 
employees.  
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Table 16: Respondents’ Representation by Sector and Size 
Vars Category 
Size (No of Employees) 
<100 100-200 201-500 501-999 >1000 Total 
count % count % count % count % count % count % 
Industry 
Social and 
Civic 
65 48 38 50 21 28 32 43 24 23 180 39 
Culture and 
Recreation 
33 24 7 9 7 9 10 14 9 9 66 14 
Transport 16 12 5 7 5 7 6 8 11 11 43 9 
Economic 
Affairs 
9 7 6 8 23 30 5 7 15 14 58 13 
Health 2 2 6 8 6 8 2 3 8 8 24 5 
Education 2 2 6 8 4 5 11 15 16 15 39 8 
Public 
Order 
5 4 6 8 5 7 3 4 8 8 27 6 
Science and 
Technology 
3 2 2 3 5 7 5 7 13 13 30 6 
Total 135 100 76 100 76 100 74 100 104 100 467 100 
 
 
 
4.6 Reliability Analysis and Correlation Matrix  
The mean, standard deviation, reliability and correlations of study variables 
are presented in Table 17. The results of the reliability analyses showed that all the 
study variables had an alpha value greater than 0.7, the minimum threshold for 
reliability. The correlation values show that all the independent variables 
cybersecurity knowledge/competence, support from top management, role of 
technology, training of staff, and awareness of users and presence of strategic plans  
were positively correlated with the dependent variable, cybersecurity effectiveness. 
These results initially support our hypotheses.   
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Table 17: Mean, Standard Deviation, Reliability and Correlations 
Variables Mean SD Alpha CK SM RoT CE UT SP 
A
U 
1. CK 4.15 0.56 0.921 1            
2. SM  3.72 0.69 0.926 0.243** 1          
3. RoT 3.78 0.62 0.899 0.430** 0.243** 1        
4. CE 4.13 0.62 0.747 0.397*** 0.245* 0.367** 1      
5. UT 4.05 4.05 0.839 0.466** 0.122** 0.346** 0.373** 1    
6.SP 3.95 3.95 0.815 0.406** 0.275** 0.375** 0.337** 0.244** 1  
7. AU 4.01 0.60
1 
0.712 0.139** 0.026* 0.133*** 0.301*** 0.108** 0.074* 1 
* P < 0.05, ** P < 0.01, ***P < 0.001 
Note: CK = Cybersecurity knowledge/competence; SM = Support from Management, RoT = 
Role of Technology, CE = Cybersecurity effectiveness, TS = Training of staff, SP = 
Strategic Plans, AU = Awareness of users. 
 
It is also noted that staff competence/cybersecurity knowledge and awareness 
of users were highly correlated with cybersecurity effectiveness (r = 0.397, r = 0.301) 
at p < 0.001 level and least correlated with support from management (r = 0.245) at p 
< 0.05 level. All the other variables showed good positive Pearson correlation value 
with the dependent variable of cybersecurity effectiveness. The role of technology, 
training of staff and support from management were significantly correlated (r = 
0.367, r = 0.373, r = 0.337) with cybersecurity effectiveness at p < 0.01 level. After 
finding initial support for our study hypotheses, we further tested with regression 
analysis to accurately find the impact of the independent variables on the dependent 
variable.  
4.7 Study Hypotheses 
Hypotheses derived from the literature review state that both organizational 
and individual level factors contributed to an effective cybersecurity system. At the 
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organizational level, three factors, support from top management, role of technology 
and strategic plans were all positively related to cybersecurity effectiveness. We 
hypothesized that organizations with a higher score in these three factors have more 
effective cybersecurity systems. Similarly, at individual level, staff 
competency/cybersecurity knowledge, training of staff and awareness of users were 
found to be directly associated with cybersecurity effectiveness. Employee 
knowledge and awareness about cybersecurity systems is helpful in maintaining an 
effective cybersecurity system. Likewise, employees’ training in cybersecurity also 
impacts positively such a system. We propose to test the following study hypotheses 
through linear and multiple regressions analysis methods to obtain answers to the 
study research questions; 
H1: There is a positive relationship between the competence/knowledge of staff 
and cybersecurity effectiveness. 
H2: There is a positive relationship between senior management support and 
cybersecurity effectiveness. 
H3:  There is a positive relationship between level of technology and 
cybersecurity effectiveness 
H4:  There is a positive relationship between cybersecurity training of staff and 
cybersecurity effectiveness. 
H5:  There is a positive relationship between the presence of cybersecurity 
strategic plans and cybersecurity effectiveness 
H6: There is a positive relationship between awareness of users about cyber 
security and cybersecurity effectiveness. 
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4.8 Hypotheses Testing  
 This section discusses the results from hypothesis tests conducted for this 
study.  The section below contains the general steps taken to arrive at the 
conclusions. 
   
4.8.1 Competence/Knowledge of Staff and Cybersecurity Effectiveness 
 In order to tell the differences in the competency of staff in the eight different 
sectors, an ANOVA test was applied. An ANOVA test is used to compare the means 
of more than two groups on a continuous variable (Pallant et al., 2011). AN ANOVA 
test helps only by identifying whether or not the group means differ. It does not 
indicate the exact differences between groups. To find the significant differences 
between groups, post-hoc comparisons are performed.  
The basic assumption for applying ANOVA test is to satisfy the condition of 
homogeneity of variance. If the p-value of Levene’s statistics in the homogeneity of 
variance test is greater than 0.05, the condition of homogeneity of variance is 
satisfied and the ANOVA test can be applied. Therefore we conducted a test of 
homogeneity of variance and found that the p-value of Levene’s statistics was greater 
than 0.05 (Table 18), so we proceeded further to do an ANOVA test.   
Table 18: Test of Homogeneity of Variances (Staff competence) 
 
Levene Statistic df1 df2 Sig. 
1.730 7 459 0.100 
 A one way analysis of variance between groups was performed to examine 
the effect of an employee’s government sector on his/her competence/ cybersecurity 
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knowledge. Respondents were grouped into eight levels according to their relevant 
sectors or work departments (Group 1 = Social and Civic; Group 2 = Culture and 
Recreation; Group 3 = Transport; Group 4 = Economic Affairs; Group 5 = Health; 
Group 6 = Education; Group 7 = Public Order; Group 8 = Science and Technology). 
Table 19 presents the result of the ANOVA test. If the sig. (p-value) is less than or 
equal to 0.05, it indicates that at least two of the group means are different on a 
dependent variable, and the converse (Pallant et al., 2011). In our case, the sig. value 
was greater than 0.05 (p = 0.070) which explains that on the dependent variable of 
staff competence/cybersecurity knowledge there was no difference between the 
employees from the eight departments.   
 
Table 19: ANOVA for staff competence (sector-wise) 
 
 
Sum of 
Squares Df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 4.140 7 0.591 1.888 0.070 
Within Groups 143.801 459 0.313     
Total 147.941 466       
 
 We did not perform any post hoc analysis because the results of the ANOVA 
reported above supported no difference in staff competence between employees of 
different sectors.    
 
4.8.1.1 Regression Analysis for study Hypothesis 1 (H1) 
 Linear regression analysis was conducted to test the study hypotheses. In 
order to find the impact of cybersecurity knowledge/staff competence on 
cybersecurity effectiveness, linear regression was conducted. The results of the 
ANOVA (see Table 20) show a significant p-value (p = 0.000), enabling us to say 
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that the cybersecurity knowledge/staff competence and cybersecurity effectiveness 
model is significant.   
 
Table 20: ANOVA for H1 
 
Model Sum of Squares Df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 
Regression 28.457 1 28.457 87.244 0.000
b
 
Residual 151.673 465 0.326   
Total 180.131 466    
 
In order to analyze the variation in cybersecurity effectiveness due to 
cybersecurity knowledge/staff competence, we calculated the value of R², which was 
0.158 (see Table 21). The value of R² shows that a 15.8% variation in cybersecurity 
effectiveness is explained by cybersecurity knowledge/staff competence.  
 
Table 21: Model Summary for H1 
 
Model R R 
Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the Estimate 
1 0.397
a
 0.158 0.156 0.57112 
 
Moreover, the Beta value, 0.397 in Table 22 below shows that a one unit 
change in cybersecurity knowledge/staff competence can bring a 0.39 unit change in 
cybersecurity effectiveness, which is also significant. Hence Hypothesis 1 is 
supported by the results of the data analysis.   
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Table 22: Coefficients for H1 
 
 
Model Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
T Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta 
1 
(Constant) 2.315 0.197 
 
11.772 0.000 
Cybersecurity 
Knowledge  
0.439 0.047 0.397 9.340 0.000 
 
 
 
4.8.2 Support from Management and Cybersecurity Effectiveness 
       To analyze the difference between the staff from eight departments in terms of 
management support, a test of Homogeneity of Variances was conducted. The value 
of Levene’s test is 0.239, greater than 0.05, (Table 23).  It indicates that the 
assumption of homogeneity of variance is not violated and an ANOVA test can be 
applied.   
Table 23: Test of Homogeneity of Variances (support from management) 
 
Levene Statistic df1 df2 Sig. 
1.319 7 459 0.239 
 
 
A one way ANOVA was conducted to gauge the influence of participants’ 
working sector on support from top management (Table 24). The output of the 
ANOVA test shows a significant statistical difference at p = 0.01 in support for the 
management scores in the eight sectors: F = 2.634, p = 0.01. 
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Table 24: ANOVA for support from management (sector wise) 
 
Sum of 
Squares Df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between 
Groups 
8.704 7 1.243 2.634 0.011 
Within Groups 216.688 459 0.472     
Total 225.392 466       
The multiple comparisons were conducted by performing post-hoc analysis, 
using Tukey’s HSD test. The results of Tukey’s HSD test reveal that the mean score 
for the Science and Technology (M = 4.21) group is statistically different from all 
the other groups (Social and Civic, Culture and Recreation, Transport, Economic 
Affairs, Education, Public Order) except the Health sector. The other groups do not 
differ from one another in terms of the same variable as seen in Table 25 and 
Table 26. 
Table 25: Tuckey HSD 
 
Employee Govt. Sector Subset for alpha = 0.05 
1 2 
Culture and Recreation 3.61  
Public Order 3.64  
Transport 3.67  
Education 3.68  
Social and Civic 3.69  
Economic Affairs 3.71  
Health 3.81 3.81 
Science and Technology 
  
4.21 
Sig. 0.880 0.165 
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Table 26: Multiple Comparisons for Support from Management 
 
 
 (I) Employ Govt Sector 
Mean 
Difference 
(I-J) 
Std. 
Error Sig. 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
      
 
 
 
 
 
Social and Civic 
Culture and 
Recreation 0.085 0.099 0.989 -0.216 0.386 
Transport 0.021 0.117 1.000 -0.334 0.376 
Economic 
Affairs 
-0.042 0.134 1.000 -0.452 0.367 
Health -0.106 0.152 0.992 -0.569 0.357 
Education -0.170 0.170 1.000 -0.687 0.348 
Public Order -0.233 0.188 1.000 -0.805 0.338 
Science and 
Technology -0.297 0.205 0.004 -0.922 0.328 
 
 
 
 
Culture and Recreation 
Social and 
Civic 
-0.361 0.223 0.989 -1.040 0.319 
Transport -0.424 0.241 1.000 -1.158 0.309 
Economic 
Affairs 
-0.488 0.259 0.991 -1.276 0.299 
Health -0.552 0.276 .912 -1.393 0.290 
Education -0.615 0.294 1.000 -1.511 0.280 
Public Order -0.679 0.312 1.000 -1.629 0.271 
Science and 
Technology -0.743 0.330 0.002 -1.747 0.261 
 
 
 
 
Transport 
Social and 
Civic 
-0.807 0.347 1.000 -1.864 0.251 
Culture and 
Recreation -0.870 0.365 1.000 -1.982 0.242 
Economic 
Affairs 
-0.934 0.383 1.000 -2.100 0.232 
Health -0.998 0.401 0.992 -2.218 0.223 
Education -1.061 0.418 1.000 -2.335 0.213 
Public Order -1.125 0.436 1.000 -2.453 0.203 
Science and 
Technology -1.189 0.454 0.023 -2.571 0.194 
 
 
 
 
 
Economic Affairs 
Social and 
Civic 
-1.252 0.472 1.000 -2.689 0.184 
Culture and 
Recreation -1.316 0.489 0.991 -2.806 0.174 
Transport -1.380 0.507 1.000 -2.924 0.165 
Health -1.443 0.525 0.999 -3.042 0.155 
Education -1.507 0.543 1.000 -3.160 0.146 
Public Order -1.571 0.560 1.000 -3.277 0.136 
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Table 26: Multiple Comparisons for Support from Management (Continued) 
 (I) Employ Govt Sector 
Mean 
Difference 
(I-J) 
Std. 
Error Sig. 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
 
Science and 
Technology 
-1.634 0.578 0.029 -3.395 0.126 
 
 
 
 
 
Health 
Social and 
Civic 
-1.698 0.596 .992 -3.513 
0.11
7 
Culture and 
Recreation 
-1.762 0.614 .912 -3.631 0.107 
Transport -1.825 0.631 .992 -3.748 0.097 
Economic 
Affairs 
-1.889 0.649 .999 -3.866 0.088 
Education -1.953 0.667 .995 -3.984 0.078 
Public Order -2.017 0.685 .987 -4.102 0.069 
Science and 
Technology 
-2.080 0.703 .415 -4.219 0.059 
 
 
 
 
Education 
Social and 
Civic 
-2.144 0.720 1.000 -4.337 
0.04
9 
Culture and 
Recreation 
-2.208 0.738 1.000 -4.455 0.040 
Transport -2.271 0.756 1.000 -4.573 0.030 
Economic 
Affairs 
-2.335 0.774 1.000 -4.690 0.020 
Health -2.399 0.791 0.995 -4.808 0.011 
Public Order -2.462 0.809 1.000 -4.926 0.001 
Science and 
Technology 
-2.526 0.827 0.034 -5.044 -0.008 
 
 
 
 
 
Public Order 
Social and 
Civic 
-2.590 0.845 1.000 -5.161 -0.018 
Culture and 
Recreation 
-2.653 0.862 1.000 -5.279 -0.028 
Transport -2.717 0.880 1.000 -5.397 -0.037 
Economic 
Affairs 
-2.781 0.898 1.000 -5.514 -0.047 
Health -2.844 0.916 0.987 -5.632 -0.057 
Education -2.908 0.933 1.000 -5.750 -0.066 
Science and 
Technology 
-2.972 0.951 0.041 -5.868 -0.076 
 
 
 
Science and Technology 
Social and 
Civic 
-3.035 0.969 0.004 -5.985 -0.085 
Culture and 
Recreation 
-3.099 0.987 0.002 -6.103 -0.095 
Transport -3.163 1.004 0.023 -6.221 -0.105 
Economic 
Affairs 
-3.226 1.022 0.029 -6.339 -0.114 
Health -3.290 1.040 0.415 -6.456 -0.124 
Education -3.354 1.058 0.034 -6.574 -0.134 
Public Order -3.418 1.075 0.041 -6.692 -0.143 
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4.8.2.1 Regression Analysis for Hypothesis 2 (H2) 
In the regression analysis, the results highlighted the significance value of the 
F-test (0.000) in ANOVA as seen in Table 27 below.  Results show that support from 
top management as compared to cybersecurity effectiveness model is significant.  
 
Table 27: ANOVA for H2 
 
Model Sum of Squares Df Mean Square F Sig. 
      
1 
Regression 10.792 1 10.792 29.634 0.000
b
 
Residual 169.339 465 0.364   
Total 180.131 466    
 
Further, the results of the model summary (Table 28) showed an R² value of 
0.060. This value of R² demonstrates that 6% of the variation in cybersecurity 
effectiveness (CSE) is due to support from top management.  
 
Table 28: Model Summary for H2 
 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
1 0.245a 0.060 0.058 0.60346 
 
 
Similarly the standardized beta value (β = 0.245) explains that a one unit 
change in support from management can bring a 0.24 unit change in cybersecurity 
effectiveness, which is also significant. The results presented in Table 29 provide full 
support for Hypothesis 2 (H2) 
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Table 29: Coefficients for H2 
 
 
Model 
 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
T Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta 
1 
(Constant) 3.321 0.152  21.825 0.000 
Support from 
Management 
0.219 0.040 0.245 5.444 0.000 
 
 
4.8.3 Role of Technology and Cybersecurity Effectiveness 
 The homogeneity of variance for the role of technology in the eight different 
government sectors was calculated through Levene’s statistics. The p-value of 
Levene’s statistics (p = 0.066) shows that the assumption of homogeneity of variance 
is justified and an ANOVA test can be applied (Table 30).   
  
Table 30: Test of Homogeneity of Variances (Role of Technology) 
 
Levene Statistic df1 df2 Sig. 
2.171 7 459 0.066 
 
The purpose of the one way analysis of variance between groups was to 
explore the impact of government sectors on the role of technology. We observed a 
significant difference at p < 0.05 level in the role of technology scores for the eight 
government sectors: F = 2.261, p = 0.029. The result specified that at least two of the 
government sectors were different from one another with respect to the technology 
deployed in these sectors (Table 31).     
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Table 31: ANOVA for Role of Technology (sector-wise) 
 
 
Sum of 
Squares Df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 
6.159 7 0.880 2.261 0.029 
Within Groups 178.593 459 0.389 
  
Total 184.752 466 
   
 
 The result of the multiple comparisons made using post-hoc analysis shows 
that only two sectors, i.e. health and education, were different from each other as 
well as from all the others: the p-value between the mean of these two sectors is 
somewhat significant (p = 0.057) i.e. slightly above 0.05 (Table 32). 
 
Table 32: Multiple Comparisons for the Level of Technology 
(I) Employ Govt Sector 
Mean 
Difference 
(I-J) 
Std. 
Error Sig. 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Social and Civic 
Culture and 
Recreation -0.067 0.090 1.000 -0.340 0.206 
Transport -0.026 0.106 0.165 -0.349 0.296 
Economic 
Affairs 
0.015 0.122 0.692 -0.357 0.386 
Health 
0.056 0.138 0.251 -0.365 0.476 
Education 0.097 0.154 1.000 -0.373 0.566 
Public Order 0.137 0.170 1.000 -0.381 0.656 
Science and 
Technology 
0.178 0.186 0.999 -0.389 0.746 
Culture and Recreation 
Social and 
Civic 
0.219 0.203 1.000 -0.398 0.836 
Transport 0.260 0.219 0.529 -0.406 0.926 
Transport 1.447 0.686 0.346 -0.643 3.536 
Economic 
Affairs 
1.487 0.702 0.818 -0.651 3.626 
Health 1.528 0.718 0.057 -0.659 3.716 
Public Order 1.569 0.734 0.999 -0.667 3.806 
Science and 
Technology 
1.610 0.751 0.997 -0.675 3.896 
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Table 32: Multiple comparison for Level of Technology (Continued) 
(I) Employ Govt Sector 
Mean 
Difference 
(I-J) 
Std. 
Error Sig. 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Public Order 
Social and 
Civic 
1.651 0.767 1.000 -0.684 3.986 
Culture and 
Recreation 
1.692 0.783 1.000 -0.692 4.076 
Transport 1.733 0.799 0.867 -0.700 4.166 
Economic 
Affairs 
1.774 0.815 0.998 -0.708 4.256 
Health 1.815 0.831 0.812 -0.716 4.346 
Education 
1.856 0.847 0.999 -0.724 4.436 
Science and 
Technology 
1.897 0.863 1.000 -0.733 4.526 
Science and Technology 
Social and 
Civic 
1.937 0.880 0.999 -0.741 4.616 
Culture and 
Recreation 
1.978 0.896 1.000 -0.749 4.706 
Transport 2.019 0.912 0.888 -0.757 4.796 
Economic 
Affairs 
2.060 0.928 0.999 -0.765 4.886 
Health 2.101 0.944 0.835 -0.773 4.976 
Education 2.142 0.960 0.997 -0.782 5.066 
Public Order 2.183 0.976 1.000 -0.790 5.156 
 
  
4.8.3.1 Regression Analysis for Hypothesis 3 
The outcome of the F-test was statistically significant at p < 0.001 level, 
showing the significant impact of the regression model, meaning that the role of the 
technology and cybersecurity effectiveness model is significant (Table 33).  
 
Table 33: ANOVA for H3 
 
Model Sum of Squares Df Mean Square F Sig. 
      
1 
Regression 24.200 1 24.200 72.167 0.000 
Residual 155.931 465 0.335   
Total 180.131 466    
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The R² value indicates that a 13.4% variation in the dependent variable, 
cybersecurity effectiveness, is explained by the role of technology, as summarised in 
Table 34: 
Table 34: Model Summary for H3 
 
Model R R Square Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 0.367 0.134 0.132 0.57908 
 
Further, the beta value of 0.367 specifies that a one unit change in technology 
deployed by organizations may bring a 0.36 unit change in cybersecurity 
effectiveness, which is also significant. The results of regression analysis 
summarized in Table 35 highlight the fact that Hypothesis 3 of the study is fully 
supported. 
 
Table 35: Coefficients for H3 
 
 
Model Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
T Sig. 
B Std. 
Error 
Beta 
1 
(Constant) 2.767 0.163 
 
16.947 0.000 
Role of 
Technology 
0.362 0.043 0.367 8.495 0.000 
 
 
4.8.4 Training of staff and Cybersecurity Effectiveness 
 The homogeneity of variance test for the training of staff in the eight different 
government sectors was measured by Levene’s statistics. The p-value of Levene’s 
180 
 
 
 
statistics (p = 0.518) is greater than 0.05, satisfying the assumption of homogeneity 
of variance (Table 36). Therefore an ANOVA test was a useful technique to find the 
difference between different government sectors.  
   
Table 36: Test of Homogeneity of Variances (Training of Staff) 
 
Levene Statistic df1 df2 Sig. 
    
0.885 7 459 0.518 
 
 
The output in Table 37 of a one way ANOVA test shows a significant p-value 
(p = 0.014) for between group analysis. It demonstrates that some of the government 
sectors are different from one another.   
 
Table 37: ANOVA for Training of Staff (sector-wise) 
 
 
Sum of 
Squares Df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 6.986 7 0.998 2.551 0.014 
Within Groups 179.576 459 0.391 
  
Total 186.562 466 
   
 
 In order to know precisely which of the government sectors differ in the 
training of staff, a Tukey HSD test was conducted. The result shows that only three 
sectors are different from one another. From Table 38, it can be observed that there is 
a difference between the “culture and recreation” and “science and technology” 
sectors (P < 0.05). For further details please refer to Table 38 below. 
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Table 38: Multiple Comparisons for Training of Staff 
 
(I) Employ Govt Sector 
Mean 
Difference 
(I-J) 
Std. 
Error 
Sig. 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Social and Civic 
Culture and 
Recreation 
0.193 0.090 0.392 -0.082 0.467 
Transport -0.111 0.106 0.967 -0.434 0.212 
Economic 
Affairs 
-0.140 0.094 0.818 -0.427 0.148 
Health -0.140 0.136 0.970 -0.554 0.274 
Education -0.098 0.110 0.987 -0.434 0.239 
Public 
Order 
0.139 0.129 0.962 -0.255 0.532 
Science and 
Technology 
-0.243 0.123 0.502 -0.619 0.132 
Culture and 
Recreation 
Social and 
Civic 
-0.193 0.090 0.392 -0.467 0.082 
Transport -0.304 0.123 0.208 -0.677 0.070 
Economic 
Affairs 
-0.332 0.113 0.065 -0.675 0.011 
Health -0.332 0.149 0.336 -0.786 0.122 
Education -0.290 0.126 0.298 -0.675 0.095 
Public 
Order 
-0.054 0.143 1.000 -0.489 0.381 
Science and 
Technology 
-0.435 0.138 0.035 -0.855 -0.016 
Transport 
Social and 
Civic 
0.111 0.106 0.967 -0.212 0.434 
Culture and 
Recreation 
0.304 0.123 0.208 -0.070 0.677 
Economic 
Affairs 
-0.029 0.126 1.000 -0.412 0.355 
Health -0.029 0.159 1.000 -0.514 0.456 
Education 0.013 0.138 1.000 -0.408 0.435 
Public 
Order 
0.250 0.154 0.735 -0.218 0.717 
Science and 
Technology 
-0.132 0.149 0.987 -0.585 0.321 
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Table 38: Multiple Comparison for Training of Staff (Continued) 
(I) Employ Govt Sector 
Mean 
Difference 
(I-J) 
Std. 
Error 
Sig. 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Economic Affairs 
Social and 
Civic 
0.140 0.094 0.818 -0.148 0.427 
Culture and 
Recreation 
0.332 0.113 0.065 -0.011 0.675 
Transport 0.029 0.126 1.000 -0.355 0.412 
Health 0.000 0.152 1.000 -0.462 0.462 
Education 0.042 0.130 1.000 -0.352 0.437 
Public 
Order 
0.278 0.146 0.545 -0.165 0.722 
Science and 
Technology 
-0.103 0.141 0.996 -0.532 0.325 
Health 
Social and 
Civic 
0.140 0.136 0.970 -0.274 0.554 
Culture and 
Recreation 
0.332 0.149 0.336 -0.122 0.786 
Transport 0.029 0.159 1.000 -0.456 0.514 
Economic 
Affairs 
0.000 0.152 1.000 -0.462 0.462 
Education 0.042 0.162 1.000 -0.452 0.536 
Public 
Order 
0.278 0.175 0.758 -0.256 0.813 
Science and 
Technology 
-0.103 0.171 0.999 -0.625 0.418 
Education 
Social and 
Civic 
0.098 0.110 0.987 -0.239 0.434 
Culture and 
Recreation 
0.290 0.126 0.298 -0.095 0.675 
Transport -0.013 0.138 1.000 -0.435 0.408 
Economic 
Affairs 
-0.042 0.130 1.000 -0.437 0.352 
Health -0.042 0.162 1.000 -0.536 0.452 
Public 
Order 
-0.236 0.157 0.803 -0.241 0.713 
Science and 
Technology 
-0.146 0.152 0.980 -0.608 0.317 
Public Order 
Social and 
Civic 
-0.139 0.129 0.962 -0.532 0.255 
Culture and 
Recreation 
0.054 0.143 1.000 -0.381 0.489 
Transport -0.250 0.154 0.735 -0.717 0.218 
Economic 
Affairs 
-0.278 0.146 0.545 -0.722 0.165 
Health -0.278 0.175 0.758 -0.813 0.256 
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Table 38: Multiple Comparison for Training of Staff (Continued) 
 
(I) Employ Govt Sector 
Mean 
Difference 
(I-J) 
Std. 
Error 
Sig. 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
 Education -0.236 0.157 0.803 -0.713 0.241 
 
Science and 
Technology 
-0.382 0.166 0.295 -0.887 0.124 
Science and 
Technology 
Social and 
Civic 
0.243 0.123 0.502 -0.132 0.619 
Culture and 
Recreation 
0.43568
*
 0.138 0.035 0.016 0.855 
Transport -0.132 0.149 0.987 -0.321 0.585 
Economic 
Affairs 
0.103 0.141 0.996 -0.325 0.532 
Health 0.103 0.171 0.999 -0.418 0.625 
Education 0.146 0.152 0.980 -0.317 0.608 
Public 
Order 
0.382 0.166 0.295 -0.124 0.887 
 
 
4.8.4.1. Regression Analysis for Hypothesis 4 
The linear regression model is presented in Table 39. The significant value of 
the F-test shows a statistically significant regression model of training of staff and 
cybersecurity effectiveness.  
 
Table 39: ANOVA for H4 
 
Model Sum of 
Squares 
Df Mean 
Square 
F Sig. 
      
1 
Regressio
n 
25.078 1 25.078 75.209 0.000 
Residual 155.053 465 0.333   
Total 180.131 466    
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The R² value of 0.139 shows that 13.9% of the variation in cybersecurity 
effectiveness is due to the training of staff. These results are presented in Table 40 
below. 
Table 40: Model Summary for H4 
 
Mode
l 
R R 
Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 0.373 0.139 0.137 0.57745 
 
 
Moreover, the standardized beta value of 0.373 indicates that a one unit 
change in training of staff influenced a 0.37 unit change in cybersecurity 
effectiveness, which is also significant (Table 41). Therefore it supports our 
Hypothesis 4.   
 
Table 41: Coefficients for H4 
 
Model Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta 
1 
(Constant) 2.648 0.174 
 15.26
1 
0.000 
Training of 
staff 
0.367 0.042 0.373 8.672 0.000 
 
 
4.8.5 Strategic Plan and Cybersecurity Effectiveness 
 The test of homogeneity of variance (see Table 42) showed the significant 
value (p = 0.310) to be greater than 0.05 and thus satisfied the condition of applying 
an ANOVA test of variance.   
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Table 42: Test of Homogeneity of Variances (Strategic Plan) 
Levene Statistic df1 df2 Sig. 
1.185 7 459 0.310 
 
The p-value of a one way ANOVA test was greater than 0.05 (i.e. p = 0.252), 
which confirmed that there was no difference between the eight government sectors 
on the basis of strategic plans (see Table 43 below). Since the ANOVA results were 
insignificant, no post hoc analysis was performed for this variable. 
 
 
Table 43: ANOVA for Strategic Plan (sector-wise) 
 
 
 
Sum of 
Squares Df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 2.720 7 0.389 1.293 0.252 
Within Groups 137.942 459 0.301 
  
Total 140.662 466 
   
 
4.8.5.1 Regression Analysis for Hypothesis 5 
 The significant value of the F-test in ANOVA in Table 44 showed that 
government sectors have strategic plans and that the cybersecurity effectiveness 
regression model was significant.  
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Table 44: ANOVA for H5 
 
Model Sum of 
Squares 
Df Mean 
Square 
F Sig. 
      
1 
Regression 20.412 1 20.412 59.427 0.000 
Residual 159.719 465 0.343   
Total 180.131 466    
 
The R² value of 0.113 in Table 45 showed an 11.3% variation in the 
dependent variable; cybersecurity effectiveness was explained by the independent 
variable, i.e., the strategic plan.  
Table 45: Model Summary for H5 
 
 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
1 0.337 0.113 0.111 0.58607 
 
 
The coefficients in the results in Table 46 showing a beta value of 0.337 
indicates that a one unit change in strategic plans may affect staff cybersecurity 
effectiveness by 0.33 units and this impact is also significant, supporting our 
Hypothesis 5. The detailed results are presented in Table 46 below. 
 
 
Table 46: Coefficients for H5 
 
 
Model Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
T Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta 
1 
(Constant) 2.629 0.197  13.325 0.000 
SP_mean1 0.381 0.049 0.337 7.709 0.000 
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4.8.6 Awareness of Users and Cybersecurity Effectiveness 
 The significant value of Levene’s test of homogeneity of variance (greater 
than 0.05) in Table 47 endorsed the assumption that an ANOVA test of variance 
could be applied.  
Table 47: Test of Homogeneity of Variances (Awareness of Users) 
 
Levene Statistic df1 df2 Sig. 
1.514 7 458 0.160 
 
The p-value of a one way ANOVA test was greater than 0.05 (i.e. p = 0.101), 
which made it clear that there was no difference between the staff of the eight 
government sectors on the basis of awareness about cybersecurity issues (please see 
Table 48 below). Therefore, we did not apply a post hoc analysis.   
 
Table 48: ANOVA for Awareness (sector-wise) 
 
 
 
Sum of 
Squares Df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Between 
Groups 
4.663 7 0.666 1.726 0.101 
Within Groups 176.765 458 0.386 
  
Total 181.427 465 
   
 
4.8.6.1 Regression Analysis for Hypothesis 6 
 The impact of the awareness of users about cybersecurity on its effectiveness 
was calculated by using linear regression analysis. The regression model shows 
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significant value at a p < 0.001 level, indicating the significance of the regression 
model of awareness of users and cybersecurity effectiveness (Table 49).  
 
Table 49: ANOVA for H6 
 
 
Model Sum of Squares Df Mean Square F Sig. 
      
1 
Regression 16.260 1 20.412 46.427 0.000 
Residual 163.719 465 0.343   
Total 180.131 466    
 
Although the F-test showed a significant regression model of independent 
and dependent variables, the smaller value of R² showed a smaller variation in 
cybersecurity effectiveness due to the awareness of users. There was a 9% change in 
the dependent variable due to awareness of users (see Table 50).  
 
 
Table 50: Model Summary 
 
 
Model R R 
Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 0.301 0.090 0.088 0.59415 
 
 
The coefficients table, Table 51, shows a beta value of 0.301 significant at 
 p < 0.001. These results indicate that one unit change in the awareness of 
users may affect staff cybersecurity effectiveness by 0.30 units and this impact is 
also significant, supporting the study Hypothesis 6. The detailed results are presented 
below. 
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Table 51: Coefficients for H6 
 
 
 Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
T Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta 
1 
(Constant) 2.929 0.179  16.325 0.000 
Awareness of 
users 
0.299 0.049 0.301 6.709 0.000 
 
4.9 Multiple Regression Analysis 
In addition to the above discussions were impact of the six independent 
variables on dependent variable (CSE) has been evaluated separately, multiple 
regression analysis is also performed to know the combined effect of all independent 
variables on dependent variable. The results of multiple regression analysis presented 
in Table 52 shows a significant impact (F = 72.167, p = 0.000) of independent 
variables on dependent variable, cybersecurity effectiveness.  
 
Table 52: ANNOVA for the Multiple Regression Test 
 
Model Sum of 
Squares 
Df Mean 
Square 
F Sig. 
      
1 
Regression 24.200 1 24.200 72.167 0.000 
Residual 155.931 465 0.335   
Total 180.131 466    
 
Furthermore, Table 53 shows the R-square value for the combined model 
which is 0.317. This values shows that 31% change in depending variable is 
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occurring due to the six (6) independent variables used in current study as seen 
below; 
 
Table 53: Model Summary 
 
Model R R Square Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 0.563
a
 0.317 0.308 0.51768 
 
Additionally, the individual independent variable effect on dependent 
variable is also shown in Table 54.  Results suggested that all independent variables 
have significant impact on dependent variable. Awareness of users has highest 
impact (β = 0.230, p = 0.000) on cybersecurity effectiveness followed by training of 
staff (β = 0.192, p = 0.000). Complete detail is given in Table 55 below. 
 
 
 
Table 54: Multiple Regression Coefficients 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Model Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
 B Std. Error Beta 
(Constant) 0.348 0.265  1.315 0.189 
Competence/knowle
dge of staff 
0.150 0.053 0.136 2.818 0.005 
Level of 
Technology 
0.130 0.045 0.132 2.921 0.004 
Support from Mgt 0.100 0.037 0.112 2.747 0.006 
Training of Staff 0.188 0.044 0.192 4.314 0.000 
Strategic Plans 0.156 0.050 0.138 3.119 0.002 
Awareness of Users 0.229 0.039 0.230 5.885 0.000 
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4.10 Summary of Hypotheses Testing 
A. Research Hypothesis H1: There is a positive relationship between the 
Competence/knowledge of staff of information security and cybersecurity 
effectiveness. 
In addition to demographic statistical results presented previously, linear 
regression analysis was conducted to evaluate the relationship between 
Competence/knowledge of staff of information security and cybersecurity 
effectiveness of their organisations. The significant p-value of F-test shows the 
association between competence/knowledge of staff of information security and 
cybersecurity effectiveness. Further, the R² value (0.158) shows a direct positive 
impact of competence/knowledge of staff of information security on cybersecurity 
effectiveness.  
 In order to generalize our results, the impact of staff competency/knowledge 
on cybersecurity effectiveness was compared among eight different departments. The 
p-value (0.070) of ANOVA results show that there is no difference among 
employees of eight sectors on the basis of their competency/knowledge about cyber 
information.  
 
B. Research Hypothesis H2: There is a positive relationship between senior 
management support and cybersecurity effectiveness. 
Impact of support from top management on employees’ performance is a 
widely studied topic in field of management. Support from top management brings 
several positive results on employees’ behaviour, their well-being and their 
performance which in turn helps organizations to achieve their goals.  The empirical 
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support for our hypothesis reveal the importance of management support in 
generating effective cybersecurity framework. These results were in line with 
theoretical deliberations discussed in literature where authors emphasized that; 
“cybersecurity is a management issue” which requires management intervention 
through establishment of appropriate cyber and information security strategies, 
policies and frameworks; 
(Asante, 2011; NIST, 2014, Symantec, 2013; and Dutton and Duncan, 1987) among 
others. Our results offer interesting findings that establishment of an effective 
cybersecurity system does not only require user competency but also demands for 
management cooperation.  
The comparative ANOVA test is applied on eight different government 
entities to analyse if there any difference among the support provided by top 
management team. The results of ANOVA test show no difference among all 
departments with respect to management support for effective cybersecurity system. 
It means employees from all departments need equal support from management for 
effective functioning of their information security.  
 
C. Research Hypothesis H3: There is a relationship between role of technology and 
cybersecurity effectiveness 
New security challenges place significant demands for highly secure software 
and hardware platforms to maintain appropriate level of confidentiality, integrity and 
access to critical data (Conklin, 2006). In analyzing the factors of developing 
effective cybersecurity framework, the most critical factor is the role of technology. 
Impact of technology in managing cyber-threats is widely acknowledged among 
practitioners and academicians. The application of regression test in current study 
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show statistically significant p-value (p < 0.001) of F-test. We can infer from these 
results that role of technology has a direct positive impact on cybersecurity 
effectiveness model. It includes all sort of measures i.e. use of antivirus, firewalls 
etc.  
Unlike other factors, the impact of role of technology on cybersecurity 
system shows difference among some departments. The significant p-value of 
ANOVA test indicates that at least two of the departments are differ with respect to 
their use of technology. The post-hoc analysis further discloses that two of the 
departments, health and education are different with each other on role of 
technology. It might be the difference in types of technology two departments 
deployed.      
 
D. Research Hypothesis H4: There is a positive relationship between cybersecurity 
training of staff and cybersecurity effectiveness. 
Training of staff enriches end user security knowledge which in turn help 
them to manage cyber-threats effectively. Scholars agree that training of staff 
enhances their capacity to handle cyberattacks.  The significant value of F-test shows 
a statistically significant regression model of training of staff and cybersecurity 
effectiveness. This significance level supports the study hypothesis H4. From the 
study results, it eminent that management in Abu Dhabi government entities needs to 
establish and maintain appropriate cybersecurity training program for all employees 
to enable acquisition of cybersecurity knowledge especially for the less experienced 
workers with little or no knowledge of cyber and information security skills. 
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E. Research Hypothesis H5. There is a positive relationship between the presence 
of cybersecurity strategic plans and cybersecurity effectiveness 
Impact of strategic plans on cybersecurity effectiveness is not clearly known. 
Past studies on this issue presented a mixed view. The results of linear regression 
shows a significant positive relationship between cybersecurity strategic plans and 
cybersecurity effectiveness. Moreover, the data collected from eight different 
departments also show similar findings with regard to the relationship between 
cybersecurity strategic plans and cybersecurity effectiveness. These regression 
results were in support of the study hypothesis H5 which confirms that when 
developing strategic plans, all Abu Dhabi government entities need to consider 
cybersecurity as part of the planning process to ensure effectiveness of the 
established cyber and information security defences. In the next section we discuss 
the recommendations of this study on cybersecurity effectiveness in Abu Dhabi 
government entities. 
 
F. Research Hypothesis H6. There is a positive relationship between awareness of 
users about cybersecurity and cybersecurity effectiveness 
 
Users’ awareness about cybersecurity can be helpful in managing cyber-
threats and maintaining effective cybersecurity system. The impact of awareness of 
users about cybersecurity on its effectiveness was calculated by using linear 
regression analysis. The regression model shows significant value at p < 0.001 level 
indicating the significant regression model of awareness of users and cybersecurity 
effectiveness. Although the F-test shows a significant regression model of 
independent and dependent variable, the smaller value of R² shows a smaller 
variation in cybersecurity effectiveness due to awareness of users. There is 9% 
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change in dependent variable due to awareness of awareness of users.  
 
4.10.1 Comparison of Departments based on Cybersecurity Effectiveness 
 A departmental comparison based on the performance of the different 
government entities in terms of cybersecurity effectiveness is shown in Table 55 
below. For this study, the data were collected from eight different public sector 
departments of the Abu Dhabi government. It is interesting to investigate whether or 
not these departments are different in terms of effectiveness with regard to their 
cybersecurity system. We divide cybersecurity effectiveness into three categories 
(low, medium and high. The departments with cybersecurity mean ranges from 1 to 3 
are classified as low while departments with a cybersecurity mean value greater than 
3 but less than 4 are classified as medium. Finally, the departments with a 
cybersecurity mean value greater than 4 are considered highly effective in terms of 
their cybersecurity system. It is worth noting that all public sector departments are 
highly effective as regards their cybersecurity system except the public order 
department, which is in the medium category of cybersecurity effectiveness. The 
comparison also reveals that no department shows low effectiveness in this regards. 
Full details of the departmental cybersecurity comparison are given below. 
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Table 55: Department Wise Effectivity of Cybersecurity System 
 
Department N CE 
Mean 
        Std. 
Deviation 
High/Medium/
Low 
Social and Civic 180 4.09 0.65 High 
Culture and Recreation 66 4.07 0.55 High 
Transport 43 4.24 0.43 High 
Economic Affairs 58 4.25 0.59 High 
Health 24 4.21 0.44 High 
Education 39 4.08 0.75 High 
Public Order 27 3.83 0.76 Medium 
Science and 
Technology 
30 4.37 0.50 High 
Total 467           4.13        0.62 High 
Note: CE Mean 1-3 = Low effectiveness, CE Mean > 3 but < 4 = Medium 
effectiveness, CE Mean > 4 = High effectiveness 
 
Table 55 above and Figure 20 below present that, while all departments show 
high performance, four departments in particular stand out when it comes to 
Cybersecurity Effectiveness. The departmental results show that Science and 
Technology (M = 4.37), Economic Affairs (M = 4.25), Transport (M = 4.24) and 
Health (M = 4.21) performed better in terms of cybersecurity effectiveness than did 
the Social and Civic, Culture and Recreation, Education and Public Order 
departments. This is attributed to the strong cybersecurity systems established in 
these departments and the highly qualified staff employed there. 
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Figure 20: Departmental Cybersecurity Effectiveness comparison 
 
 
4.11 Summary of the Results 
 The detailed analyses were performed using IBM SPSS 21. All the 
hypotheses were tested using linear regression. Table 56 below provides a summary 
of the hypotheses testing, which shows that all the proposed hypotheses were 
supported by the empirical data. This exhibits the important role of the predictors 
proposed in our model in developing cybersecurity effectiveness. 
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Table 56: Summary of Results 
 
Hypothesis Variables Beta Value Significance Accepted
/Rejected 
H1 Competence 
CSE 
0.397 0.000 Accepted 
H2 Support from 
mgt. CSE 
0.245 0.000 Accepted 
H3 Role of tech. 
CSE 
0.367 0.000 Accepted 
H4 Training of 
staff CSE 
0.373 0.000 Accepted 
H5 Strategic plan 
CSE 
0.337 0.000 Accepted 
H6 Awareness of 
users CSE 
0.301 0.000 Accepted 
 
 
 
4.12 Conclusion 
 The empirical evidence showed that all the six factors (staff 
competency/knowledge, support from top management, role of technology, training 
of staff, strategic plans and awareness of users) play a significant role in developing 
effective cybersecurity systems. The support for the proposed hypotheses reveals that 
for an effective cybersecurity system all six factors are equally important for the 
eight sectors. This study has several important implications for both practitioners and 
academics.  These are discussed in detail in Chapter five below. 
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Chapter 5: Discussions and Implications of the Study 
5.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter presented results of data analysis process through 
descriptive and inferential statistics. Several statistical tests have been conducted 
including post-hoc analysis, One Way ANOVA, linear regression and multiple 
regressions to assess the statistical significance of the casual relationships between 
different study constructs with the goal of testing the different study hypotheses and 
answering of the research questions. 
In this chapter, the researcher presents a discussion and summary of findings 
from the survey results presented in the previous chapter in comparison with the key 
research hypotheses as well as study objectives and deduces the overall contribution 
and implication of the study compared to the theoretical and practical frameworks 
and strategies critically reviewed in literature. Further, the chapter highlights the 
contributions of the study and provides recommendations to managers and future 
directions to the researchers bearing in mind limitations of the study. Finally, a 
summary of chapters and conclusion is provided at the end. The design of the chapter 
is presented Figure 21 below: 
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Introduction
Discussion
Study Contributions
Study Implications
Study Recommendations
Limitations and Future 
Research directions
Summary of findings
Conclusions
References
Appendices
 Theoretical 
Implications
 Practical 
Implications
Chapter 4 Data analyses and 
Interpretations
Chapter 3 ( Research Methodology; 
Definition & Measurement of Variables, 
Research Strategy, etc 
 CSE Theoretical 
Framework
 CSE Checklist 
 
Figure 21: Design of Chapter Five 
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5.2 Discussion 
Safe and secure management of the cyberspace system is critically important 
for information centered organizations. Although most of these organizations have 
equipped themselves with the latest technologies for prevention of cyberattacks and 
other vulnerabilities, incidences of cyber intrusions are still evident globally and the 
UAE in particular. Therefore, this study has focused on identifying additional human 
and organizational factors responsible for evaluating the effectiveness of a 
cybersecurity system in an organization. More specifically, areas of end-user security 
competency and senior management support provided to the system have attained 
higher attention in various organizations. In a cybersecurity framework, observing 
end-user security competence is very much challenging due to the divergent views 
and preferences.   
In this dissertation, the researcher developed and tested a theoretical 
framework with a checklist for enhancing cybersecurity effectiveness in government 
organizations (the case study of Abu Dhabi government entities). Impact of end-user 
capacity building factors were examined to enrich readers’ understanding of 
employee compliance to cybersecurity policies. Based on the data collected and 
analyzed from the eight different entity types, the model was tested empirically. 
Study findings advocate that security behaviors can be predisposed through extrinsic 
as well as intrinsic motivators. Similarly, the staff competency to handle 
cybersecurity issues is also controlled by their individual as well as organizational 
factors. Further, implications of the study results are discussed for theory and 
practice.  
The major goal of this study was to develop a framework for the evaluation 
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of cybersecurity effectiveness in Abu Dhabi government entities. Specifically, the 
study was intended to identify the factors that contribute to cybersecurity 
effectiveness of an organization more especially determining the role of management 
in the prevention of cyberattacks, the role of training and awareness in resisting 
cyberattacks, the role of technology level in building defences against cyberattacks, 
and examining the relationship between the competence/ knowledge of employees 
and cybersecurity effectiveness as well as the role cybersecurity strategic planning in 
ensuring an effective cybersecurity system. 
Moreover, this study validates the critical role of some human and 
organizational factors that help in augmenting the effectiveness of cybersecurity 
defence system. Acknowledging the idiosyncratic features of UAE public 
organizations, the researcher, based on the findings of the study in consultation with 
10 experts in the practice and 2 academic professors, proposed a set of factors 
responsible for improving cybersecurity effectiveness. The research postulated that 
competence/knowledge of staff, support from senior management, level of 
technology, training of staff, cybersecurity strategic planning and awareness of users 
about cybersecurity have significant bearing on bringing effectiveness to the 
cybersecurity defence system of an organization. 
The survey, conducted in eight different public sector organizations of the 
Abu Dhabi government, revealed some important findings; first, when establishing 
an effective cybersecurity framework, both human as well as organizational level 
variables are important. At individual level, employees need to have sufficient 
knowledge and awareness about cybersecurity issues to tackle cyberattacks. Further, 
the research also found out that cybersecurity training to employees especially the 
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information security staff provides an imperative element in developing effective 
cybersecurity defense. In addition to individual level factors, this study highlighted 
some important organizational level factors contributing towards operative 
cybersecurity system. The researcher found that support from senior management 
and organization’s strategic plans about cybersecurity help employees in effective 
implementation of cybersecurity plans and policies. Finally, this research supports 
the previous study, (Rowe et al., 2011) that different technological tools (firewalls, 
data encryption, anti-malware, anti-spyware and anti-virus scanners) are 
indispensable in generating effective cybersecurity model. Findings of other authors 
have also lent support for the above finding observed in this research study (Rees, 
2011;  NIST, 2014; and Hiller and Russell, 2015) among others. 
 A second significant upshot that emerges from this research is the 
generalizability of all antecedents to the eight different sectors. The data was 
collected from eight different public sector entities including social and civic, culture 
and recreation, transport, economic affairs, health, education, public order and 
science and technology. The results from ANOVA, linear and multiple regression 
tests show that all six factors are equally important in the eight different entities in 
framing an effective cybersecurity system. 
 
5.3 Contributions 
Despite the high rate of cybersecurity problems, systems administrators and 
information security professionals continue to take few effective precautions. During 
interviews and discussions with the experts as well as organizations functionaries it 
was observed that this lack of precaution was partly because of the lack a meaningful 
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tool or framework as well as checklist to assess the effectiveness of cybersecurity 
system within the different government entities. In order to gain an effective security 
position, organizations must overcome this drawback with effective measures. This 
study therefore, contributes to literature by providing a useful framework and 
checklist for evaluation of cybersecurity effectiveness in Abu Dhabi government 
entities. A gap was revealed in literature concerning existing cybersecurity 
frameworks that majorly focus on technological mechanisms for identification, 
detection, prevention and analysis of associated risks, while others were found 
inadequate with a focus on the European or American standards which may not fully 
address cyber and information security issues in cultural setup of the region. 
Additionally these frameworks were found complex especially when it comes to 
interpretation and implementation. Therefore, the researcher proposed additional 
strategies to strengthen the existing technological strategies including the 
introduction of culturally sensitive cybersecurity training and awareness 
programmes, ensuring strong legal framework, strong management support, and 
attracting and retaining experienced information technology professionals in 
government entities and incorporation of cybersecurity strategic planning in the 
organization wide planning. 
An important contribution of this study is the comparison of effective 
cybersecurity measures in eight different public entities in Abu Dhabi government 
out of which Science and Technology, Economic affairs, Transport and Health 
showed better performance and readiness in terms cybersecurity counter measures in 
place. The results from multiple regressions conducted on all the six study factors 
combined in a single model showed that all six factors make a significant difference 
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to firms’ cybersecurity system with the R-square value of 0.317 for the combined 
model signifying that 32% change in an organization’s cybersecurity effectiveness 
(CSE) is occurring due to the six independent variables in the study combined with 
standardised coefficients showing awareness of users (β = 0.230, p = 0.000) and 
training of staff (β = 0.192, p = 0.000) contributing the highest impact to an 
organization’s cybersecurity system. All eight entities have different culture, values 
and cybersecurity issues which enhances the generalizability and reliability of study 
results by confirming that six factors are critical in developing effective 
cybersecurity defence mechanism in line with several scholars previously reviewed 
in literature, (Nambiro et al., 2014; Abawajy, 2014; Ahn et al., 2013; Aloul, 2010 
and Asante et al., 2011) among others. 
The current research focuses on recommending new ways of approaching 
cybersecurity risks. A major goal of the research was to analyse if employee 
development and organizational support systems are effective in improving 
cybersecurity system. Application of different factors to the eight different entities 
highlighted that both employee effectiveness and organizational effectiveness are 
essential in managing cybersecurity issues. 
Although the sensitivity of information security is well acknowledged among 
IT professionals, managers and government entities, information is often protected 
without considering its form or location or the competencies of the people involved 
in protection. Cybersecurity deals not only with the protection of information but 
also with security and development of the person using it (Von Solms and Van, 
2013).  
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5.4 Study Implications 
5.4.1 Theoretical Implications 
In this study, a framework for evaluating the effectiveness of the existing 
cybersecurity defences in Abu Dhabi government entities has been proposed. The 
framework is based on six major factors; 1: Competency/ Knowledge of information 
security staff, 2: Senior management support, 3: Level of technology deployed 4: 
Training of staff, 5: Presence of cybersecurity strategic plans and 6: Awareness of 
users in addition to the existing Laws and regulations that support and protect 
cybersecurity. 
The present study has several theoretical implications in cybersecurity 
regulations literature. It is among the few endeavours to investigate the antecedents 
of effective cybersecurity system. Past researches mainly emphasized technology as 
the major variable in cybersecurity with little or no focus on human and 
organizational factors. This research adds to this body of knowledge by proposing 
that, in addition to technological sophistication, organizations should focus on human 
factors as well including; (competency/knowledge of staff, awareness of users about 
cybersecurity, regulations and the training of staff) for examining effectiveness of 
cybersecurity issues. Therefore, this research opens new dimensions for future 
scholars to view cybersecurity issue from a different angle.   
The necessity for a behaviourally-rooted cybersecurity framework is 
addressed in this research. Drawing on intrinsic motivation theory, the researcher 
endeavours to analyse cybersecurity related employee and organizational 
competencies in organizations. The findings of the study confirms that there exists a 
207 
 
 
 
real necessity for effective enhancement of employee’s capacity to manage 
cybercrimes, in the organizations under study. Kshetri (2005) explains that 
employees’ behaviour for doing a task is affected by two motivation factors: (1) 
intrinsic and (2) extrinsic. In cybersecurity context, results of this study confirm the 
role of intrinsic as well as extrinsic motivating factors in strengthening security 
behaviours of firms.     
5.5 Proposed Framework 
The cybercrime threats force policymakers to suggest new regulations in 
order to prevent from cyberattacks. The framework proposed in this study consists of 
strategies beneficial to such stakeholders. The government policy makers can utilize 
the findings of our study for defining crucial policies on cybersecurity regulations. 
Our research guides lawmakers to consider some factors more critically than others 
while formulating cybersecurity regulations.   
The framework proposed in this study is worthwhile for organizational 
managers, leaders and executives. These people are supposed to implement 
cybersecurity policies in their organizations. For that reason, this study leads them in 
implementing cybersecurity strategies while considering different individual and 
organizational level factors. The management of organization must know that in 
order to implement cybersecurity strategies effectively, their employees must be 
competent enough and have sufficient training and should be well aware of 
cybersecurity issues. Further, the study findings helps managers in supporting their 
team while efficiently applying cybersecurity regulations. Finally, the research 
outcomes are equally important for information security consultants and trainers. 
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Trainers can use this research for making a broad checklist of competencies that need 
to be developed by IT personnel. IT personnel equipped with capabilities like 
cybersecurity knowledge, awareness and training can handle cybersecurity issues 
better.  
Below, we present the proposed theoretical framework for evaluating the 
effectiveness of cybersecurity systems that could be used by authorities in Abu 
Dhabi government entities. The framework has been based on the six factors, as 
summarised in Figure 22 below after which the factors are related to the proposed 
checklist to enable evaluation in terms of CSE as discussed in section 5.5.1.  
 
Competence/ Knowledge of 
Staff
Support from Management
Level of Technology
Training of Staff
Cybersecurity Strategic 
Plans
Awareness of Users
C
S
E
Refer to Section 
5.5.1
 
                               Figure 22: Proposed Theoretical Framework 
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Furthermore, Figure 23 below shows the proposed research framework from 
which the entire study has been grounded. 
 
 
Figure 23: Proposed Research Framework 
 
 
In the next section, we discuss the proposed CSE checklist with respect to the 
proposed pillars in details. 
5.5.1 Cybersecurity Checklist 
The checklist proposed in tables 57- 60 for this study was developed in 
consultation with 10 experts in the subject area within the Abu Dhabi Government, 
guidelines from 2 academic Professors, the researcher’s vast experience of 17 years 
in region’s cyber and information security domain, empirical evidence revealed from 
international standards on cyber and information security such as the ADSIC II 
Information Security Guidelines, 2013, ISO / IEC 27001; 2013; ISMS standard, ISO/ 
IEC 27032; 2012; Cybersecurity Standard, ISO / IEC 27035, International Standard 
Competency/
Knowledge of staff
Senior Management 
Support
Level of Technology 
Training of Staff
Cybersecurity 
Strategic Plans
INDEPENDENT VARIABES DEPENDENT VARIABLE
Cybersecurity 
Effectiveness (CSE)IND V-1
IND V-2
IND V-3
IND V-4
IND V-5
H1
H2
H3
H4
H5
Competency of Staff
MCSE
HCSE
LCSE
Technology Deployed
Training of Staff
Cybersecurity 
Strategic Plans
1-3
>3&
<4
>4
Dep V
CSE Level
Awareness of UsersIND V-6
Senior Management 
support
H6 Awareness of Users
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for incident management and the NIST (2014) risk based framework for information 
security implementation and process improvement to enable Abu Dhabi government 
entities assess the status of their existing cybersecurity defences, the severity of 
potential security breaches and analyse the potential cyber and information security 
risks associated with their entities to ensure appropriate resource allocation and 
overall improvement of their entity’s cybersecurity systems. The checklist was 
formulated basing on the six (6) pillars (factors) for evaluation of cybersecurity 
effectiveness in Abu Dhabi government entities as cited in the proposed 
cybersecurity theoretical framework.  
Furthermore, to establish an appropriate CSE evaluation scale, the researcher 
modified the Capability Maturity Model Integration (CMMI) software process 
evaluation scaling technique explained earlier in the literature to come up with a 
measurement scale that government entities can use to verify their level of 
cybersecurity effectiveness (CSE).  According to this modified scale for the study 
checklist, a Level of 1 indicates that the organization has taken initial steps towards 
implementing measures that contribute towards CSE; Level of 2 indicates that these 
measures are repeatable and show evidence of improvement; Level 3 indicates that 
these CSE measures are defined and can be referenced and evidenced in the 
organization’s process assets.  Meanwhile, Level 4 shows that the organization has 
well managed CSE operations and the highest level of CSE evaluation in an 
organization is Level 5, which shows that the all the six factors in addition to a strong 
technology foundation are optimized and understood by all users in the organization.   
In addition, as previously presented in Chapter 4, departmental cybersecurity 
effectiveness is considered low if the scores are 1 – 3;   medium if they are greater 
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than 3 but less than 4 and high wherever they are greater than 4 with a score of 5 
being maximum to scale. It is the researcher’s hope that assessors of cybersecurity 
preparedness in Abu Dhabi government entities can apply or modify this scale to 
evaluate their cybersecurity effectiveness levels. The checklist has been organized 
according to the pertinent factors to ease implementation and allow focus by 
different departmental groups to different areas of concern.  For instance, to 
complete and evaluate the competency/knowledge of information security staff 
pillar, the assessor enters a score of 1 – 5 on the last column for each sub-factor then 
calculates the average for the factor. At the end of the evaluation process, the level of 
Competency/knowledge of Information Security will have a cybersecurity 
effectiveness level of between 1 and 5 as indicated in the Table 57. 
Meanwhile, for Support from Management factor on the checklist, the 
assessor enters a score of 1 – 5 on the last column for each sub-factor then calculates 
the average for the factor. At the end of the evaluation process, Support from 
Management factor on the scale will have a cybersecurity effectiveness level 
between 1 and 5 representing the performance level of the organization to scale in 
terms of CSE as seen in Table 58. 
Below, the researcher presents the CSE evaluation checklist proposed for the 
study based on the six pillars; 1) Competence/ Knowledge of staff, 2) Support from 
Management, 3) Level of Technology, 4) Training of Staff, 5) Strategic Plans and 6) 
Awareness of Users as described in the study theoretical framework in Figure 22.  
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Table 57: Competence/Knowledge of Staff Checklist 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Check 
 Options 
 I=Initial; 
 M=Managed; 
 D=Defined; 
QM=Quantitative
ly Managed;  
O=Optimized CSE Evaluation Pillars 
Competence/ Knowledge of 
Staff
Support from Management
Level of Technology
Training of Staff
Cybersecurity Strategic 
Plans
Awareness of Users
 
Pillar  1: 
Competence/Knowledge of Staff 
 
I 
 
M 
 
D 
 
Q
M  O 
  i. 
Organization has well 
qualified and experienced 
staff assigned to 
cybersecurity functions.           
  ii. 
Most Cybersecurity staff 
have relevant industry 
certifications academic 
credentials on Cyber and 
information security.           
  
iii
. 
Cybersecurity staff 
maintain up to date 
industry knowledge in 
their domain of expertise.           
 
iv
. 
Cybersecurity staff have 
membership in 
international professional 
organizations.      
 v 
Experienced staff are 
retained in the 
organization      
 vi 
The organization has 
subscribed and can access 
up to date Libraries on 
cyber and Information 
security.      
  
Average for Competence/ 
Knowledge  of Staff   
Proposed Abu Dhabi 
Government Department 
CSE-Checklist based on 6 - 
Pillars 
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Table 58: Support from Management Checklist 
 
 
 
Check 
Options  
I= Initial;  
M= Managed; 
D=Defined; 
QM=Quantitative
ly     Managed; 
O=Optimized 
CSE Evaluation Pillars   I M D 
Q
M O 
 
Competence/ Knowledge of 
Staff
Support from Management
Level of Technology
Training of Staff
Cybersecurity Strategic 
Plans
Awareness of Users
 
Pillar 2: Support from 
Management           
      
      
A 
Development and Communication of 
Cybersecurity Security Policies           
  i. 
Organization has developed 
cybersecurity policies.           
  ii. 
Cybersecurity policies are 
approved by the Chief Executive 
Officer or equivalent           
  
iii
. 
The policies are published within 
the organization in places where 
they are easily seen.           
  
iv
. 
The  policies are communicated 
to all employees when they are 
first hired and on a regular basis 
thereafter           
  v. 
The policies are shared with all 
relevant external parties.           
            
B 
Review and updating of 
Cybersecurity Policies           
  i. 
Cybersecurity policies are 
revised at least once a year and 
whenever need arises           
  ii. 
Changes to policies are approved 
by senior management and 
communicated to all the staff      
 
 
      
 
 
Proposed Abu Dhabi Government 
Department CSE-Checklist based 
on 6 - Pillars 
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Table 58: Support from Management Checklist (Continued) 
  
 
Check 
Options 
I=Initial; 
M=Managed; 
D=Defined; 
QM=Quantitativ
ely Managed; 
O=Optimized 
CSE Evaluation Pillars 
I M D 
Q
M O 
Competence/ Knowledge of 
Staff
Support from Management
Level of Technology
Training of Staff
Cybersecurity Strategic 
Plans
Awareness of Users
 
Pillar 2: Support from Management            
 
C 
Cyber Security Roles and 
Responsibilities           
  i. I 
Chief Information Security Officer 
(CISO) roles are well defined.           
 
ii. i
i 
There is clear segregation between 
CISO and IT roles and 
responsibilities in the organization.      
 iii.  
 
The cybersecurity department in the 
organization maintains contact and 
engagement with relevant UAE 
organizations such as NESA, AE-
Cert and ADSIC.      
 iv.  
 
The CISO in the organization 
reports directly to the Chief 
Executive Officer (CEO) or 
equivalent.      
 v.  
 
The Information Security 
department maintains contacts with 
relevant external organizations.      
 vi.  
 
Information Security requirements 
are integrated into project 
management functions.      
D 
d
D Budget      
 i. 
The organization has an annual line 
item on cybersecurity activities.      
 ii. 
 
Budgets for IT Cybersecurity 
equipment is separated from other 
general budget and allocated 
appropriately to purchase the latest 
Cyber Intrusion hardware.      
 
 
 
 
 
Proposed Abu Dhabi Government 
Department CSE-Checklist based 
on 6 - Pillars 
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Table 58: Support from Management Checklist (Continued) 
  
 
Check 
Options 
I=Initial; 
M=Managed; 
D=Defined; 
QM=Quantitati
vely Managed; 
O=Optimized 
CSE Evaluation Pillars I M D 
Q
M O 
Competence/ Knowledge of 
Staff
Support from Management
Level of Technology
Training of Staff
Cybersecurity Strategic 
Plans
Awareness of Users
 
Pillar 2: Support from 
Management            
E. Planning           
  i. 
 
Organization has established 
strategic plans.           
 ii. 
 
Cybersecurity measures and 
efforts are explicitly stated in 
the strategic plans.      
 
iii
. 
 
Cybersecurity plans are 
documented and distributed 
within the organization.      
 
iv
. 
 
Cybersecurity plans are 
reviewed and updated 
annually.      
        
F. 
Cyber Security Key Performance 
Indicators      
 i. 
 
Organization has metrics that 
measures performance of 
cyber security activities      
 ii. 
 
Organization has established 
overall monitoring tools for 
cyber-security performance.      
Average for Support of Management      
 
 
 For the Level of Technology factor on the checklist, the assessor enters a 
score of 1 – 5 on the last column for each sub-factor then calculates the average for 
the factor.    At the end of the evaluation process, the level of Technology will have a 
cybersecurity effectiveness level assessed between 1 and 5 as indicated in Table 59 
below. 
Proposed Abu Dhabi Government 
Department CSE-Checklist based 
on 6 - Pillars 
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Table 59: Level of Technology Deployed Checklist 
 
 
 
 
Check 
 Options 
 I=Initial; 
 M=Managed; 
 D=Defined; 
QM=Quantitatively 
Managed;  
O=Optimized 
CSE Evaluation Pillars Pillar 3:  Level of Technology   I  M  D  QM  O 
 A. Operations Management      
Competence/ Knowledge of 
Staff
Support from Management
Level of Technology
Training of Staff
Cybersecurity Strategic 
Plans
Awareness of Users
 
 
i. 
Organization has 
annual budget for 
information security 
technology           
  ii. 
Organization has 
implemented 
technology for 
detection of cyber 
breaches           
  iii. 
Technology has been 
implemented to prevent 
cybersecurity breaches 
from happening in the 
organization           
  iv.  
Our organization has 
effective backup 
policies, procedures 
and technology.           
  v. 
Our organization has 
established technology 
to test and evaluate 
cybersecurity breaches.           
  vi. 
Network or system 
access by all users are 
logged, regularly 
reviewed and 
monitored for 
cybersecurity breaches.           
  vii 
Our organization has 
implemented processes 
for change management           
B. Vulnerability Management           
 i.  
Reports generated from 
the penetration tests are 
presented and discussed 
and senior management 
meetings.      
Proposed Abu Dhabi 
Government Department 
CSE-Checklist based on 6 - 
Pillars 
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Table 59: Level of Technology Deployed Checklist (Continued) 
 
Check 
 Options 
 I=Initial; 
 M=Managed; 
 D=Defined; 
QM=Quantitatively 
Managed;  
O=Optimized 
CSE Evaluation Pillars  Pillar 3:  Level of Technology   I  M  D  QM  O 
 
 ii.  
Organization has policies 
and procedures for 
connection of personal 
devices to the corporate 
network. 
      
Competence/ Knowledge of 
Staff
Support from Management
Level of Technology
Training of Staff
Cybersecurity Strategic 
Plans
Awareness of Users
 
 
iii.  
Actions taken to mitigate 
information security 
vulnerabilities are 
planned, documented and 
monitored for 
effectiveness.           
  iv.  
Organization has policies 
and procedures that 
govern user installation 
of software.           
  v.  
Our organization uses 
third parties to conduct 
penetration testing of its 
information systems 
environment.           
 C Incident Management           
  i.  
Organization has 
designated roles for 
cybersecurity incident 
management.           
  ii.  
Organization has 
established plans, 
policies and procedures 
for handling cyber 
security incidents.           
D. Business Continuity           
 
i.  
Organization has 
established a framework 
for business continuity in 
the case of cyberattacks.           
 ii.  
There is a redundant site 
for recovery in case of 
major cyber-attack.      
 
Proposed Abu Dhabi 
Government Department 
CSE-Checklist based on 6 - 
Pillars 
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Table 60: Training of Staff and CSE Checklist 
 
 
 
Check 
 Options 
 I=Initial; 
 M=Managed; 
 D=Defined; 
QM=Quantitatively 
Managed;  
O=Optimized 
CSE Evaluation Pillars 
Competence/ Knowledge of 
Staff
Support from Management
Level of Technology
Training of Staff
Cybersecurity Strategic 
Plans
Awareness of Users
 
Pillar  4:  Training  of Staff 
 
I  M  D 
 
Q
M  O 
  i. 
The organization has 
implemented a regular 
user training program on 
cyber security for all its 
employees.           
  ii. 
User training programs 
implemented takes into 
consideration the cultural 
diversity of the 
workforce.           
  
iii
. 
Monitoring and 
measurement tools are in 
place to evaluate the 
effectiveness of staff 
training programs.           
 
iv
. 
All staff cybersecurity 
training programmes are 
reviewed at least once a 
year or whenever the 
security need arises      
 v 
Our induction training 
programmes include 
culturally sensitive 
session on cyber and 
information security      
        
  Average for training of staff   
 
 
For the Training of Staff factor, to use the checklist in Table 60 above, the 
assessor enters a score of 1 – 5 on the last column and then calculates the average for 
the factor. At the end of the evaluation process, the contribution of Training of Staff 
to cybersecurity effectiveness will be evaluated between 1 to 5. 
 
Proposed Abu Dhabi 
Government Department 
CSE-Checklist based on 6 - 
Pillars 
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Finally the strategic planning pillar checklist is further presented on Table 61 
below and the assessor enters a score of 1 – 5 on the last column for each sub-factor 
then calculates the average for the factor after which an average value will be 
computed to attain the final CSE level for the factor. 
Table 61: Checklist for Strategic Planning Pillar 
 
 
 
Check 
 Options 
 I=Initial; 
 M=Managed; 
 D=Defined; 
QM=Quantitatively 
Managed;  
O=Optimized 
CSE Evaluation Pillars 
Competence/ Knowledge of 
Staff
Support from Management
Level of Technology
Training of Staff
Cybersecurity Strategic 
Plans
Awareness of Users
 
Pillar  5:  Strategic Planning 
 
I  M  D 
 
Q
M  O 
  i. 
A cybersecurity budget 
has been incorporated into 
our organization’s 
strategic plan           
  ii. 
Information and 
cybersecurity policies are 
reviewed at least once in a 
year and whenever need 
arises to ensure 
effectiveness           
  
iii
. 
All employees can access 
the organization’s 
strategic plans           
 
iv
. 
Strategic plans guide our 
organization to implement 
cybersecurity measures      
        
        
        
        
        
  
Average for Cybersecurity Strategic 
Planning  
 
 
Proposed Abu Dhabi 
Government Department 
CSE-Checklist based on 6 - 
Pillars 
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Next, for the Awareness of Users factor the relationship with the checklist is 
indicated in Table 62. At the end of the evaluation process, the level of User 
Awareness will have a cybersecurity effectiveness (CSE) level of between 1 and 5.   
Table 62: Awareness of Staff and CSE Checklist 
 
 
Check 
 Options 
 I=Initial; 
 M=Managed; 
 D=Defined; 
QM=Quantitatively 
Managed;  
O=Optimized 
CSE Evaluation Pillars 
Competence/ Knowledge of 
Staff
Support from Management
Level of Technology
Training of Staff
Cybersecurity Strategic 
Plans
Awareness of Users
 
Pillar  6:  Awareness of Staff 
 
I  M  D 
 Q
M 
 
O 
  i. 
All employees are made 
aware of information 
security policies upon 
joining.           
  ii. 
Organization's policies on 
information awareness are 
strictly enforced.           
  
iii
. 
The organization has a 
formal and documented 
disciplinary policy for 
information security 
breaches adhered to by all 
staff.             
 
iv
. 
The organization 
consistently applies the 
disciplinary measures on 
cybersecurity breaches.       
 v. 
Periodic campaigns are 
held by the organization 
to communicate, 
emphasize and reinforce 
cyber security readiness 
within the organization.      
        
        
  Average for Awareness of Staff   
 
 
 
 
Proposed Abu Dhabi 
Government Department 
CSE-Checklist based on 6 - 
Pillars 
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5.6 Limitations and Future Research Directions  
In this study, a framework for examining the effectiveness of cybersecurity 
defences in Abu Dhabi government entities has been proposed.  In future, the 
researcher intends to examine applicability of the proposed framework to private 
sector organizations, the Abu Dhabi government and globally. This study covers the 
cybersecurity aspects of only UAE public organizations. Comparing cybersecurity 
regulations, cybersecurity attack patterns and way of tackling these threats in other 
countries of the world would offer more insights to the issue at hand. This 
comparison study would also provide more detailed knowledge about cybersecurity 
regulations and methods of prevention from data breach.     
The study findings are based on cross sectional data. Future studies may bring 
more comprehensive findings about patterns of cybersecurity issues by adopting 
longitudinal data collection at two different points of time. Similarly, use of 
experimental design by incorporating experiment and control group can give more 
robust picture about the influential factors responsible for effective cybersecurity 
system. Such studies will help in concluding causal relationship among different 
factors of cybersecurity effectiveness.  
The current study focused both human and organizational level factors that 
contribute towards cybersecurity effectiveness. Future research, however, should 
include factors that are beyond human and organizational control; for example 
government support, government policies regarding use of information technology, 
external political influence among others.    
    The system of cybersecurity effectiveness is analysed in the light of several 
practicable factors. In this study, all these factors are supposed to have a positive 
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effect in enhancing the effectiveness of cybersecurity system. Further research is 
required to examine those factors that can deteriorate the potential capacity of 
cybersecurity system. These may be poor working conditions, lack of employee 
engagement among others. Such type of research will guide managers and policy 
makers to avoid those factors that can be a hindrance to effective management of 
cybersecurity systems.    
 
5.7 Summary of the Study  
The major goal of this study was to propose a framework for evaluation of 
cybersecurity defences in Abu Dhabi government entities. A cybersecurity 
framework consisting of key factors for evaluation of cybersecurity defences has 
been proposed by this study. This framework has been developed basing on the six 
key factors proposed for evaluating cybersecurity effectiveness in Abu Dhabi 
government entities. These factors are; 1) Competence/ Knowledge of Information 
security staff 2) Support from senior management 3) Level of technology deployed 
4) training of staff 5) cybersecurity strategic plans and 6) Awareness of users. The 
proposed framework provides systematic guidelines to executive level management 
in different departments for preparation, protection and prevention of their 
departments from any form of cyber and information security attacks. A chapter wise 
overview of the study is summarized below: 
In chapter one, the researcher introduced the study on cybersecurity globally 
and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in particular. Several research glitches, 
research objectives, the research questions were formulated grounded on the fact that 
the UAE has become a target for a multitude of cyberattacks recently. 
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In chapter two, the researcher reviewed literature from several existing 
studies, journals, and published conference papers, among others, concerning the 
subject matter, which enabled identification of the research gap and the six study 
hypotheses for further analysis.  
Chapter three presented the methodological approach undertaken to address 
the research questions and study hypotheses. A detailed discussion of the research 
strategy, tools and the research design was presented in detail. The chapter further 
presented various tests conducted to validate and ensure reliability of the research 
instrument and to test the hypotheses of the study. 
In chapter four, the researcher presented the data analysis and study results 
including the method of analysis, reliability and validity checks, demographic 
statistical results and correlation results linear and multiple regression. In the same 
chapter the results were presented to provide answers to the different research 
questions identified in chapter one.  
Finally, chapter five discussed the research contributions and presented a 
framework with checklist for cybersecurity assessment with the aid of key check 
points to evaluate effectiveness and readiness of a department’s cybersecurity 
programme as well as study recommendations and areas of future research.  
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Appendix 1: Survey Questionnaire 
 
A Framework for the Evaluation of Cybersecurity Effectiveness           ةيلعاف مييقتل راطإ
تامولعملا نمأ 
 
Introduction:                                                                                                  ةمدقم
                               
                                                                                                         
 
انأ  ةرادإ يف هاروتكدلا جمانرب يف ايلاح قحتلم
 و ،ةدحتملا ةيبرعلا تاراملإا ةعماجب لامعلأا
 ينورتكللإا تامولعملا نمأ لاجم لوانتت يتحورطا
 ضرغلا ،يبظوبأ ةرامإ يف ةيموكحلا تاسسؤملا يف
 هذه دادعلإ تامولعم عمج وه نايبتسلاا اذه نم
 وأ نيكراشملا ءامسأ ركذُت نل و ،ةساردلا تاسسؤملا
 نم وأ ةساردلا نم ناكم يأ يف اهيف نولمعي يتلا
 اذه قرغتسي نل ،اقحلا اهدادعإ متيس يتلا ةحورطلأا
 نم رثكأ ءاصقتسلاا51  ىلع مكل اركش ،ةقيقد
.مكتكراشم 
 
I am currently enrolled into the DBA 
program at the UAE University.  As 
part of my studies I am conducting 
research on cybersecurity in Abu 
Dhabi government agencies.  The 
purpose of this questionnaire is to 
collect data for this research.  The 
names of the participants or the 
agencies they work for will not be 
identified anywhere in this survey or 
the dissertation to follow. This 
survey will not take more than 15 
minutes. Thank you for participating.   
 
General information:                                                                                                                              
    :ةماعلا تامولعملا 
1. What is your age? 
1 ؟كرمع وهام .  
  نم لقأ52 .ةنس  Less than 25 years  
  نيب52 و03 ةنس  25 - 30 years  
  نيب03 و03 ةنس  30 - 40 years  
  نم رثكأ03 ةنس  More than 40 year  
 
2. What is your educational background?  [Indicate major course work where 
applicable] 
5)دجو نإ صصختلا ركذ عم ( ؟يميلعتلا كاوتسم وه ام .  
 ةماع ةيوناث High School  
 مولبد Diploma  
238 
 
 
 
 يلاع مولبد Higher Diploma  
 سويرولاكب Bachelors  
 ريتسجام Masters  
 هاروتكد Doctorate  
 
3. What is your major? 
0؟كصصخت وه ام . 
 صصخت نودب No Major  
 تامولعملا ةينقت وأ رتويبمكلا لاجمب طبترم Computer or IT related  
 ةسدنهلا لاجمب طبترم Engineering related  
 لامعلأا و ةرادلإا لاجمب طبترم Business relater  
 
 رخآ
()........................................................... 
Others 
(………………………) 
 
 
 
 
0. How many years have you worked in the government sector? 
0؟يموكحلا عاطقلا يف تلمع ةنس مك .  
 
  نم3  ىلإ2 تاونس  0 – 5 years  
  نم2  ىلإ13 تاونس  5 - 10 years  
  نم رثكأ13 تاونس  More than 10 years  
 
 
5. What is your managerial level? 
2 .؟يرادلإا كاوتسم وهام 
 فظوم /قيرف وضع Team Member/ Officer  
 قيرف ريدم /مسق ريدم Section Manager/ Team Lead  
 ةرادإ ريدم 
Department Manager/ CIO/ 
CISO/ IT manager 
 
 ريدم ماع ريدم /يذيفنت  Executive Director/CEO/GM  
 راشتسم Consultant  
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6. How many employees does your organization have? 
6؟ةسسؤملا يف نولمعي نيذلا نيفظوملا ددع مك .  
Less than 100 100 – 200 201 – 500 500 - 999 Greater than 1000 
 نم لقا133   نم133  ىلإ533  
 نم531  ىلإ
233 
 نم233  ىلإ
999 
 نم رثكأ1333  
     
 
7. How would you rate your understanding of cybersecurity? 
7 .؟)يناربيسلا نملأا( ينورتكللإا تامولعملا نملأ كمهف فنصت فيك 
 دجوي لا None  
 فيعض Poor  
 ديج Good  
 زاتمم Excellent  
 
 
8. A cyberattack is a perceived threat to network security. 
8.تاكبشلا نملأ اديدهت لكشت )ينورتكللإا قارتخلإا( ةنصرقلا . 
 
9. Our employees do not know when their computers have been attacked by a 
virus. 
9 ..ينورتكيلإ سوريفل مهب ةصاخلا رتويبمكلا ةزهجأ تضرعت ىتم نوملعي لا انوفظوم 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
 ةدشب قفاوأ لا قفاوأ لا دياحم قفاوأ ةدشب قفاوأ 
     
 
13. A cyberattack can be perceived as a threat to data and information 
13. .ةينورتكللإا تامولعملاو تانايبلل اديدهت لكشت )ينورتكللإا قارتخلإا( ةنصرقلا 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
 ةدشب قفاوأ لا قفاوأ لا دياحم قفاوأ ةدشب قفاوأ 
     
 
 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
 ةدشب قفاوأ لا قفاوأ لا دياحم قفاوأ ةدشب قفاوأ 
     
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11. A Virus attack is a type of a cyber-attack. 
11 ..)ةنصرقلا( ةينورتكللإا تامجهلا عاونأ نم عون يسوريفلا موجهلا 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
 ةدشب قفاوأ لا قفاوأ لا دياحم قفاوأ ةدشب قفاوأ 
     
 
 
15. Untrustworthy employees or disgruntled IT insiders can initiate a 
cyberattack against the organization. 
15 . نع نييضارلا ريغ و نييلوخملا تامولعملا ةينقت وصتخم وأ مهب قوثوملا ريغ نوفظوملا نشي نأ نكمي
. ةسسؤملا دض )ةنصرق ( ةينورتكللإا تامجه ،لمعلا 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
 ةدشب قفاوأ لا قفاوأ لا دياحم قفاوأ ةدشب قفاوأ 
     
 
10. Website defacing is a type of a cyber-attack 
10 ..)ةنصرقلا( وأ ينورتكللإا موجهلا عاونأ نم عون تنرتنلإا عقاوم بيرخت  
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
 ةدشب قفاوأ لا قفاوأ لا دياحم قفاوأ ةدشب قفاوأ 
     
 
10. I completely understand what email client vulnerability is. 
10 . لثم ( ينورتكللإا ديربلا تامدخ يرفوم ىدل تارغثلا دجاوت امامت كردأGmail, Yahoo, Hotmail 
.).خلإ 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
 ةدشب قفاوأ لا قفاوأ لا دياحم قفاوأ ةدشب قفاوأ 
     
 
 
12. I understand the importance of choosing a strong password 
12 . .نيمختلا ةبعص و ةعينملا رسلا ةملك رايتخا ةيمهأ كردأ 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
 ةدشب قفاوأ لا قفاوأ لا دياحم قفاوأ ةدشب قفاوأ 
     
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16. The vulnerability of an organization can be decreased by implementing 
appropriate security countermeasures 
16 . قيبطت للاخ نم ينملأا ةسسؤملا فعض نم دحلا نكمي.ةمئلاملا ةيميظنتلا و ةينملأا تاءارجلإا 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
 ةدشب قفاوأ لا قفاوأ لا دياحم قفاوأ ةدشب قفاوأ 
     
 
 
17. Our organization understands the risk of cyberattacks and the importance 
of implementing safeguarding techniques. 
17 ..اهتيامحل تاينقت قيبطت ةيمهأ ىدمو )ةنصرقلا( ةينورتكللإا تامجهلا ةروطخ انتسسؤم كردت  
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
 ةدشب قفاوأ لا قفاوأ لا دياحم قفاوأ ةدشب قفاوأ 
     
 
18. Cyberattacks may disrupt organizational activities. 
18 ..ةسسؤملا طاشن لـقرعت نأ )ةنصرقلا( ةينورتكللإا تامجهلل نكمي 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
 ةدشب قفاوأ لا قفاوأ لا دياحم قفاوأ ةدشب قفاوأ 
     
 
 
19. Legal consequences against attackers may deter cyberattacks. 
19 ..)ةينورتكللإا تامجهلا( ةنصرقلا تايلمع  عدرت دق تامجهلا يبكترمل ةينوناقلا ةلءاسملا 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
 ةدشب قفاوأ لا قفاوأ لا دياحم قفاوأ ةدشب قفاوأ 
     
 
53. Cyber-attackers focus on targets such as networks, servers and routers. 
53 )ةنصرقلا( ةينورتكللإا تامجهلا يبكترم زكري . فادهأ ىلعلا طاقن و مداوخلاو تاكبشلا لثمهيجوت.  
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly Agree 
 ةدشب قفاوأ لا قفاوأ لا دياحم قفاوأ ةدشب قفاوأ 
     
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51.  Please check below what type of attack your organization has experienced 
over the last 1 – 3 years? 
51؟مكتسسؤم هل تضرعت )ةنصرقلا( ةينورتكللإا تامجهلا نم عون يأ .  
 
 
 
 
 
55. When was this information about the attack disclosed to the 
public/customers? (In days, weeks etc.) 
55 /مايلأاب( ءلامعلا / روهمجلل )ةنصرقلا( ةينورتكللإا ةمجهلا نع ةمولعملا هذه نع نلاعلإا مت ىتم . .
.)خلإ .../عيباسلأا 
 مويلا سفن يف On the same day  
 عوبسا للاخ Within a week  
 رهش للاخ Within a month  
 اهنع نلاعلإا متي مل Never been disclosed  
 
23. To what degree did the attacks reduce the availability of your network? 
50 .؟مكب ةصاخلا ةكبشلا ماظن نادقف يف )ةنصرقلا ( ةينورتكللإا تامجهلا تببست ةجرد يأ ىلإ 
 
I Don’t 
know 
No Effect Some 
Effect 
Considerable 
Effect 
Catastrophic 
Effect 
 لاملعأ  ريثأت نودب ريثأتلا ضعب غلاب ريثأت يواسأم ريثأت 
     
24.  To what degree did the attacks reduce the availability of your 
data/information? 
50 .؟ةينورتكللإا تامولعملا/تانايبلا رفاوت ليلقت يف )ةنصرقلا( ةينورتكللإا تامجهلا تببست ةجرد يأ ىلإ 
 
I Don’t 
know 
No Effect Some Effect Considerable 
Effect 
Catastrophic 
Effect 
ملعأ لا ريثأت نودب ريثأتلا ضعب غلاب ريثأت يواسأم ريثأت 
     
 
 
 
 Denial of Service (DOS) تامدخلا نم نامرحلا  
 Virus Attack يسوريفلا موجهلا  
 Worm Attack رتويبمكلا ةدود ةطساوب موجه  
 Industrial Sabotage يعانص بيرخت  
 Insider Attack ةيلخادلا تامجهلا  
 Denial of access to your email or computer systems 
 ديربلا تامدخل لوصولا نم نامرحلا
ةمظنلأا تامدخ وأ ينورتكيللإا 
 
 Website defacing ينورتكللإا عقوملا بيرخت  
    
 
Others: (Please specify) 
_____________________________
___________ 
 
)ديدحتلا ىجري( ىرخأ 
_________________________
___________ 
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25. To what degree did the attacks reduce your ability to collaborate by email? 
52 تامجهلا تببست ةجرد يأ ىلإ . ديربلا ةطساوب لصاوتلا ىلع مكتردق ليلقت يف )ةنصرقلا( ةينورتكللإا
؟ينورتكللإا 
 
I Don’t 
know 
No Effect Some Effect Considerable 
Effect 
Catastrophic 
Effect 
ملعأ لا ريثأت نودب ريثأتلا ضعب غلاب ريثأت يواسأم ريثأت 
     
 
26.  To what degree did the attacks reduce the overall operations of your 
organization? 
56 .؟مكتسسؤم طاشن ليطعت يف )ةنصرقلا( ةينورتكللإا تامجهلا تببست ةجرد يأ ىلإ  
I Don’t 
know 
No Effect Some Effect Considerable 
Effect 
Catastrophic 
Effect 
ملعأ لا ريثأت نودب ريثأتلا ضعب غلاب ريثأت  ريثأتيواسأم  
     
 
 
27.  To what degree did the attacks reduce employee productivity in your 
organization? 
57 .؟مكتسسؤم يفظوم ةيجاتنإ ليلقت يف )ةنصرقلا( ةينورتكللإا تامجهلا تببست ةجرد يأ ىلإ 
 
I Don’t 
know 
No Effect Some Effect Considerable 
Effect 
Catastrophic 
Effect 
ملعأ لا ريثأت نودب ريثأتلا ضعب غلاب ريثأت يواسأم ريثأت 
     
 
58. Disclosing to the public that an organization has experienced a cyberattack 
may negatively impact its reputation. 
58ةينورتكلإ تامجهل تضرعت دق ةسسؤملا نأب نلاعلإا . ؟اهتعمس ىلع ابلس رـثؤي دق )ةنصرقلا تايلمع(  
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly Agree 
 ةدشب قفاوأ لا قفاوأ لا دياحم قفاوأ ةدشب قفاوأ 
     
     
 
 
59. All Abu Dhabi government organization should have a budget allocated to 
strengthen cybersecurity measures. 
59 نملأا( ةينورتكللإا ةينملأا تاءارجلإا زيزعتل ةينازيم صصخت نأ بجي ،يبظوبأ ةموكح تاسسؤم عيمج .
.)يناربيسلا 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
 ةدشب قفاوأ لا قفاوأ لا دياحم قفاوأ ةدشب قفاوأ 
     
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03. Our organization has invested adequate funds to promote countermeasures 
against cyberattacks. 
03 ..)ةنصرقلا( ةينورتكللإا تامجهلا دض ةداضم ريبادت ةيقرتل ةيفاك لااومأ انتسسؤم ترمثتسا  
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
 ةدشب قفاوأ لا لا قفاوأ  دياحم قفاوأ ةدشب قفاوأ 
     
 
 
 
01. Our organization has invested adequate funds towards increasing 
employee education as a protection from cyberattacks. 
01 . ةينورتكللإا تامجهلا نم اهتيامحل ةليسوك اهيفظوم ميلعت يف ةيفاك لااومأ انتسسؤم ترمثتسا)ةنصرقلا(  
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly Agree 
 ةدشب قفاوأ لا قفاوأ لا دياحم قفاوأ ةدشب قفاوأ 
     
 
 
05. Disaster recovery is not considered as a protection from cyberattacks, but 
rather a pre-determined plan in case of a cyberattack. 
05 . يف ةقبسم ةيطايتحإ ةطخ لب ،)ةنصرقلا( ةينورتكللإا تامجهلا نم ةيامح ربتعت لا "ةثراكلا نم يفاعتلا ططخ"
.)ةنصرقلا( ةينورتكلإ ةمجه يأ ثودح ةلاح 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly Agree 
 ةدشب قفاوأ لا قفاوأ لا دياحم قفاوأ  قفاوأةدشب  
     
     
 
00. In our organization, government practices and guidelines has helped us in 
safeguarding against cyberattacks. 
 
00  )يناربيسلا نملأا( ينورتكللإا نملأا لاجم يف ةيموكحلا تاءارجلإا و تاسرامملا انتدعاس ،انتسسؤم يف .
تامجهلا نم اهتيامحل .)ةنصرقلا( ةينورتكلإ  
 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagre
e 
Neutral Agree Strongly Agree 
 ةدشب قفاوأ لا قفاوأ لا دياحم قفاوأ ةدشب قفاوأ 
     
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00. It is important to have cybersecurity incorporated in organizations 
Strategic plans. 
 
00 . و جمد مهملا نم ةسسؤملا تاططخم نمض )يناربيسلا نملأا ( ينورتكللإا نملأا ةلأسم نيمضت
.ةيجيتارتسلاا 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagre
e 
Neutral Agree Strongly Agree 
 ةدشب قفاوأ لا قفاوأ لا دياحم قفاوأ ةدشب قفاوأ 
     
 
 
02. All employees in our organization are aware of the strategic plan 
implemented to protect against cyberattacks 
35 ..)ةنصرقلا( ةينورتكللإا تامجهلا نم دحلل ةيجيتارتسلإا ةطخلاب كاردإ ىلع انتسسؤم يف نيلماعلا لك 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree 
 
Neutral 
 
Agree 
 
Strongly Agree 
 
 ةدشب قفاوأ لا قفاوأ لا دياحم قفاوأ ةدشب قفاوأ 
     
 
 
06. Senior management has an important role in developing information 
security policies for our organization. 
36 ..)يناربيسلا نملأا( ةينورتكيللإا تامولعملا نمأ تاسايس ريوطت يف مهم رود انتسسؤم يف ايلعلا ةرادلإل 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
 ةدشب قفاوأ لا قفاوأ لا دياحم قفاوأ ةدشب قفاوأ 
     
 
 
  07 . The Head of Information Security of our organization reports directly to 
the highest official in our organization  
37 .  انتسسؤم يف تامولعملا نمأ سيئرطلس ىلعأب رشابم لاصتا ىلع.ةسسؤملا يف ة 
Strong
ly 
Disagr
ee 
Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly Agree 
 قفاوأ لا
 ةدشب 
قفاوأ لا دياحم قفاوأ ةدشب قفاوأ 
     
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08. It is important that information security policies are reviewed on a regular 
basis to ensure their effectiveness in our organization.  
38 . نامضل ةمظتنم ةفصب )يناربيسلا نملأا( ينورتكللإا تامولعملا نمأ  تاءارجإ و تاسايس ةعجارم مهملا نم
.انتسسؤم يف اهتيلاعف 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
 قفاوأ لا
 ةدشب 
قفاوأ لا دياحم قفاوأ ةدشب قفاوأ 
     
 
 
09. Strategic plans guide our organization to implement cybersecurity measures 
39 ..)يناربيسلا نملأا( ينورتكللإا نملأا ريبادت قيبطت وحن انتسسؤم هجوت ةيجيتارتسلإا ةطخلا 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
 ةدشب قفاوأ لا قفاوأ لا دياحم قفاوأ ةدشب قفاوأ 
     
 
 
03. Cybersecurity generally should be the responsibility of the IT department. 
40 ..تامولعملا ةينقت ةرادإ صاصتخا نم امومع )يناربيسلا نملأا( ينورتكللإا تامولعملا نمأ نوكي نأ يغبني 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly Agree 
 ةدشب قفاوأ لا قفاوأ لا دياحم قفاوأ ةدشب قفاوأ 
     
 
01. It is important to separate the roles of IT management and Information 
Security management in our organization. 
41 .ةرادإ رود نيب لصفلا مهملا نم  يف )يناربيسلا نملأا( ةينورتكللإا تامولعملا نمأ ةرادإ رودو تامولعملا ةينقت
.انتسسؤم 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly Agree 
 ةدشب قفاوأ لا قفاوأ لا دياحم قفاوأ ةدشب قفاوأ 
     
     
 
05. Budget al.,location is not important when it comes to cybersecurity 
strategies for our organization. 
42..ةينازيم صيصخت مهملا نم سيلف انتسسؤمل ةبسنلاب تامولعملا نمأ تايجيتارتساب رملأا قلعتي امدنع 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
 ةدشب قفاوأ لا قفاوأ لا دياحم قفاوأ ةدشب قفاوأ 
     
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00. Our organization has implemented software solutions to protect against 
cyberattacks. 
00 ..)ةنصرقلا( ةينورتكللإا تامجهلا نم ةيامحلل ةيجمرب لولح قيبطت ىلع انتسسؤم لمعت  
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
 ةدشب قفاوأ لا قفاوأ لا دياحم قفاوأ ةدشب قفاوأ 
     
 
00.  Our organization has implemented an effective anti-virus software program 
to safeguard against cyberattacks. 
00 .م ةيامحلل )تاسوريفلا ةحفاكم جمانرب( ةلاعف و ةيجهنم ةيلمع قيبطت ىلع انتسسؤم لمعت تامجهلا ن
)ةنصرقلا( ةينورتكللإا 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
 ةدشب قفاوأ لا قفاوأ لا دياحم قفاوأ ةدشب قفاوأ 
     
 
 
02. Our organization has implemented an effective up-to-date software 
patching procedure to safeguard against cyberattacks. 
02 . نم ةيامحلل )تاسوريفلا ةحفاكم جمارب ثيدحت( ةلاعف و ةيجهنم تاءارجإ قيبطت ىلع انتسسؤم لمعت
.)ةنصرقلا( ةينورتكللإا تامجهلا 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
 ةدشب قفاوأ لا قفاوأ لا دياحم قفاوأ ةدشب قفاوأ 
     
 
 
06. Our organization has installed the following items as safeguards against 
cyberattacks. (Check all that apply) 
06 ..)قبطم وه ام رايتخا ىجري( )ةنصرقلا( ةينورتكللإا تامجهلا نم ةيامحلل ةيلاتلا رصانعلا انتسسؤم دمتعت  
 
 Anti-Virus software’s تاسوريفلا ةحفاكم جمارب  
 Firewalls ةيرانلا ناردجلا  
 Proxy Servers يسكوربلا مداوخ  
 Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) للستلا فشك ةمظنا  
 Intrusion Protection Systems (IPS) للستلا نم ةيامحلا ةمظنأ  
 Data Encryption  تانايبلا ريفشت  
 Digital Signature Certificates ةيمقرلا تاداهشلا / ةيمقرلا تاعيقوتلا  
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 Password Policies رورملا ةملك تاسايس  
 I don’t know فرعأ لا  
 
 
07. Within our organization, we have implemented Employee Awareness 
programs/strategies in order to minimize some vulnerabilities that facilitate 
cyberattacks. 
07 . يتلا فعضلا طاقن ضعب نم دحلا ضرغب نيفظوملل ةيوعوت تايجيتارتسا / جمارب ذيفنتب انمق ،انتسسؤم يف
.)ةنصرقلا( ةينورتكللإا تامجهلا لهست 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
 ةدشب قفاوأ لا قفاوأ لا دياحم قفاوأ ةدشب قفاوأ 
     
 
 
08. Within our organization, we have implemented a st rong Organizational 
Security Policies on employee awareness programs in cybersecurity.  
08 . ةيوعوت جمارب نمض )يناربيسلا نملأا( تامولعملا نمأ تاسايس قيبطتب انمق ،انتسسؤم يف يف نيفظوملل
.)يناربيسلا نملأا( ينورتكللإا نملأا لاجم 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
 ةدشب قفاوأ لا قفاوأ لا دياحم قفاوأ ةدشب قفاوأ 
     
 
09. Within our organization, an increase in Employee Awareness has 
minimized some vulnerabilities that facilitate cyberattacks. 
09 . تامجهلا لهست يتلا فعضلا طاقن ضعب نم دحلا يف نيفظوملا يعو ةدايز تمهاس ،انتسسؤم يف
.)ةنصرقلا( ةينورتكللإا 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
 ةدشب قفاوأ لا قفاوأ لا دياحم قفاوأ ةدشب قفاوأ 
     
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23. Our employees know what to do and whom to contact in case of a 
cybersecurity breach in our Organization 
23 . ينورتكلإ ينمأ قرخ ثودح لاح يف اهب لاصتلاا بجي يتلا ةهجلاو هب مايقلا بجي يذلا ام نوملـعي انيفظوم
ةسسؤملا يف )ةنصرقلا( 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
 ةدشب قفاوأ لا قفاوأ لا دياحم قفاوأ ةدشب قفاوأ 
     
 
 
21. All employees who join our organization must  go through a cybersecurity 
awareness training. 
21 . مهيلع بجي انتسسؤمب نوقحتلي نيذلا نيفظوملا لك ينورتكللإا نملأا لوح ةيوعوت و ةيبيردت ةرودب قاحتللاا
.)يناربيسلا نملأا( 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
 ةدشب قفاوأ لا قفاوأ لا دياحم قفاوأ ةدشب قفاوأ 
     
 
25. Most employees generally understand the different types of cyberattacks. 
25 . .)ةنصرقلا( ةينورتكللإا تامجهلا عاونأ فلتخمب ةيارد ىلع نيفظوملا مظعم  
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
 ةدشب قفاوأ لا قفاوأ لا دياحم قفاوأ ةدشب قفاوأ 
     
 
20. Weak passwords by employees is not a threat to network systems. 
20 ..ةكبشلا مظنل اديدهت لكشت لا نوفظوملا اهمدختسي يتلا ةلهسلا و ةفيعضلا رورملا تاملك   
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
 ةدشب قفاوأ لا قفاوأ لا دياحم قفاوأ ةدشب قفاوأ 
     
 
20. Employees in our organization understand their responsibility in 
preventing against cyberattacks 
20 ..)ةنصرقلا( ةينورتكللإا تامجهلا عنم يف مهتيلوؤسم انتسسؤم يف نوفظوملا كردُي  
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
 ةدشب قفاوأ لا قفاوأ لا دياحم قفاوأ ةدشب قفاوأ 
     
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22. Our employees are able to tell when their computers have been infected by 
viruses. 
22.تاسوريفب ةباصلإ مهب ةصاخلا رتويبمكلا ةزهجأ تضرعت ىتم ديدحت ىلع نورداق انوفظوم .  
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
 ةدشب قفاوأ لا  لاقفاوأ  دياحم قفاوأ ةدشب قفاوأ 
     
 
 
26. Our employees know the importance of keeping their passwords secret. 
26.مهب ةصاخلا رورملا تاملك ةيرس ىلع ظافحلا ةيمهأ انوفظوم كردُي .  
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly Agree 
 ةدشب قفاوأ لا لا قفاوأ  دياحم قفاوأ ةدشب قفاوأ 
     
 
27. Our employees understand the importance of not connecting their   
personal devices (smartphones etc.) on corporate network systems. 
27 و ،ةيكذلا فتاوهلا لثم( ةيصخشلا مهتزهجأ ليصوت مدع ةيمهأ انوفظوم كردُي . )خلإ...،ةيحوللا ةزهجلأا
ةينورتكللإا ةسسؤملا ةكبش مظنب.  
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
 قفاوأ لا
 ةدشب 
قفاوأ لا دياحم قفاوأ ةدشب قفاوأ 
     
 
 
Thank you for participating! 
،،،مكتكراشم ىلع مكركشن 
  
251 
 
 
 
Appendix 2: Ethics Application  
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Appendix 3: Letter of Introduction 
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Appendix 4: Consent Form 
Social Sciences Research Ethics Committee 
- Consent to Participate in a Research Study- 
Please read carefully before signing the Consent Form! 
 
A Framework for the Evaluation of Cyber-Security Effectiveness of 
Abu Dhabi Government Entities 
 
You will be asked to provide or deny consent after reading this form. 
Topic of the research, the researcher(s) and the location 
You have been invited to take part in a study to investigate 
Cybersecurity Effectiveness of Abu Dhabi Government Entities  
 
This study will be conducted by Mr. Abdulla Al Neaimi] in DBA Program 
of UAEU. 
The study will take place via survey monkey.  Participants will receive 
email inviting them to this study if they choose. The questionnaire will take 
approximately 15 minutes to complete. 
Benefit of the research 
It is hoped that the results of this study will be beneficial in two main ways: 
1. Provide a uniform way of evaluating cybersecurity effectiveness in 
government entities. 
2. Provide a basis which cybersecurity can be enhanced in government 
departments. 
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Procedure/setting 
The online survey can be done by using any device that has internet 
connection (phone, ipad, computer etc).   
Confidentiality and Privacy Information 
No names of participants or the agencies they work for will be collected or 
used in this study. 
Right to Withdraw 
Participants are free to withdraw from this study at any time. 
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Informed Consent 
1. I confirm that I have read and understood the above information sheet and have 
had the opportunity to ask questions. 
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw. 
3. I understand that my data will be kept confidential and if published, the data will 
not be identifiable as mine. 
I agree to take part in this study: 
 
    
 (Name and signature of participant)  (Date) 
    
    
 (Name and signature of person taking 
consent) 
 (Date) 
    
    
 (Name and signature of witness (if 
participant unable to read/write) 
 (Date) 
    
    
 (Name and signature of 
parent/guardian/next of kin (when 
participant unable to give consent due 
to age or incapacity) 
 (Date) 
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Appendix 5:  Statistical Tables and Analysis 
Table 63: Descriptive Statistics-Education Background Vs Managerial Level 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 64: Descriptive Statistics- Gov't Sector Vs. Number of Employees 
 
 
Employ Govt Sector * Number of Employees Crosstabulation 
Count   
 Number of Employees Total 
1 <100 2 100 - 
200 
3 201 - 
500 
4 501 – 
999 
5 
>1000 
Employ Govt 
Sector 
1 Social and Civic 65 38 21 32 24 180 
2 Culture and 
Recreation 
33 7 7 10 9 66 
3 Transport 16 5 5 6 11 43 
4 Economic Affairs 9 6 23 5 15 58 
5 Health 2 6 6 2 8 24 
6 Education 2 6 4 11 16 39 
7 Public Order 5 6 5 3 8 27 
8 Science and 
Technology 
3 4 5 5 13 30 
Total 135 78 76 74 104 467 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
What is your Education Background * Your Managerial Level Crosstabulation 
Count   
 Your Managerial Level Total 
1 
Office
r 
2 Station 
manager/
Team 
Leader 
3 
CIO/CI
SO 
4 Exec-
Director 
5 
Consulta
nt 
What is your Education 
Background 
1 High 
School 
1 19 12 0 0 32 
2 Diploma 9 0 13 10 0 32 
3 Higher 
Diploma 
3 0 0 12 3 18 
4 Bachelors 189 81 0 0 10 280 
5 Masters 56 43 0 0 0 99 
6 Doctorate 
or PHD 
0 6 0 0 0 6 
Total 258 149 25 22 13 467 
252 
 
 
 
Table 65: Descriptive Statistics-Education Background vs Managerial Level 
 
What is your Education Background * Your Managerial Level Crosstabulation 
Count   
 Your Managerial Level Total 
1 
Office
r 
2 Station 
manager/
Team 
Leader 
3 
CIO/CI
SO 
4 Exec-
Director 
5 
Consulta
nt 
What is your Education 
Background 
1 High 
School 
11 14 7 0 0 32 
2 Diploma 9 6 11 6 0 32 
3 Higher 
Diploma 
3 1 3 8 3 18 
4 Bachelors 25 30 73 100 52 280 
5 Masters 4 4 10 34 47 99 
6 Doctorate 
or PHD 
0 0 0 5 1 6 
Total 52 55 104 153 103 467 
 
 
Table 66: Descriptive Statistics-Gov't Experience Vs Managerial Level  
 
Your Govt Experience * Your Managerial Level Crosstabulation 
Count   
 Your Managerial Level Total 
1 
Officer 
2 Station 
manager/Te
am Leader 
3 
CIO/CIS
O 
4 Exec-
Director 
5 
Consultant 
Your Govt 
Experience 
1 0 -5 
years 
30 22 44 31 2 129 
2 5 - 10 
years 
19 4 37 96 25 181 
3 >10 
Years 
3 29 23 26 76 157 
Total 52 55 104 153 103 467 
 
 
Table 67: Descriptive Statistics- Study Population by Education Background 
  
 
 
 
 
 
What is your Education Background 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 
1 High School 32 5.3 6.9 6.9 
2 Diploma 32 5.3 6.9 13.7 
3 Higher Diploma 18 3.0 3.9 17.6 
4 Bachelors 280 46.7 60.0 77.5 
5 Masters 99 16.5 21.2 98.7 
6 Doctorate or PHD 6 1.0 1.3 100.0 
Total 467 77.8 100.0  
Missing System 133 22.2   
 Total              600 100.0   
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Table 68: Descriptive Statistics- Study Population by Major 
 
What is your major 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
1 No Major 13 2.2 2.8 2.8 
2 Computer or IT related 145 24.2 31.0 33.8 
3 Engineering Related 70 11.7 15.0 48.8 
4 Business Related 158 26.3 33.8 82.7 
5 Others 81 13.5 17.3 100.0 
Total 467 77.8 100.0  
Missing System 133 22.2   
Total 600 100.0   
 
Table 69: Descriptive Statistics- Study Population by Education by Experience 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
1 0 -5 years 129 21.5 27.6 27.6 
2 5 - 10 years 181 30.2 38.8 66.4 
3 >10 Years 157 26.2 33.6 100.0 
Total 467 77.8 100.0  
Missing System 133 22.2   
Total 600 100.0   
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Table 70: Descriptive Stats - Correlation Results 
 
Correlations 
 CE_mean
1 
CK_me
an1 
RoT_mean1 SM_mean1 UT_mean SP_mean1 UA_
mean 
CE_mean1 
Pearson Correlation 1 .397
** .367** .245** .373** .337** .301** 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
N 467 467 467 467 467 467 466 
CK_mean
1 
Pearson Correlation .397
** 1 .430** .243** .466** .406** .139** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000  .000 .000 .000 .000 .003 
N 467 467 467 467 467 467 466 
RoT_mean
1 
Pearson Correlation .367
** .430** 1 .243** .346** .375** .133** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000  .000 .000 .000 .004 
N 467 467 467 467 467 467 466 
SM_mean
1 
Pearson Correlation .245
** .243** .243** 1 .122** .275** .026 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000  .008 .000 .573 
N 467 467 467 467 467 467 466 
UT_mean 
Pearson Correlation .373
** .466** .346** .122** 1 .244** .108* 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .008  .000 .019 
N 467 467 467 467 467 467 466 
SP_mean1 
Pearson Correlation .337
** .406** .375** .275** .244** 1 .074 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .000 .000  .113 
N 467 467 467 467 467 467 466 
UA_mean 
Pearson Correlation .301
** .139** .133** .026 .108* .074 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .003 .004 .573 .019 .113  
N 466 466 466 466 466 466 466 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
Table 71: Descriptive - Stats (Mean and Standard Deviation) 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
CE_mean1 4.1352 .62173 467 
CK_mean1 4.1501 .56344 467 
RoT_mean1 3.7804 .62965 467 
SM_mean1 3.7212 .69547 467 
UT_mean 4.0557 .63273 467 
SP_mean1 3.9543 .54941 467 
UA_mean 4.0012 .62463 466 
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Table 72: Reliability Statistical results: Cronbach Alpha and PCA 
Cronbach alpha-Rotated Component Matrix 
 
Component Matrix
a
 
 Component 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
SM9 .720 .321      
SM1 .714 .303      
SM8 .706 .334      
SM7 .704 .325      
SM2 .697 .357      
SM3 .666 .320      
SM4 .662 .349      
SM6 .621       
SM10 .580       
SM5 .491       
CK1 -.390 .642 .327     
CK2 -.423 .616 .301     
CK5 -.400 .566 .308     
CK4 -.415 .559 .347     
CK8 -.418 .556      
CK6 -.410 .544      
CK10 -.425 .539      
CK7 -.412 .520      
CK9 -.322 .507      
CK3 -.342 .504 .327     
RoT11  -.409 .686     
RoT6  -.412 .680     
RoT7  -.352 .673     
RoT3  -.421 .652     
RoT10  -.421 .628     
RoT8  -.330 .614     
RoT12  -.330 .614     
RoT4  -.367 .612     
RoT5  -.348 .593     
RoT1  -.322 .520     
RoT2   .473     
RoT9   .338     
UTA5    .739   -.304 
UTA11    .709   -.305 
UTA4    .693    
UTA7    .691    
UTA8    .647    
UTA10    .643   .311 
UTA6    .627    
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Table 72: Reliability Statistical results: Cronbach Alpha and PCA 
Cronbach alpha-Rotated Component Matrix (Continued) 
 
UTA3    .529   .412 
CE3     .684   
CE4 -.316    .671   
CE7 -.336    .606   
CE6     .604   
CE5     .599   
CE2     .533   
UTA1     .341   
SP3      .656  
SP1  -.302    .623  
SP2  -.327    .575  
SP4  -.323    .565  
UTA9    .442   .599 
UTA2    .394   .534 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
a. 7 components extracted. 
 
 
Table 73: Component Transformation Matrix-Varimax Rotation 
 
Component Transformation Matrix 
Component 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 .804 -.489 -.033 -.097 -.250 .181 -.091 
2 .381 .705 -.489 -.190 -.145 -.230 -.094 
3 .273 .381 .865 -.007 -.091 -.153 -.003 
4 .201 .108 -.103 .871 -.033 .014 .421 
5 .298 .067 .000 -.071 .937 .141 .057 
6 -.064 .306 .028 .126 -.103 .872 -.338 
7 -.016 .093 .008 -.418 -.134 .332 .829 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.   
 Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
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Table 74: Reliability Statistics-Rotated component Matrix-Cumulative Variance 
Component Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared 
Loadings 
Rotation Sums of Squared 
Loadings 
Total % of 
Variance 
Cumulat
ive % 
Total % of 
Variance 
Cumulative % Total % of 
Variance 
Cumula
tive % 
1 6.791 12.814 12.814 6.791 12.814 12.814 6.174 11.648 11.648 
2 6.344 11.971 24.784 6.344 11.971 24.784 5.899 11.130 22.778 
3 5.767 10.881 35.665 5.767 10.881 35.665 5.886 11.106 33.884 
4 4.183 7.893 43.558 4.183 7.893 43.558 3.822 7.210 41.094 
5 2.843 5.363 48.922 2.843 5.363 48.922 3.163 5.969 47.063 
6 2.206 4.163 53.084 2.206 4.163 53.084 2.621 4.944 52.007 
7 1.748 3.298 56.383 1.748 3.298 56.383 2.319 4.375 56.383 
8 1.616 3.049 59.432       
9 1.224 2.310 61.742       
10 1.134 2.140 63.882       
11 1.046 1.974 65.857       
12 1.037 1.957 67.814       
13 .928 1.750 69.564       
14 .873 1.647 71.211       
15 .862 1.626 72.837       
16 .827 1.561 74.398       
17 .770 1.453 75.851       
18 .680 1.282 77.134       
19 .664 1.254 78.387       
20 .653 1.231 79.619       
21 .643 1.212 80.831       
22 .610 1.150 81.981       
23 .590 1.113 83.094       
24 .563 1.063 84.156       
25 .530 1.001 85.157       
26 .512 .967 86.124       
27 .498 .940 87.064       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
258 
 
 
 
Table 74: Reliability Statistics-Rotated Component Matrix-Cumulative Variance 
(Continued) 
 
 
 
Table 75: ANOVA Group Comparison Results for Competence of Staff (CK) 
 
CK_mean1   
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between 
Groups 
4.140 7 .591 1.888 .070 
Within 
Groups 
143.801 459 .313   
Total 147.941 466    
 
 
 
28 .452 .853 87.917       
29 .446 .841 88.758       
30 .428 .808 89.566       
31 .424 .801 90.367       
32 .421 .794 91.161       
33 .384 .724 91.885       
34 .368 .695 92.580       
35 .353 .665 93.245       
36 .350 .661 93.906       
37 .341 .643 94.549       
38 .333 .628 95.177       
39 .299 .565 95.742       
40 .270 .509 96.251       
41 .257 .484 96.735       
42 .247 .466 97.201       
43 .224 .422 97.623       
44 .218 .410 98.033       
45 .203 .383 98.416       
46 .194 .366 98.782       
47 .171 .322 99.104       
48 .150 .282 99.386       
49 .120 .226 99.612       
50 .104 .196 99.808       
51 .102 .192 100.000       
52 .000 .000 100.000       
53 .000 .000 100.000       
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
259 
 
 
 
Table 76:  Regression analysis Results for Competence of Staff – CK 
Descriptives 
CK_mean1   
 N Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Std. 
Error 
95% Confidence 
Interval for Mean 
Minimu
m 
Maxim
um 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Social and 
Civic 
180 4.084
8 
.59740 .04453 3.9970 4.1727 2.00 5.00 
Culture 
and 
Recreation 
66 4.118
2 
.59223 .07290 3.9726 4.2638 2.00 5.00 
Transport 
43 4.330
2 
.44909 .06849 4.1920 4.4684 3.40 5.00 
Economic 
Affairs 
58 4.227
9 
.51687 .06787 4.0920 4.3638 2.00 5.00 
Health 
24 4.375
0 
.35047 .07154 4.2270 4.5230 3.60 5.00 
Education 
39 4.056
4 
.68664 .10995 3.8338 4.2790 2.00 5.00 
Public 
Order 
27 4.140
7 
.45341 .08726 3.9614 4.3201 3.20 5.00 
Science 
and 
Technolog
y 
30 4.153
3 
.50291 .09182 3.9655 4.3411 3.20 5.00 
Total 
467 4.150
1 
.56344 .02607 4.0988 4.2013 2.00 5.00 
CK_mean1   
Levene 
Statistic 
df1 df2 Sig. 
1.730 7 459 .100 
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  Table 77: Post Hoc Test Results for Competence of Staff- CK 
 
Multiple Comparisons 
Dependent Variable:   CK_mean1   
LSD   
(I) Employ 
Govt Sector 
(J) Employ Govt 
Sector 
Mean 
Difference 
(I-J) 
Std. 
Error 
Sig. 95% Confidence 
Interval 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Social and 
Civic 
Culture and 
Recreation 
-.03336 .08054 .679 -.1916 .1249 
Transport -.24541
*
 .09501 .010 -.4321 -.0587 
Economic Affairs -.14308 .08451 .091 -.3092 .0230 
Health -.29018
*
 .12163 .017 -.5292 -.0512 
Education .02841 .09886 .774 -.1659 .2227 
Public Order -.05592 .11552 .629 -.2829 .1711 
Science and 
Technology 
-.06851 .11038 .535 -.2854 .1484 
Culture and 
Recreation 
Social and Civic .03336 .08054 .679 -.1249 .1916 
Transport -.21205 .10969 .054 -.4276 .0035 
Economic Affairs -.10972 .10074 .277 -.3077 .0883 
Health -.25682 .13342 .055 -.5190 .0054 
Education .06177 .11305 .585 -.1604 .2839 
Public Order -.02256 .12787 .860 -.2738 .2287 
Science and 
Technology 
-.03515 .12325 .776 -.2774 .2070 
Transport 
Social and Civic .24541
*
 .09501 .010 .0587 .4321 
Culture and 
Recreation 
.21205 .10969 .054 -.0035 .4276 
Economic Affairs .10233 .11264 .364 -.1190 .3237 
Health -.04477 .14262 .754 -.3250 .2355 
Education .27382
*
 .12377 .027 .0306 .5170 
Public Order .18949 .13744 .169 -.0806 .4596 
Science and 
Technology 
.17690 .13315 .185 -.0848 .4386 
Economic 
Affairs 
Social and Civic .14308 .08451 .091 -.0230 .3092 
Culture and 
Recreation 
.10972 .10074 .277 -.0883 .3077 
Transport -.10233 .11264 .364 -.3237 .1190 
Health -.14710 .13585 .279 -.4141 .1199 
Education .17149 .11591 .140 -.0563 .3993 
Public Order .08716 .13040 .504 -.1691 .3434 
Science and 
Technology 
.07457 .12588 .554 -.1728 .3219 
Health 
Social and Civic .29018
*
 .12163 .017 .0512 .5292 
Culture and 
Recreation 
.25682 .13342 .055 -.0054 .5190 
Transport .04477 .14262 .754 -.2355 .3250 
Economic Affairs .14710 .13585 .279 -.1199 .4141 
Education .31859
*
 .14521 .029 .0332 .6040 
261 
 
 
 
Table 77: Post hoc Test Results for Competence of Staff (CK-Continued) 
 
Public Order .23426 .15703 .136 -.0743 .5428 
Science and 
Technology 
.22167 .15329 .149 -.0796 .5229 
Education 
Social and Civic -.02841 .09886 .774 -.2227 .1659 
Culture and 
Recreation 
-.06177 .11305 .585 -.2839 .1604 
Transport -.27382
*
 .12377 .027 -.5170 -.0306 
Economic 
Affairs 
-.17149 .11591 .140 -.3993 .0563 
Health -.31859
*
 .14521 .029 -.6040 -.0332 
Public Order -.08433 .14013 .548 -.3597 .1910 
Science and 
Technology 
-.09692 .13593 .476 -.3640 .1702 
Public Order 
Social and Civic .05592 .11552 .629 -.1711 .2829 
Culture and 
Recreation 
.02256 .12787 .860 -.2287 .2738 
Transport -.18949 .13744 .169 -.4596 .0806 
Economic 
Affairs 
-.08716 .13040 .504 -.3434 .1691 
Health -.23426 .15703 .136 -.5428 .0743 
Education .08433 .14013 .548 -.1910 .3597 
Science and 
Technology 
-.01259 .14848 .932 -.3044 .2792 
Science and 
Technology 
Social and Civic .06851 .11038 .535 -.1484 .2854 
Culture and 
Recreation 
.03515 .12325 .776 -.2070 .2774 
Transport -.17690 .13315 .185 -.4386 .0848 
Economic 
Affairs 
-.07457 .12588 .554 -.3219 .1728 
Health -.22167 .15329 .149 -.5229 .0796 
Education .09692 .13593 .476 -.1702 .3640 
Public Order .01259 .14848 .932 -.2792 .3044 
*. The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level. 
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Table 78: ANOVA and Regression Results for Level of Technology (RoT) 
 
ANOVA  
RoT_mean1    
 Sum of 
Square
s 
Df Mean 
Square 
F Sig.  
Between 
Groups 
6.159 7 .880 2.26
1 
.029  
Within 
Groups 
178.593 459 .389    
Total 184.752 466     
       
 
 
 
 
  
Descriptives 
RoT_mean1   
 
N Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Std. 
Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
for Mean 
Minimu
m 
Maximu
m 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Social and Civic 180 3.6989 .66538 .04959 3.6010 3.7967 1.17 5.00 
Culture and 
Recreation 
66 3.7660 .50284 .06190 3.6423 3.8896 2.50 5.00 
Transport 43 3.7250 .73832 .11259 3.4978 3.9523 1.83 5.00 
Economic Affairs 58 3.8957 .42203 .05542 3.7847 4.0066 2.67 4.83 
Health 24 4.1655 .50166 .10240 3.9536 4.3773 3.00 5.00 
Education 39 3.7735 .70034 .11214 3.5465 4.0005 1.50 5.00 
Public Order 27 3.7346 .74716 .14379 3.4390 4.0301 1.17 5.00 
Science and 
Technology 
30 3.9000 .61370 .11205 3.6708 4.1292 2.83 5.00 
Total 467 3.7804 .62965 .02914 3.7231 3.8377 1.17 5.00 
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Table 79: Multiple Comparisons with Post hoc Test for Level of Technology (RoT) 
 
Education -.07463 .11017 .498 -.2911 .1419 
Public Order -.03570 .12873 .782 -.2887 .2173 
Science and 
Technology 
-.20113 .12301 .103 -.4429 .0406 
Culture and 
Recreation 
Social and Civic .06708 .08976 .455 -.1093 .2435 
Transport .04091 .12225 .738 -.1993 .2811 
Economic Affairs -.12970 .11227 .249 -.3503 .0909 
Health -.39952
*
 .14869 .007 -.6917 -.1073 
Education -.00755 .12598 .952 -.2551 .2400 
Public Order .03138 .14250 .826 -.2486 .3114 
Science and 
Technology 
-.13405 .13735 .330 -.4040 .1359 
Transport 
Social and Civic .02617 .10588 .805 -.1819 .2342 
Culture and 
Recreation 
-.04091 .12225 .738 -.2811 .1993 
Economic Affairs -.17061 .12553 .175 -.4173 .0761 
Health -.44043
*
 .15894 .006 -.7528 -.1281 
Education -.04846 .13793 .725 -.3195 .2226 
Public Order -.00953 .15316 .950 -.3105 .2915 
Science and 
Technology 
-.17496 .14839 .239 -.4666 .1166 
Economic Affairs 
Social and Civic .19678
*
 .09418 .037 .0117 .3819 
Culture and 
Recreation 
.12970 .11227 .249 -.0909 .3503 
Transport .17061 .12553 .175 -.0761 .4173 
Health -.26981 .15140 .075 -.5673 .0277 
Education .12215 .12917 .345 -.1317 .3760 
Public Order .16109 .14532 .268 -.1245 .4467 
Science and 
Technology 
-.00435 .14028 .975 -.2800 .2713 
Health 
Social and Civic .46659
*
 .13555 .001 .2002 .7330 
Culture and 
Recreation 
.39952
*
 .14869 .007 .1073 .6917 
Transport .44043
*
 .15894 .006 .1281 .7528 
Economic Affairs .26981 .15140 .075 -.0277 .5673 
Education .39196
*
 .16183 .016 .0739 .7100 
Public Order .43090
*
 .17499 .014 .0870 .7748 
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Table 79: Multiple Comparisons with Post hoc test for Level of Technology (RoT) 
(Continued) 
 
Education 
Social and Civic .07463 .11017 .498 -.1419 .2911 
Culture and 
Recreation 
.00755 .12598 .952 -.2400 .2551 
Transport .04846 .13793 .725 -.2226 .3195 
Economic Affairs -.12215 .12917 .345 -.3760 .1317 
Health -.39196
*
 .16183 .016 -.7100 -.0739 
Public Order .03894 .15616 .803 -.2680 .3458 
Science and 
Technology 
-.12650 .15148 .404 -.4242 .1712 
Public Order 
Social and Civic .03570 .12873 .782 -.2173 .2887 
Culture and 
Recreation 
-.03138 .14250 .826 -.3114 .2486 
Transport .00953 .15316 .950 -.2915 .3105 
Economic Affairs -.16109 .14532 .268 -.4467 .1245 
Health -.43090
*
 .17499 .014 -.7748 -.0870 
Education -.03894 .15616 .803 -.3458 .2680 
Science and 
Technology 
-.16543 .16547 .318 -.4906 .1597 
Science and 
Technology 
Social and Civic .20113 .12301 .103 -.0406 .4429 
Culture and 
Recreation 
.13405 .13735 .330 -.1359 .4040 
Transport .17496 .14839 .239 -.1166 .4666 
Economic Affairs .00435 .14028 .975 -.2713 .2800 
Health -.26547 .17083 .121 -.6012 .0702 
Education .12650 .15148 .404 -.1712 .4242 
Public Order .16543 .16547 .318 -.1597 .4906 
*. The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level. 
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Table 80: Regression and ANOVA Test Results for Awareness of Users (UA) 
 
Model Summary Table 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square  Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .013
a
 .000 -.002  .75323 
 a. Predictors: (Constant), UA_mean 
 b. Dependent Variable: CE_mean 
Residuals Statistics
a
 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value 2.7701 2.8164 2.8005 .00982 466 
Residual -1.81175 1.79904 .00000 .75242 466 
Std. Predicted Value -3.094 1.612 .000 1.000 466 
Std. Residual -2.405 2.388 .000 .999 466 
a. Dependent Variable: CE_mean 
ANOVA
a
 
Model Sum of Squares Df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 
Regression .021 1 .021 .037 .847
b
 
Residual 263.276 464 .567   
Total 263.297 465    
Dependent Variable: CE_mean 
 
Table 81: Multiple Comparisons-Tukeys HSD Results for CSE 
 
Multiple Comparisons 
Dependent Variable:   CE_mean1   
LSD   
(I) Employ Govt Sector (J) Employ Govt Sector Mean 
Difference (I-
J) 
Std. Error Sig. 95% Confidence 
Interval 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Social and Civic 
Culture and Recreation .08503 .09887 .390 -.1093 .2793 
Transport .02134 .11663 .855 -.2078 .2505 
Economic Affairs -.01878 .10374 .856 -.2226 .1851 
Health -.12158 .14931 .416 -.4150 .1718 
Education .01237 .12136 .919 -.2261 .2509 
Public Order .05040 .14180 .722 -.2283 .3291 
Science and 
Technology 
-.51718* .13550 .000 -.7834 -.2509 
Culture and Recreation 
Social and Civic -.08503 .09887 .390 -.2793 .1093 
Transport -.06368 .13465 .636 -.3283 .2009 
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Table 81: Multiple Comparisons-Tukeys HSD Results for CSE (Continued) 
 
 
Transport 
Social and Civic -.02134 .11663 .855 -.2505 .2078 
Culture and 
Recreation 
.06368 .13465 .636 -.2009 .3283 
Economic Affairs -.04012 .13827 .772 -.3118 .2316 
Health -.14293 .17507 .415 -.4870 .2011 
Education -.00898 .15193 .953 -.3075 .2896 
Public Order .02906 .16871 .863 -.3025 .3606 
Science and 
Technology 
-.53852
*
 .16345 .001 -.8597 -.2173 
Economic Affairs 
Social and Civic .01878 .10374 .856 -.1851 .2226 
Culture and 
Recreation 
.10381 .12366 .402 -.1392 .3468 
Transport .04012 .13827 .772 -.2316 .3118 
Health -.10280 .16676 .538 -.4305 .2249 
Education .03115 .14228 .827 -.2485 .3108 
Public Order .06918 .16008 .666 -.2454 .3837 
Science and 
Technology 
-.49840
*
 .15452 .001 -.8020 -.1947 
Health 
Social and Civic .12158 .14931 .416 -.1718 .4150 
Culture and 
Recreation 
.20661 .16378 .208 -.1152 .5285 
Transport .14293 .17507 .415 -.2011 .4870 
Economic Affairs .10280 .16676 .538 -.2249 .4305 
Education .13395 .17826 .453 -.2163 .4842 
Public Order .17198 .19276 .373 -.2068 .5508 
Science and 
Technology 
-.39559
*
 .18817 .036 -.7654 -.0258 
Education 
Social and Civic -.01237 .12136 .919 -.2509 .2261 
Culture and 
Recreation 
.07266 .13877 .601 -.2000 .3454 
Transport .00898 .15193 .953 -.2896 .3075 
Economic Affairs -.03115 .14228 .827 -.3108 .2485 
Health -.13395 .17826 .453 -.4842 .2163 
Public Order .03803 .17202 .825 -.3000 .3761 
Science and 
Technology 
-.52954
*
 .16686 .002 -.8574 -.2016 
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Table 81: Multiple Comparisons-Tukeys HSD Results for CSE (Continued) 
Public Order 
Social and Civic -.05040 .14180 .722 -.3291 .2283 
Culture and 
Recreation 
.03463 .15696 .825 -.2738 .3431 
Transport -.02906 .16871 .863 -.3606 .3025 
Economic Affairs -.06918 .16008 .666 -.3837 .2454 
Health -.17198 .19276 .373 -.5508 .2068 
Education -.03803 .17202 .825 -.3761 .3000 
Science and 
Technology 
-.56757
*
 .18227 .002 -.9258 -.2094 
Science and 
Technology 
Social and Civic .51718
*
 .13550 .000 .2509 .7834 
Culture and 
Recreation 
.60220
*
 .15129 .000 .3049 .8995 
Transport .53852
*
 .16345 .001 .2173 .8597 
Economic Affairs .49840
*
 .15452 .001 .1947 .8020 
Health .39559
*
 .18817 .036 .0258 .7654 
Education .52954
*
 .16686 .002 .2016 .8574 
Public Order .56757
*
 .18227 .002 .2094 .9258 
*. The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level. 
 
 
Table 82: ANOVA and Regression Results for Training of Staff  
 
Descriptives 
UT_mean   
 N Mean Std. 
Deviatio
n 
Std. 
Error 
95% Confidence 
Interval for Mean 
Minim
um 
Maxim
um 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Social and 
Civic 
180 4.0324 .66254 .04938 3.9349 4.1298 1.00 5.00 
Culture and 
Recreation 
66 3.8399 .61062 .07516 3.6898 3.9900 2.00 5.00 
Transport 43 4.1434 .53702 .08189 3.9781 4.3087 2.83 5.00 
Economic 
Affairs 
58 4.1721 .54649 .07176 4.0284 4.3158 2.40 5.00 
Health 24 4.1722 .55696 .11369 3.9370 4.4074 3.00 5.00 
Education 39 4.1299 .71781 .11494 3.8972 4.3626 2.00 5.00 
Public Order 27 3.8938 .74627 .14362 3.5986 4.1890 2.00 5.00 
Science and 
Technology 
30 4.2756 .47107 .08601 4.0997 4.4515 3.17 5.00 
Total 467 4.0557 .63273 .02928 3.9982 4.1132 1.00 5.00 
UT_mean   
Levene 
Statistic 
df1 df2 Sig. 
.885 7 459 .518 
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Table 83: Multiple Comparisons using Tukeys HSD for Training of Staff 
 
 
Multiple Comparisons 
Dependent Variable:   UT_mean   
LSD   
(I) Employ 
Govt Sector 
(J) Employ Govt 
Sector 
Mean 
Difference 
(I-J) 
Std. 
Error 
Sig. 95% Confidence 
Interval 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Social and 
Civic 
Culture and 
Recreation 
.19251
*
 .09001 .033 .0156 .3694 
Transport 
-.11103 .10617 .296 -.3197 .0976 
Economic Affairs 
-.13968 .09444 .140 -.3253 .0459 
Health 
-.13984 .13592 .304 -.4069 .1273 
Education 
-.09753 .11048 .378 -.3146 .1196 
Public Order 
.13856 .12909 .284 -.1151 .3922 
Science and 
Technology 
-.24317
*
 .12335 .049 -.4856 -.0008 
Culture and 
Recreation 
Social and Civic 
-.19251
*
 .09001 .033 -.3694 -.0156 
Transport 
-.30353
*
 .12258 .014 -.5444 -.0626 
Economic Affairs 
-.33218
*
 .11258 .003 -.5534 -.1110 
Health 
-.33235
*
 .14909 .026 -.6253 -.0394 
Education 
-.29004
*
 .12633 .022 -.5383 -.0418 
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Table 83: Multiple Comparisons using Tukeys HSD for Training of Staff 
 (Continued) 
 
 
Public Order -.05395 .14289 .706 -.3348 .2269 
Science and 
Technology 
-.43568* .13773 .002 -.7063 -.1650 
Transport 
Social and Civic .11103 .10617 .296 -.0976 .3197 
Culture and 
Recreation 
.30353* .12258 .014 .0626 .5444 
Economic Affairs -.02865 .12587 .820 -.2760 .2187 
Health -.02881 .15937 .857 -.3420 .2844 
Education .01350 .13831 .922 -.2583 .2853 
Public Order .24958 .15359 .105 -.0522 .5514 
Science and 
Technology 
-.13214 .14879 .375 -.4245 .1603 
Economic 
Affairs 
Social and Civic .13968 .09444 .140 -.0459 .3253 
Culture and 
Recreation 
.33218* .11258 .003 .1110 .5534 
Transport .02865 .12587 .820 -.2187 .2760 
Health -.00016 .15181 .999 -.2985 .2982 
Education .04215 .12953 .745 -.2124 .2967 
Public Order .27823 .14572 .057 -.0081 .5646 
Science and 
Technology 
-.10349 .14066 .462 -.3799 .1729 
Health 
Social and Civic .13984 .13592 .304 -.1273 .4069 
Culture and 
Recreation 
.33235* .14909 .026 .0394 .6253 
Transport .02881 .15937 .857 -.2844 .3420 
Economic Affairs .00016 .15181 .999 -.2982 .2985 
Education .04231 .16227 .794 -.2766 .3612 
Public Order .27840 .17547 .113 -.0664 .6232 
Science and 
Technology 
-.10333 .17130 .547 -.4400 .2333 
Education 
Social and Civic .09753 .11048 .378 -.1196 .3146 
Culture and 
Recreation 
.29004* .12633 .022 .0418 .5383 
Transport -.01350 .13831 .922 -.2853 .2583 
Economic Affairs -.04215 .12953 .745 -.2967 .2124 
Health -.04231 .16227 .794 -.3612 .2766 
Public Order .23609 .15659 .132 -.0716 .5438 
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Table 83: Multiple Comparisons using Tukeys HSD for Training of Staff 
(Continued). 
 
 
 
Science and 
Technology 
-.14564 .15190 .338 -.4441 .1529 
Public Order 
Social and Civic -.13856 .12909 .284 -.3922 .1151 
Culture and 
Recreation 
.05395 .14289 .706 -.2269 .3348 
Transport -.24958 .15359 .105 -.5514 .0522 
Economic Affairs -.27823 .14572 .057 -.5646 .0081 
Health -.27840 .17547 .113 -.6232 .0664 
Education -.23609 .15659 .132 -.5438 .0716 
Science and 
Technology 
-.38173* .16593 .022 -.7078 -.0557 
Science and 
Technology 
Social and Civic .24317
* .12335 .049 .0008 .4856 
Culture and 
Recreation 
.43568* .13773 .002 .1650 .7063 
Transport .13214 .14879 .375 -.1603 .4245 
Economic Affairs .10349 .14066 .462 -.1729 .3799 
Health .10333 .17130 .547 -.2333 .4400 
Education .14564 .15190 .338 -.1529 .4441 
Public Order .38173
* .16593 .022 .0557 .7078 
*. The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level. 
 
Table 84: ANOVA and Regression Results for Support from Management 
 
Descriptives 
SP_mean1   
 N Mean Std. 
Deviatio
n 
Std. 
Error 
95% Confidence 
Interval for Mean 
Minim
um 
Maxim
um 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Social and Civic 180 3.9062 .54478 .04061 3.8261 3.9863 2.00 5.00 
Culture and 
Recreation 
66 3.8811 .55958 .06888 3.7435 4.0187 2.60 5.00 
Transport 43 3.9831 .58383 .08903 3.8035 4.1628 2.75 5.00 
Economic 
Affairs 
58 4.0985 .50790 .06669 3.9649 4.2320 2.63 5.00 
Health 24 4.0813 .48808 .09963 3.8752 4.2873 3.13 5.00 
Education 39 3.9936 .52796 .08454 3.8224 4.1647 2.63 5.00 
Public Order 27 3.8722 .44199 .08506 3.6974 4.0471 3.13 5.00 
Science and 
Technology 
30 4.0057 .70206 .12818 3.7435 4.2678 2.38 5.00 
Total 467 3.9543 .54941 .02542 3.9044 4.0043 2.00 5.00 
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Table 85: Test of Homogeneity of Variances for Support from Management 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 86: Multiple Comparisons for Support from Management 
 
 
Culture and Recreation .21739
*
 .09867 .028 .0235 .4113 
Transport .11534 .11032 .296 -.1015 .3321 
Health .01723 .13305 .897 -.2442 .2787 
Education .10489 .11352 .356 -.1182 .3280 
Public Order .22626 .12772 .077 -.0247 .4772 
Science and 
Technology 
.09280 .12328 .452 -.1495 .3351 
Health 
Social and Civic .17507 .11913 .142 -.0590 .4092 
Culture and Recreation .20016 .13067 .126 -.0566 .4570 
Transport .09811 .13968 .483 -.1764 .3726 
Economic Affairs -.01723 .13305 .897 -.2787 .2442 
Education .08766 .14222 .538 -.1918 .3672 
Public Order .20903 .15379 .175 -.0932 .5113 
Science and 
Technology 
.07557 .15013 .615 -.2195 .3706 
Education 
Social and Civic .08741 .09683 .367 -.1029 .2777 
Culture and Recreation .11250 .11072 .310 -.1051 .3301 
Transport .01045 .12122 .931 -.2278 .2487 
Economic Affairs -.10489 .11352 .356 -.3280 .1182 
Health -.08766 .14222 .538 -.3672 .1918 
Public Order .12137 .13725 .377 -.1483 .3911 
Science and 
Technology 
-.01209 .13313 .928 -.2737 .2495 
Public Order 
Social and Civic -.03396 .11314 .764 -.2563 .1884 
Culture and Recreation -.00887 .12524 .944 -.2550 .2372 
Transport -.11092 .13461 .410 -.3754 .1536 
Economic Affairs -.22626 .12772 .077 -.4772 .0247 
Health -.20903 .15379 .175 -.5113 .0932 
Education -.12137 .13725 .377 -.3911 .1483 
Science and 
Technology 
-.13346 .14542 .359 -.4192 .1523 
Science and 
Technology 
Social and Civic .09951 .10811 .358 -.1129 .3120 
Culture and Recreation .12460 .12071 .303 -.1126 .3618 
Transport .02254 .13041 .863 -.2337 .2788 
Economic Affairs -.09280 .12328 .452 -.3351 .1495 
Health -.07557 .15013 .615 -.3706 .2195 
Education .01209 .13313 .928 -.2495 .2737 
Public Order .13346 .14542 .359 -.1523 .4192 
 
 
SP_mean1   
Levene Statistic df1 df2 Sig. 
1.185 7 459 .310 
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Table 87: Test of Homogeneity of Variances for User Awareness 
UA_mean   
Levene Statistic df1 df2 Sig. 
1.514 7 458 .160 
 
Table 88: Test of Homogeneity of Variances for Cybersecurity Effectiveness 
Variable 
 
CE_mean1   
Levene Statistic df1 df2 Sig. 
1.894 7 459 .069 
CE_mean1   
 Sum of Squares Df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 6.286 7 .898 2.371 .022 
Within Groups 173.844 459 .379   
Total 180.131 466    
 
Table 89: Multiple Comparisons using Tukeys HSD for Cybersecurity Effectiveness 
(CSE) 
 
Multiple Comparisons 
Dependent Variable:   CSE_mean1   
(I) Employ Govt Sector (J) Employ Govt 
Sector 
Mean Difference 
(I-J) 
Std. 
Error 
Sig. 95% Confidence Interval 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Social and Civic 
Culture and 
Recreation 
.02374 .08856 .789 -.1503 .1978 
Transport -.15005 .10446 .152 -.3553 .0552 
Economic Affairs -.16158 .09292 .083 -.3442 .0210 
Health -.12020 .13374 .369 -.3830 .1426 
Education .00928 .10870 .932 -.2043 .2229 
Public Order .25943
*
 .12701 .042 .0098 .5090 
Science and 
Technology 
-.27687
*
 .12136 .023 -.5154 -.0384 
Culture and 
Recreation 
Social and Civic -.02374 .08856 .789 -.1978 .1503 
Transport -.17378 .12061 .150 -.4108 .0632 
Economic Affairs -.18531 .11076 .095 -.4030 .0324 
Health -.14394 .14670 .327 -.4322 .1443 
Education -.01445 .12430 .907 -.2587 .2298 
Public Order .23569 .14059 .094 -.0406 .5120 
Science and 
Technology 
-.30061
*
 .13551 .027 -.5669 -.0343 
 
273 
 
 
 
Table 89: Multiple Comparisons using Tukeys HSD for Cybersecurity Effectiveness 
(CSE)- (Continued) 
 
Transport 
Social and Civic .15005 .10446 .152 -.0552 .3553 
Culture and Recreation .17378 .12061 .150 -.0632 .4108 
Economic Affairs -.01153 .12385 .926 -.2549 .2318 
Health .02984 .15681 .849 -.2783 .3380 
Education .15933 .13609 .242 -.1081 .4268 
Public Order .40947
* .15111 .007 .1125 .7064 
Science and Technology -.12682 .14640 .387 -.4145 .1609 
Economic Affairs 
Social and Civic .16158 .09292 .083 -.0210 .3442 
Culture and Recreation .18531 .11076 .095 -.0324 .4030 
Transport .01153 .12385 .926 -.2318 .2549 
Health .04137 .14937 .782 -.2522 .3349 
Education .17086 .12744 .181 -.0796 .4213 
Public Order .42100
* .14338 .003 .1392 .7028 
Science and Technology -.11529 .13840 .405 -.3873 .1567 
Health 
Social and Civic .12020 .13374 .369 -.1426 .3830 
Culture and Recreation .14394 .14670 .327 -.1443 .4322 
Transport -.02984 .15681 .849 -.3380 .2783 
Economic Affairs -.04137 .14937 .782 -.3349 .2522 
Education .12949 .15966 .418 -.1843 .4432 
Public Order .37963
* .17265 .028 .0403 .7189 
Science and Technology -.15667 .16854 .353 -.4879 .1745 
Education 
Social and Civic -.00928 .10870 .932 -.2229 .2043 
Culture and Recreation .01445 .12430 .907 -.2298 .2587 
Transport -.15933 .13609 .242 -.4268 .1081 
Economic Affairs -.17086 .12744 .181 -.4213 .0796 
Health -.12949 .15966 .418 -.4432 .1843 
Public Order .25014 .15407 .105 -.0526 .5529 
Science and Technology -.28615 .14945 .056 -.5799 .0075 
Public Order 
Social and Civic -.25943
* .12701 .042 -.5090 -.0098 
Culture and Recreation -.23569 .14059 .094 -.5120 .0406 
Transport -.40947
* .15111 .007 -.7064 -.1125 
Economic Affairs -.42100
* .14338 .003 -.7028 -.1392 
Health -.37963
* .17265 .028 -.7189 -.0403 
Education -.25014 .15407 .105 -.5529 .0526 
Science and Technology -.53630
* .16326 .001 -.8571 -.2155 
Science and Technology 
Social and Civic .27687
* .12136 .023 .0384 .5154 
Culture and Recreation .30061
* .13551 .027 .0343 .5669 
Transport .12682 .14640 .387 -.1609 .4145 
Economic Affairs .11529 .13840 .405 -.1567 .3873 
Health .15667 .16854 .353 -.1745 .4879 
Education .28615 .14945 .056 -.0075 .5799 
Public Order .53630
* .16326 .001 .2155 .8571 
*. The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level. 
 
 
 
